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Summary 
The temporal binding effect was first reported by Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras 
(2002) as a shift in the perceived times of intentional actions and their effects toward one 
another, and the compression of the perceived interval between them. Research has since 
shown causal inferences to be necessary for temporal binding to occur (e.g., Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009), with some suggesting that the effect results from the perception of 
causality alone (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002). 
Despite the importance of causality, the mechanisms by which it contributes to 
temporal binding have received little attention, with the perception of agency being the focus 
of most temporal binding research. In particular, the role of phenomenal causality has been 
almost entirely overlooked. Phenomenal causality refers to causal impressions formed 
visually (Michotte, 1964/63). To date, only one study had made use of visual stimuli giving 
rise to phenomenal causality to investigate temporal binding (Cravo, Claessens & Baldo, 
2009) and no distinction between inferred and phenomenal causality had been made in 
theoretical accounts of the effect. 
This thesis aimed to investigate temporal binding in phenomenal causality with the 
use of visual stimuli novel to temporal binding research. In experiments 1-6 (Chapter 3) 
participants provided causal impressions and temporal judgements in response to these 
stimuli. These experiments found no clear effect of phenomenal causality on the perceived 
delay intervals between perceived causes and effects. Contrary to the predictions of most 
accounts of temporal binding, experiment 6 found no evidence for temporal binding in 
phenomenal causality when intentional actions were present. Experiments 7 and 8 (Chapter 
4) investigated temporal binding in inferred causality to test for the possible role of non-
causal perceptual influences on the findings of experiments 1-6, such as predictability and 
the use of visual stimuli. No evidence was found for several such alternative explanations. 
iv 
 
While alternative explanations cannot be entirely ruled out, the findings presented 
here suggest that temporal binding does not necessarily occur due to phenomenal causality 
in the stimuli used in experiments 1-6. Future research using a greater variety of stimuli may 
confirm whether this is general to phenomenal causality or specific to certain stimuli or types 
of visual causal impressions. The findings of experiments 1-6 were not predicted by existing 
theoretical accounts of temporal binding, suggesting amendments to these accounts are 
required. 
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1. Chapter 1: Temporal Contiguity and Causality 
Causal reasoning has a pivotal role in daily life. It guides us beyond reacting to 
events through association alone; it allows us to predict future events and manipulate our 
surroundings and informs our decision-making. Simple tasks may require the understanding 
of multiple, and at times complex, causal structures. For instance, the making of a cup of tea 
requires the knowledge that the flicking of a switch on the kettle will heat its contents, on the 
condition that it must be filled with water and plugged into an electrical supply to produce hot 
water. We understand that the kettle heats the water, rather than the other way around, and 
that all three conditions are necessary for this sequence of events to take place. We are able 
to make these inferences despite the temporal delay between the flicking of the switch and 
the boiling of the water. Beyond the mundane, causal reasoning has enabled humans to 
develop science, medicine and engineering. 
Although causal reasoning is crucial to our understanding of the world, how causality 
is inferred and perceived has long vexed philosophers and has been the subject of much 
scientific research. Causality cannot be perceived directly; it cannot be sensed or measured 
by any organ or scientific instrument. Instead, causal relationships are inferred and 
perceived through probabilistic, temporal and spatial cues, in addition to knowledge of 
causal structures and mechanisms. David Hume (1739/1978, as cited in Buehner, 2002) 
famously conjectured on the cues used to infer causality. Contingency refers to the 
probability of an event taking place in the presence of another; e.g. the flicking of a switch 
will usually be followed by a light switching on and the light does not usually switch on when 
the switch is not turned, allowing the inference that the switch causes the light to switch on. 
Temporal priority refers the temporal order of cause effect; cause must always precede 
effect. Returning to the light switch example, if the light turned on before the flicking of the 
switch the switch one would be unlikely to infer that the switch caused this to happen. 
Finally, temporal and spatial contiguity refer the temporal and spatial distance between 
cause and effect. The closer (more contiguous) they are in space and time, the more likely a 
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causal relationship is to be perceived. For instance, the longer the delay between the flicking 
of a switch and a light turning on, the less likely an observer would be to infer that the switch 
caused the light to switch on. Likewise, if a lightbulb turned on in the next house rather than 
in the same room, a similar inference would be made.  
These cues – contingency, temporal priority and contiguity – have informed much 
psychological research of causal reasoning. This section, and indeed the remainder of the 
thesis, is primarily concerned with the role of temporal contiguity in causal reasoning and 
perception. Below is a discussion of the existing research on temporal contiguity and causal 
inference. 
1.1. The effect of temporal contiguity on causal inferences 
Hume’s observation that temporally contiguous events are more likely to be judged 
as causally related has more recently been evidenced by experimental findings. Studies 
have found that, all else being equal, contiguity indeed leads to stronger causal judgements. 
Shanks, Pearson and Dickinson (1989) investigated this in several experiments (experiment 
1a and b) and found participants made higher causal judgements when their actions were 
followed immediately by an outcome than when the outcome occurred following a delay. In 
these experiments participants’ keypresses always produced an outcome (a triangle flashing 
on a computer screen) with a probability of 75%, while the probability of the same event 
occurring in the absence of a keypress and the delay between the keypress and outcome 
was varied between conditions. In all conditions participants were asked to report the 
likelihood of the outcome following a keypress (contingency judgements), used here as a 
measure of causal judgements. In both experiments, these judgements were close to the 
real contingencies in the absence of a delay, whereas judgements were significantly reduced 
by the inclusion of a temporal delay. Similarly, experiments 2 and 3 found that the longer the 
delay, the lower the causal judgements were. These findings have since been replicated in 
several studies (e.g. Reed, 1992; 2009). It should be noted that these experiments never 
made use of 100% contingencies, meaning participants could never be entirely certain that 
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their keypresses caused the outcome. More importantly, it was clear to participants that it 
was possible for the outcome event to occur, at least some of the time, without the cause, 
meaning that if a temporal delay was present there was an increased likelihood that the 
outcome had occurred due to an event other than the keypress, occurring between the 
keypress and the outcome. In contrast, on blocks in which there was no delay between 
keypresses and their outcomes, any visual flash which did not occur immediately following 
the keypress was very unlikely to have occurred due to the keypress and every visual flash 
which occurred immediately following a keypress was unlikely to have done so by chance 
alone. It is possible, therefore, that the differences found in contingency ratings were due to 
the uncertainty introduced by the inclusion of a temporal delay, rather than because of 
inferences made due to temporal delays.  
1.2. The interaction between temporal contiguity and expected delays 
Several studies have elaborated on the findings discussed above by investigating the 
roles of temporal contiguity and knowledge of causal mechanisms, as well as their 
interactions. These found that, in adult participants, the effect of temporal contiguity can be 
mediated or even reversed by knowledge of causal mechanisms. This was demonstrated in 
a series of experiments by Buehner and May (2002, 2003 & 2004). In their 2002 study, 
participants took part in a similar procedure to the one used by Shanks et al (1989) but 
presented with several scenarios influencing the expected delay between their actions and 
their outcomes. In Experiments 1 and 2 (within- and between-subjects, respectively) these 
were the lightbulb scenario (switch flick – light turning on) and grenade scenario (the firing of 
a grenade launcher – explosion at a distance). A pilot study found the median expected 
delays in these scenarios were 0 and 8 seconds, respectively. Both actions were simulated 
using a keypress, resulting in visual and auditory stimuli simulating the outcomes. These 
scenarios were tested using different delays between actions and outcomes: 0, 2 or 5 
seconds in experiment 1, and 0 or 5 seconds in experiment 2. After each block of trials 
participants were asked to estimate the contingency between the action and outcome. The 
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results of both experiments showed an overall trend of lower contingency ratings when 
temporal contiguity was lower, but a greater effect of delays in the lightbulb scenarios. 
Experiment 3 made use of the grenade scenario alone, with different causal mechanisms 
offered; remote controlled explosion (short expected delay) and a grenade launcher (longer 
expected delay). Again, causal ratings were moderated by delays in both scenarios, with a 
greater effect in the remote-control scenario.  
This was replicated by Buehner and May (2003) in the absence of a cover story. 
Here, participants were simply either instructed to expect some delay or were given no such 
instructions. Again, the expectation of a delay mitigated the effect of temporal contiguity on 
contingency ratings. A further study (Buehner & May, 2004) used a similar procedure with 
two lightbulb scenarios: one involving regular lightbulb and the other an energy-saving 
lightbulb, which takes longer to switch on. Participants reported causal ratings between 0 
and 100. Here, temporal contiguity was only found to increase causal ratings in the lightbulb 
scenario. These studies suggest that while temporal contiguity leads to higher impressions 
of contingency and causality, this effect is dependent on the expected delay between cause 
and effect. This may have influenced the findings of Shanks et al (1989) and Reed (1992, 
1999), as typically keypresses result in a swift response by the computer, rather than a 
several-second delay. Interestingly, immediate outcomes did not reduce causal and 
contingency judgements when participants were instructed to expect a delay, despite the 
converse being true – judgements were reduced by longer-than-expected delays. This 
suggest that while the effects of temporal contiguity on causal judgements are moderated by 
the expectation of a delay, they are not necessarily eliminated altogether.  
One limitation of these studies, however, is the use of simulated causal interactions. 
It is not clear whether these findings resulted from participants imagining the scenarios given 
and their understanding of the causal mechanism, or simply responding being instructed to 
expect a delay (as in Buehner and May, 2003). Participants were not able to observe the 
actual causal mechanism responsible for the cause-outcome sequences and were fully 
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aware that the stimuli were controlled by a computer programme. Buehner and McGregor 
(2006) addressed this with the use of physical apparatus implying real causal structures 
containing different delay intervals and found that shorter-than-expected delays did result in 
lower causal ratings. This experiment made use of a Bernoulli board, whereby balls dropped 
into the apparatus slide along it, hitting pins along the way with a 50% chance of falling 
either to the right or the left of each pin. The outcome of this event is probabilistic; the ball is 
most likely to emerge near the centre of the apparatus and less likely to emerge at the 
peripheries. Upon emerging, the ball had some likelihood of triggering a light switch 
(manipulated between conditions, repeated measures). The tilt of the apparatus was also 
manipulated between conditions to determine the delay between the ball being dropped and 
the light switching on (approximately 1,300 and 2,500ms for the two levels of tilt used in this 
study). The majority of the apparatus was hidden from view during experimental trials, such 
that participants could see the tilt of the apparatus but not the progress of the ball along it. In 
experimental trials the duration of the delay was in fact controlled by a switch operated by 
the experimenter, of which the participants were not aware. In two experiments, participants 
made contingency judgements of the extent to which the light switching on was contingent 
on the experimenter dropping a ball into the apparatus. In contrast in previous experiments 
(Buehner & May 2002, 2003 & 2004), contingency judgements were lower when the delay 
was shorter than expected, indicating that temporal contiguity can result in a reduction in 
causal inferences when a delay is expected. This may have occurred because participants 
had a full understanding of the causal mechanism presented and the knowledge that, given 
this mechanism, certain delays were not feasible given the tilt of the apparatus. Here, causal 
knowledge appears to have fully mediated the effect of temporal cues on contingency 
judgements; the duration of delays increased or decreased contingency judgements based 
on how well it fit prior expectations based on the causal mechanism, rather than temporal 
contiguity leading to higher judgements. By implication, temporal contiguity may only 
contribute to causal inferences when it is expected, or at least feasible, based on the 
observer’s knowledge of the causal mechanism. Overall, the available evidence suggests 
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that, in adults, temporal contiguity contributes to causal judgements but does not take 
presence over the knowledge of causal mechanisms and contingency. Furthermore, in some 
circumstances, such as in Buehner and May’s studies and in Buehner and McGregor’s 
study, temporal contiguity does not lead to higher causal impressions.  
However, developmental studies (Mandelson & Shultz, 1976; Schlottmann, 1999) 
have found that in young children temporal cues take precedence over causal knowledge in 
determining causal inferences. Such findings suggest that temporal contiguity is an 
important early cue in causal learning, whereas the use of causal knowledge develops later. 
Mendelson and Shultz (1976) used the following sequence of events: a marble (A) was 
dropped into a box. Following a 5-second delay, a second marble (B) was dropped into a 
different aperture in the same box, followed by the ringing of a bell. The children, aged 
between 4 and 7 years, were then shown several sequences, in which marble A alone was 
dropped resulting in the bell ringing after 5 seconds and marble B was dropped with no 
consequence. Children were asked which of the two balls caused the bell to ring after each 
observation. The children were either informed that the marble causes the bell to ring (in 
reality, the bell was controlled electronically) by sliding along a runway or were given no 
model at all. Causal attribution was measured by asking the children several questions 
regarding the mechanism, e.g. whether the bell would ring if marble A was dropped, whether 
it would ring if marble B was dropped, etc. Surprisingly, covariation did not appear to affect 
causal judgments; children showed an overall preference for marble B as the cause of the 
bell ringing, even after being shown marble B dropping into the apparatus with no 
consequence. Children made more correct causal judgements when given a model 
explaining the delay, but most still failed to identify the correct causal mechanism (mean 
scores of 2.06 and 1.09 out of 5 with and without models, respectively).  
Schlottmann (1999) presented children aged between 5 and 10 years with a similar 
problem. Children were offered one of two explanations for how one marble may cause the 
bell to ring (experiment 2). The first was that the second marble drops onto a seesaw 
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causing the bell to ring almost immediately, and the second involved first marble sliding 
down a runway resulting in a longer delay (Mendelson and Shultz, 1976). After each stage of 
the experiment children were asked questions about the apparatus and causal mechanism. 
Participant responses suggested that participants of all ages showed a preference for the 
more temporally contiguous event (the second marble dropped) when determining which 
marble had caused the bell to ring. Following explanation of the true causal mechanism (half 
of the participants were assigned to the seesaw condition and half to the runway condition), 
adults made correct causal attributions whereas children reverted to a preference for the 
second, more temporally contiguous marble regardless of the true mechanism and despite 
previously demonstrating an understanding of the causal mechanism. Such findings suggest 
that while adults rely on causal knowledge and contingency cues to inform causal 
judgements, children show a greater preference for temporal cues. Temporal contiguity, 
therefore, appears to be of fundamental importance to causal reasoning, taking precedence 
over other, more complex cues in early life and remaining a useful cue to causality into 
adulthood. These findings further suggest that temporal contiguity itself informs causal 
inferences, rather than doing so only by affecting contingency judgements. In early life at 
least, outcomes are expected to be temporally contiguous to their causes, even when this is 
not the plausible based on the causal mechanism. 
1.3. The effect of temporal contiguity on phenomenal causality 
Phenomenal causality refers to visual impressions of causality. These are distinct 
from the causal judgements described above; phenomenal causality is perceived rather than 
inferred. This impression is automatic and does not require multiple exposures or causal 
learning. Crucially, the effect persists despite the observer’s explicit knowledge that the 
events taking place in the visual stimulus are not causally related (Scholl & Tremoulet, 
2000). The most extensively studied example of phenomenal causality is the “launching 
effect”, first reported by Michotte (1946/63) in a series of studies. At the beginning of the 
sequence an object, e.g. a disc, is seen at the centre of the screen (target). A second object 
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(launcher) moves across the screen towards the target. Upon collision, the launcher stops, 
and the target begins to move in the same direction as the launcher, at a similar or slower 
speed. Participants typically report this animation as appearing causal in nature, i.e. the 
impression that the launcher caused the target to move, in spontaneous reports, forced 
choice questions and on rating scales. This occurs despite the stimuli being abstract, two-
dimensional representations. Michotte and others have reported various characteristics of 
the stimuli which lead to changes in the magnitude of causal impressions, as well as the 
qualitative nature of the impression (see Hubbard, 2013 for a review of phenomenal 
causality stimuli and variations). Some are distinct from the cues used to infer causal 
relationships. Additionally, covariation across trials in particular is not necessary for these 
visual impressions to take place; participants still report impressions of a “launch”, even 
when they had observed the same launcher object failing to move the target on other 
occasions (Shlottmann & Shanks, 1992).  
Nevertheless, some Humean cues are necessary for phenomenal causality to take 
place. The cause is generally assumed to precede the effect, i.e. it is the launcher that 
perceived to cause the target to move, rather than the converse. Similarly, spatial and, of 
particular importance here, temporal contiguity are necessary for phenomenal causality to 
occur. A number of studies using a variety of measures, discussed below, have repeatedly 
found reduced launching impressions when a delay is introduced between the stopping of 
the launcher and movement of the target object. Unlike in experiments concerning inferred 
causality, discussed in the previous section, visual causal impressions appear much more 
sensitive to temporal delays. 
The effects of temporal contiguity were first reported by Michotte (1946/1963, 
experiment 29), who presented participants with launching stimuli containing varying delays 
(0-224ms) between the stopping of the launcher and the onset of the target’s movement. He 
found that launching impressions were reported more than 50% of the time in delays of up to 
70ms, and not at all at delays longer than 126ms. “Delayed launch” impressions were 
9 
 
reported more than 50% of the time for delays ranging from 84ms to 140ms. Lastly, 
participants reported the perception of two distinct movements (causally unrelated) over 50% 
of the time in delays or 140ms or longer, and 90% of the time in delays of 147s or longer. 
This was replicated by Yela (1952), who reported reduced causal impressions due to delays 
between the “collision” and “launch”. Launching impressions were reported 100% of the time 
with delays of under 50ms and the majority of the time in delays up to 83ms. Impressions of 
two distinct movements were reported over 50% of the time in delays over 150ms. These 
studies found that participants tolerated similarly small ranges of delay durations before 
causal impressions were largely eliminated (up to 140-150ms). Perceived causality appears 
to show a greater sensitivity to temporal delays between cause and effect than inferred 
causality. 
It should be noted that Michotte’s (1946/1963) and Yela’s (1952) studies contained 
some methodological flaws. Both used small sample sizes (3 and 5 participants, 
respectively) and lack inferential statistics. Furthermore, spontaneous reports are limited in 
scope; participant responses are analysed categorically and do not allow an analysis of the 
strength of causal impressions. Nevertheless, further research has replicated these findings. 
Evidence from several studies suggests that, at low ranges of temporal delays, causal 
ratings decrease as delays increase, with causal ratings falling below the midpoint of causal 
impression scales beginning at delay intervals of 100-150ms. Schlottmann and Shanks 
(1992, experiment 1) presented participants with launching animations with delays varying 
between 17ms and 289ms in intervals of 68ms. Participants reported causal impressions on 
a sliding scale (300-point resolution). Mean causal ratings decreased as the delay between 
the collision and launch increased, with mean ratings dipping below the midpoint of the scale 
(150) in delays of 153ms or longer. Other studies have found causal ratings to fall below the 
midpoint of a causal rating scale in delays over 105ms (White, 2014; experiment 2) and over 
100ms (Guski & Troje, 2003).  
10 
 
The effects of temporal delays on causal ratings appear to be context-dependent, 
however, and as such there is no fixed threshold for the elimination of causal impressions 
due to temporal delays. Several experiments have found higher causal ratings in delayed 
launch animations when participants had prior exposure to longer intervals. Powesland 
(1959, experiment 2) used presented launching animations with varying delay intervals to 
find the threshold at which participants report a causal impression 50% of the time (binary 
responses). Participants were tested before and after a treatment period in which they were 
presented with launching animations with no delays, long delays or no stimuli. Post-test 
thresholds decreased for participants who had observed launching stimuli with no temporal 
delay and increased for those exposed to longer delays, suggesting some habituation to 
delay durations. The thresholds ranged between 131.94ms to 156.25ms between groups in 
the pre-tests. Participants exposed to longer delays later showed a 38.19ms increase in their 
thresholds, while those exposed to no-delay stimuli showed a 41.67ms decrease in their 
thresholds. No significant change was found for participants who did not observe any 
additional stimuli, and those who were not required to respond to stimuli in the treatment 
period. These results were replicated by Brown and Miles (1968) who found participants 
were more likely to perceive a launching event in delayed launches when they had 
previously observed longer delay intervals. Young, Rogers and Beckman (2005, experiment 
1) presented participants with animations containing different combinations of temporal and 
spatial gaps between the launching objects. Participants who performed the causal rating 
task first (i.e. with less prior exposure) reported much higher causal ratings for delayed 
launches when no spatial gap was present, with intervals remaining at or above the midpoint 
of the rating scale in delays between 0 and 2,000ms. In addition, in this experiment delayed 
launches may have appeared more causal in nature in contrast with other animations, in 
contrast with other experiments in which participants had only been exposed to launching 
animations containing varying delays. 
11 
 
Nevertheless, the studies described above have repeatedly demonstrated a 
subtractive effect of delays on launching impressions. This finding has been established to 
the extent that delayed launches can be used as a non-causal control condition (e.g. 
Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). While context can moderate this effect, delays between 
cause and effect reduce launching impressions across different ranges of delays. Temporal 
contiguity, as Hume conjectured, appears to be an important cue to causal reasoning and 
perception, all else being equal. While temporal contiguity contributes to both causal 
inferences and visual causal impressions, the research literature to date has also found 
some differences between the two. Although temporal contiguity tends to lead to greater 
causal inferences, these inferences can be over temporal delays of indefinite durations, 
provided contingency cues and a causal mechanism are provided which allow such an 
inference to be made. In contrast, temporal contiguity appears to be essential to visual 
causal impressions, with causal impressions decreasing sharply due to sub-second delay 
intervals. 
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2. Chapter 2: Temporal Binding 
Past research has revealed several ways in which the perception of time affects our 
experience of causality (see previous chapter) and agency (e.g. Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert, 
1999). The temporal binding effect, first reported by Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras (2002), 
suggests an additional line of investigation: can our perception of causality and agency affect 
our perception of time? And, if so, how and why? The temporal binding effect has since 
attracted significant interest from researchers, both for its potential in helping us understand 
the role of time in the perception of causality and agency, and for its potential use as an 
implicit measure of causality and/or agency. Temporal binding has been referred to by 
several names in the past, including “intentional binding” (Haggard et al., 2002) and “causal 
binding” (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). As these terms imply a theoretical position 
regarding the mechanism behind the effect, it will be referred to here by the more neutral 
term, “temporal binding”. 
In Haggard et al.’s original study (2002) temporal binding was reported as “intentional 
binding”: the shift in the perceived time of actions toward their consequences, the perceived 
time of consequences toward the actions that caused them, and a compression of the 
perceived interval between actions and their consequences. Nine participants took part in all 
four baseline and three experimental conditions. Timing judgements were recorded using a 
Libet clock (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983). In each trial, participants overserved a 
fast-moving clock (2,560ms per revolution), marked with “5-minute” intervals between 0 and 
60. Participants were asked to report the times at which various events occurred using the 
markings on the clock. Different conditions were presented in separate blocks of 40 trials. In 
baseline trials participants reported the position of the clock hand at the onset of one of four 
events. In voluntary action trials condition participants performed a lever press on each trial 
and asked to report the time of the lever press. In involuntary action trials a movement of the 
participant’s finger onto the lever was induced using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
and participants were asked to report the time of the finger movement. In sham-TMS trials, 
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used as a control condition for involuntary action trials, TMS was delivered over a brain 
region that did not produce any muscle movement and participants were asked to report the 
time at which the TMS was delivered. Finally, in tone trials participants heard a tone and 
were asked to report the position of the clock hand at the onset of the tone. Participants 
were asked to make spontaneous finger movements during voluntary action trials, and the 
onset of the tones and TMS occurred at a random time after each trial began. 
In operant conditions the participant’s movement (voluntary or TMS-induced), or 
sham-TMS, were followed by a tone after 250 milliseconds. Participants were asked to 
report the clock hand position at the time of either the first event (action or sham-TMS) or 
tone, in separate blocks of 40 trials. Baseline judgement errors were computed as the 
difference between the estimate and the actual position of the clock hand during the judged 
event. These single-event baseline judgements were subtracted from the judgements made 
in the corresponding two-event conditions to produce the estimate errors. Haggard et al. 
found that when voluntary actions were followed by a tone, participants perceived their 
action as occurring later, and the tone as occurring earlier, compared with the single-event 
baseline. Therefore, the action and outcome were perceived as occurring closer in time. In 
the involuntary conditions, Haggard et al. found the opposite: a repulsion effect whereby the 
action was perceived as occurring earlier and the outcome as occurring later, compared with 
baseline measures. The sham-TMS condition showed neither a binding nor a repulsion 
effect. This pattern of findings showed a shift in the perceived times of keypresses and their 
consequences toward one another in operant, intentional action conditions relative to both 
baseline measures and non-intentional operant conditions.  
 Temporal binding can be observed in two main forms: event perception and interval 
perception. Haggard et al.’s (2002) study demonstrated shifts in the perceived times of a 
voluntary action and its consequence toward one another. Other studies using measures of 
interval rather than event perception (e.g. Humphreys & Buehner, 2009) have demonstrated 
that temporal binding also manifests as a shortening of the perceived time interval between 
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a voluntary action and its consequence (although it should be noted that they argued that 
this is the result of causality, rather than voluntary action, see Section 2.3). In both cases 
temporal binding observed as a shift in event or interval perception, relative to other 
subjective impressions. Temporal binding can be observed, for instance, if the interval 
between two events is overestimated relative to physical reality, but underestimated relative 
to a single-event baseline, or a sequence of two causally unrelated events (e.g. the sham-
TMS condition in Haggard et al., 2002). Although these two forms of temporal binding do 
show some differences and may arise from different cognitive mechanisms to an extent, 
theoretical accounts of temporal binding generally see both as arising from similar causes, 
e.g. intentionality in intentional binding accounts and causality in the causal binding account. 
As such, the theoretical implications of findings from studies investigating event and interval 
perception will be discussed alongside one another where appropriate in this thesis. 
However, it should be borne in mind that event perception findings may not necessarily be 
applicable to interval perception, and vice versa. 
2.1. Replications of temporal binding  
Temporal binding has been observed repeatedly, although the exact magnitude of 
the effect varies between different experiments and methodological differences such as 
delay intervals and measures (see Section 2.2). This section describes the evidence for the 
existence temporal binding to date, as well as the existing variations and research 
techniques used to study it. 
Temporal binding has been replicated repeatedly with the use of Libet clocks (e.g. 
Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2011; Dogge, Schaap, Custers, Wegner and Aarts, 2012; 
Moore & Haggard, 2008; Ruess, Tomaschke & Kiesel, 2017, Wohlschlager, Engbert & 
Haggard, 2003). In addition, the negative (i.e. backward) shift in the perceived time of the 
consequence of an action has been demonstrated using a variety of measures of event 
perception, including a key synchronisation task, in which participants were instructed to 
press a key at the same time as the target event (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). This 
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negative shift has also been demonstrated using simultaneity judgements, whereby 
participants were instructed to judge whether a visual event embedded between the key 
press and tone, or occurring after the tone, occurred simultaneously with the tone (Cravo, 
Claessens & Baldo, 2011). This study found lower points of subjective simultaneity (PSS) 
when the tone was caused by intentional action, compared with a non-causal sequence of 
events. This indicates that the embedded event had to occur earlier in order to be perceived 
as simultaneous with the tone, and that the tone was therefore perceived as occurring 
earlier. Although Cravo et al.’s study only investigated the shift in the perceived time of the 
outcome and not the action, such replications have demonstrated the robustness of the 
temporal binding effect, which appears to be replicable across a variety of event perception 
measures. 
Similarly, a contraction in the perceived interval between intentional actions and their 
effects has been demonstrated using a variety of measures. Interval perception has primarily 
been investigated using interval estimations, in which participants made direct estimates of 
temporal delays in milliseconds (e.g. Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Moore, Wegner & 
Haggard, 2009). Other studies have made use of interval reproduction tasks, whereby 
participants held down a key for the perceived duration of a delay (Humphreys & Buehner, 
2010). Further evidence comes from the use of the method of constant stimuli (Nolden, 
Haering & Kiesel, 2012), where participants judged whether delays were greater or smaller 
than a comparison interval (tones of varying durations). Lower points of subjective equality 
(PSE), i.e. shorter delays were perceived as equal in duration to the delay between action 
and outcome, were found when participants performed an action that caused a visual 
stimulus to appear, compared with the passive condition, in which a key “popped up” against 
the participant’s finger, followed by the same delays and visual stimuli.  
 The examples discussed above demonstrate the range of event perception and 
interval estimation measures which had been successfully used to replicate the temporal 
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binding effect. Despite this, to date, Libet clocks and interval estimation have been used in 
the majority of temporal binding studies, and indeed the majority of studies discussed here. 
2.1.1. Replications of temporal binding with non-auditory outcome 
events 
To date, the majority of temporal binding studies have used a tone as the outcome 
stimulus. This may in part be because the use of auditory stimuli allows the use of Libet 
clocks without causing participants to shift their attention from the clock, and without drawing 
participants’ attention away from the outcome stimulus. Nevertheless, several studies have 
found evidence for temporal binding with visual outcomes with a variety of measures, 
although usually not with the use of a Libet clock (see Ruess et al., 2018, for a more detailed 
discussion). Nevertheless, Ruess et al. (2018) found outcome binding of visual stimuli, 
compared with a single-event baseline, in delay intervals ranging between 150 and 650ms. 
A Libet clock was used, with a change in the colour of the clock face as result of a keypress 
serving as the outcome. A significant forward shift compared with the single-event baseline 
was found in all time intervals. However, a second experiment found greater outcome 
binding in auditory outcome stimuli (a brief tone) compared with visual outcome stimuli.  
Temporal binding between actions and outcomes, measured using an interval 
estimation task, was also found by Engbert, Wohlschlager and Haggard (2008) when using 
auditory (experiment 1), visual (experiment 2) and tactile (experiment 3) outcome stimuli. In 
all experiments lower interval estimates were found when participants performed voluntary 
actions (lever presses), as opposed to passive movements, whereby the participant’s finger 
was pulled down with the lever, followed by the outcome stimulus. Other evidence for 
temporal binding between voluntary action and tactile response, using an interval estimation 
procedure, was reported by Engbert, Wohlschlager, Thomas and Haggard (2007). In this 
study, evidence was found for temporal binding with tactile stimuli (vibration), both when 
applied to the participant’s finger and when participants observed same stimulus applied to 
the experimenter’s finger.  
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The existing literature has repeatedly replicated temporal binding between actions 
and auditory, visual and tactile outcome events and no studies published to date have failed 
to find temporal binding when using non-auditory outcome stimuli. However, while a variety 
of outcome stimuli have been used in temporal binding experiments, there is far less variety 
in the types of actions studied; intentional actions in such studies have been almost entirely 
limited to lever- or key-presses. Key and lever presses are markedly different from other 
real-world intentional actions in being swift and producing a discrete outcome accompanied 
by tactile feedback. Other intentional actions may be longer in duration and have continuous 
outcomes. At the time of writing it is not clear whether such differences may affect temporal 
binding and how they might do so. The findings discussed here suggest that non-auditory 
outcome stimuli are appropriate in studying temporal binding, with the qualification that the 
role of the sensory modality of the preceding event is less well-understood.  
2.2. Mechanisms of temporal binding 
In the seventeen years since temporal binding was first reported, much work has 
been done to shed light on how the effect manifests. This section discusses parameters of 
temporal binding which are important in understanding the phenomenon, and those 
particularly relevant to the experiments reported in this thesis and their interpretation. The 
nature of action and outcome binding, and the effects of interval duration and predictability 
are discussed below, in relation to the different measurements of time and event perception 
used in studying temporal binding. 
The positive shift in the perceived time of causal actions and the negative shift in 
perceived time of outcomes can be referred to as action binding and outcome binding, 
respectively. Early evidence of temporal binding using Libet clock procedures suggested that 
outcome binding tends to be of a greater magnitude than action binding and may account for 
the bulk of the contraction of the perceived delay interval between actions and their 
outcomes. Haggard et al.’s 2002 study found that action binding caused a mean shift of 
+15ms, whereas outcome binding caused a mean shift of -46ms. Similarly, Haggard and 
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Clark (2003) reported action binding of +30ms, compared with outcome binding of -78ms 
when participants performed a voluntary action, which caused a tone to sound, using the 
Libet clock method.   
Both the shifts in the perceived time of the action and outcome are at times used to 
infer the overall magnitude of the perceived duration between action and outcome. However, 
estimates of the times of actions and outcomes are collected in separate trials. As discussed 
below, the findings made using Libet clocks do not always match the findings made using 
measures of perceived interval durations, suggesting some differences in the mechanisms 
giving rise to temporal binding in event and time perception.  
2.2.1. Predictive and postdictive processes 
Research on action binding suggests it occurs in anticipation of the outcome 
(prediction), as well as following the outcome itself (post-diction). The magnitude of action 
binding appears similar when the outcome event is expected but does not occur to when an 
outcome does occur, suggesting that the predictive and postdictive components of action 
binding do not have an additive effect and high predictability is not necessary for the effect to 
occur. This was demonstrated by Moore and Haggard (2008) who manipulated the 
probability of a tone occurring as result of participants’ key presses. Participants performed a 
similar temporal binding task as used by Haggard et al. (2002), with the odds of the tone 
occurring fixed at either 50% or 75% of trials in different blocks (low and high probability 
conditions, respectively). Thus, the actions performed by participants were more predictive 
of the tone in some trials than others. A Libet clock was used to collect estimates of the time 
of the keypress in single-event baseline blocks (keypress only) and operant blocks in which 
keypresses could result in a tone. Estimate errors were computed by subtracting mean 
estimates from operant conditions from mean baseline measure. In low probability blocks, a 
significant forward shift in the perceived time of the keypress (action binding) was only 
observed when the tone was heard, but not on trials in which there was no tone (mean shifts 
of +13ms and +4ms, respectively). In high probability blocks significant action binding was 
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found both on trials in which the tone occurred and trials in which it did not (+16ms shift in 
no-tone trials, +13ms shift in tone trials). These results indicate that temporal binding can 
occur in anticipation of the outcome event, but that the probability of the outcome only 
affects predictive action binding. On the other hand, provided the outcome is perceived as 
caused by the action, post-dictive temporal binding appears to be unaffected by the 
probability of the outcome.  
Other work has since expanded on this finding by distinguishing between probability 
and contingency, which were conflated in the above study. In the above example, the tone 
never occurred in the absence of the keypress and therefore the contingencies between the 
keypress and tone were identical to the probability of the tone sounding. Moore, Lagnado, 
Deal and Haggard (2009) found that both the probability of the tone sounding and the 
contingency between the keypress and tone contributed to action binding. More specifically, 
contingency contributed to predictive action binding when participants’ actions were highly 
predictive of the outcome and contributed to postdictive action binding when they were not. 
In a similar design to that of Moore and Haggard (2008), the authors manipulated the 
probability of the tone occurring between subjects, and contingency within subjects. 
Participants were asked to make a key press on approximately half of the trials. In high 
contingency blocks, the probability of the tone occurring if an action was made was 50% at 
low probability and 75% at high probability, with 0% and 25% probabilities of a tone 
occurring regardless of action, respectively. In low contingency blocks the probability of the 
tone occurring when an action was made was equal to the probability of the tone occurring 
when no action was made (50% in low probability trials and 75% in high probability trials). 
This resulted in a fully factorial design of two probability conditions (low = 50%, high = 75%) 
and two contingency conditions (low = 0, high = 0.5). These were compared to baseline 
trials, in which key presses were never followed by tones, and the key was pressed on every 
trial. Forward shifts were observed in all conditions, with the exception of action-only trials at 
low tone probabilities.  
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This study both replicated the findings reported by Moore and Haggard (2008) and 
expanded on them by demonstrating an additive effect of contingency and the probability of 
outcome in some circumstances. The presence of action binding when the probability of an 
outcome or contingency between an action and outcome are high suggests that this action 
binding takes place before the outcome occurs. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
this work on predictive binding does not necessarily apply to outcome binding or to the 
perceived duration of the interval as a whole. This is because estimates of the time of the 
outcome cannot be made by participants when an outcome had not occurred.  
The extent to which temporal binding in time perception, as measured by interval 
estimation procedures or other time perception measures, occurs due to shifts in event 
perception is not yet known. However, recent research has found evidence for changes to 
internal clocks during temporal binding tasks (Fereday & Buehner, 2017; Fereday, Rushton 
& Buehner, in press). This suggests that changes to time perception occur during delay 
intervals, in anticipation of the outcome stimulus, and that predictive processes contribute to 
the perceived duration of the delay. It further suggests, however, that the contraction of 
subjective time intervals in temporal binding does not result entirely from changes in event 
perception. 
2.2.2. The effects of interval length on temporal binding 
Findings regarding the effects of interval length on temporal binding have been 
mixed, with some finding longer delay intervals to lead to a decrease in temporal binding, 
while others have not. In their 2002 paper, Haggard et al. reported decreasing outcome 
binding at longer intervals (experiment 2), with outcome binding most prominent at 250m 
delays between action and outcome, lesser at 400ms delays, and lesser still at 650ms 
delays. When the intervals were presented at a random order, rather than in separate 
blocks, no evidence for outcome binding was found. These findings suggested that temporal 
binding the effect of temporal binding on event perception diminishes as contiguity 
decreases and may be altogether absent at longer intervals.  
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However, some recent findings suggest a more complex picture of how different 
delay intervals affect both action and outcome binding than previously suggested, indicating 
that the range of the delay intervals presented to participants moderate the effect of delay 
intervals. Although a recent study using the Libet clock method found a decrease in the 
magnitude of the temporal binding effect at greater delay intervals, both for visual and 
auditory delays (Ruess, Tomaschke & Kiesel, 2018), another recent investigation using a 
Libet clock (Ruess et al., 2017) found that this effect is moderated by the range and 
predictability of delay intervals. The first of two experiments found outcome binding 
increased with delay intervals at a small range of intervals (experiment 1; 200, 250 and 
300ms intervals). Outcome binding did decrease at 400ms intervals, when the interval range 
was greater (experiment 2: 100, 250 and 400ms). The experiments additionally investigated 
the role of predictability: in unpredictable sessions, trials of all delays were presented in a 
random order within the same block, whereas in predictable blocks trials contained the same 
delay between the action and outcome within each block. Interval length was found to 
diminish outcome binding for predictable intervals only, and no overall reduction in outcome 
binding was observed in unpredictable intervals. Action binding increased at longer intervals 
in experiment 2, but not experiment 1. Similarly to the outcome binding findings, 
unpredictable intervals did not lead to a decrease in action binding.  
The findings from experiments using the Libet clock method are mixed, although the 
majority of experiments did find that temporal binding is moderated by increases in delay 
intervals. These findings suggest that temporal binding diminishes at longer delay intervals 
but are not necessarily generalisable to other measures of event perception. Two 
experiments using a key synchronisation task have found evidence for temporal binding at 
intervals of 500, 900 and 1300ms (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009), suggesting that the effects 
discussed above may have occurred due to the use of Libet clocks and do not apply to event 
perception in general. 
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Other findings show that if there is a moderating effect of increasing delay intervals 
on temporal binding, it is limited to event perception. Different measures of interval 
estimation have repeatedly found evidence for temporal binding at longer intervals. For 
instance, in two experiments Humphreys and Buehner (2010) demonstrated temporal 
binding at intervals varying randomly between 1200 and 1600ms, using an interval 
reproduction task. Participants were instructed to make temporal estimates by holding a key 
down for the duration of the temporal gap between two events. Here, temporal binding is 
evident from the significant difference in estimates between action-outcome sequences and 
unrelated, two-event sequences. Similarly, when using direct interval estimates, Humphreys 
and Buehner (2009) found evidence for temporal binding at intervals of up to 4 seconds, with 
no evidence of a decrease in temporal binding at longer intervals. In a series of experiments, 
temporal estimates were consistently shorter for the interval between action-outcome 
events, compared with estimates of the interval between two unrelated events. Slope 
analyses found significantly shallower slopes in the interval estimates made for action-
outcome sequences, suggesting that the difference in temporal estimates widened as the 
judged interval increased. The authors suggested that this disparity in the effect of interval 
length on temporal binding between measures of event perception (e.g. Libet clocks) and 
perceived intervals (e.g. interval estimates) may reflect a fundamental difference in the 
mechanisms leading to temporal binding in these cases. It is suggested that temporal 
binding in perceived intervals may result from an anticipatory slowing of an internal 
pacemaker. As mentioned previously, evidence has since been found for a slowing of an 
internal pacemaker rate during the interval between an action and its outcome (Fereday & 
Buehner, 2017; Fereday, et al., under review).  
The findings discussed in this section have both theoretical and practical implications 
for temporal binding research. Measures of perceived intervals, rather than perceived 
events, have consistently found temporal binding at longer intervals than those initially 
reported. This appears to reflect a difference in the effects of temporal binding on the 
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perception of events (as typically measured using the Libet clock method in temporal binding 
studies) and intervals (as typically measured using interval estimates). The two may well 
result from separate underlying perceptual processes. While temporal binding studies often 
yield similar findings with measures of event and interval perception, the effect of interval 
length demonstrates that this is not always the case and temporal binding findings are not 
necessarily applicable across these differing perceptual processes. It is further evident that 
in studies of temporal binding, at least when using a Libet clock, findings may be affected by 
the range and granularity of delay intervals.  
2.2.3. Predictability 
Along with contiguity and interval length, the effect of the predictability of the duration 
temporal delays on temporal binding has not been consistent between studies and appears 
to be restricted to event perception alone. Haggard et al. (2002) found diminished outcome 
binding when delay intervals were variable, while Ruess et al. (2017) did not find evidence 
for this, for either action or outcome binding. Cravo et al. (2011) reported a significant 
interaction between the presence of action, interval predictability and interval duration 
(experiment 2) in outcome binding. Cravo et al. made use of a simultaneity judgement task, 
in which participants reported whether a flash occurred at the same time as the outcome 
tone. Flashes were presented at varying intervals before or after the tone. Participants either 
pressed a key to cause the tone to sound, or passively observed the disappearance of a 
fixation cross, followed by the tone. The tone was presented either 300 or 600ms after the 
action/disappearance of the fixation cross. In some blocks only one of the two delay intervals 
was used, whereas other blocks included trials containing multiple displays of both delay 
durations, presented in a randomised order. Earlier points of subjective simultaneity, 
suggesting the tone was experienced as occurring earlier, were found in action trials, when 
the onset tone was predictable and the delay was short, compared with other conditions. It is 
possible that less predictable intervals lead to a reduction in temporal binding as, although 
the outcome is predicted by the preceding event, the time of onset of the outcome is not. 
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This lack of certainty in the delay between the action and outcome may lead to a decreased 
reliance on the action as a cue to the onset of the outcome, relative to other perceptual cues.  
In contrast, there is no evidence to date for an effect of predictability on temporal 
binding as measured by interval estimation and interval reproduction procedures, with some 
studies finding evidence for temporal binding when using delay intervals of unpredictable 
duration. Buehner & Humphreys (2010) replicated the temporal binding effect in randomly 
varying intervals with an interval reproduction task, and Humphreys and Buehner (2009) 
replicated the temporal binding effect in unpredictable intervals with an interval estimation 
task. As discussed in the previous section, recent research has implicated internal 
pacemaker rate changes in temporal binding (Fereday & Buehner, 2017; Fereday, et al., 
under review). While the reduced predictability of delay duration may make the exact onset 
of the outcome stimuli impossible to predict, the prediction of a reduction in the delay 
between the two, and therefore the anticipatory slowing of internal pacemaker rates, may still 
occur.  
Nevertheless, at the time of writing there have been few direct investigations of the 
role of predictability in temporal binding and any explanations of such effects are 
speculative. The effect of the predictability of temporal delays on temporal binding appears 
to be dependent at least in part on the experiment design and in particular whether time or 
event perception are measured. As with the effect of delay durations, the evidence for an 
effect of predictability on action and outcome binding is mixed, with some studies having 
found reduced binding under low predictability. These findings are unique to measures of 
event perception, while interval estimation and interval reproduction tasks finding no effect of 
predictability on temporal binding.  
2.2.4. Mechanisms of temporal binding: summary 
In the sixteen years since it was first reported, numerous replications have shown 
temporal binding to be robust and replicable. The effect has been found with the use of 
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various measures of time and event perception, and across varying time intervals, both 
predictable and unpredictable. Action binding appears to be lesser in magnitude than 
outcome binding, with both predictive and inferential processes contributing to the overall 
effect. Evidence for a role of internal clock changes in temporal binding also suggests a 
predictive component to the shortening of the perceived length of the interval, as such a 
change takes place prior to the outcome. What is less clear is how the extent to which the 
perceived time of the outcome affects the perceived interval length postdictively. 
Temporal binding does, however, manifest in different ways depending on the 
measures used. While the manifestations of temporal binding in event and time perception 
are at times treated as interchangeable, research on the susceptibility of temporal binding to 
changes in stimuli has demonstrated some differences. As discussed above, some studies 
have found diminished action and outcome binding due to delay intervals which are longer or 
less predictable in their duration, but this was not the case for judgements of the interval 
length. Another key difference is that the perceived time of the action and outcome cannot 
be inferred from interval judgements, and that the perceived interval of a delay may not 
necessarily be inferred from shifts in the perceived time of the two events. These differences 
suggest the involvement of different perceptual processes in temporal binding as observed 
in event and interval judgements. Although this need not indicate two entirely separate 
temporal binding effects, caution must be exercised in interpreting findings that had not been 
replicated across different measures. In practice, different measures inform theoretical 
accounts of temporal binding in different ways. Measures of event perception have been 
better suited to investigations of pre- and post-diction, for instance. Interval judgements, on 
the other hand, are more suitable when the experiment design necessitates the use of delay 
intervals over 500ms, or unpredictable intervals.  
2.3. The roles of causality and agency in temporal binding 
 At the time of writing it remains the dominant view that temporal binding results from 
the perception of agency, although multiple accounts of how and why this might be the case 
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have been proposed (see Moore & Obhi, 2012). Alternatively, some have proposed that the 
perception of causality, rather than agency, leads to temporal binding (e.g. Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009; Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002). The majority of the accounts that have 
been put forward to explain temporal binding take the position that the perception of agency 
is necessary for temporal binding to occur and can be categorised as agency accounts, 
while the main alternative explanation – that temporal binding occurs due to the perception 
of causality alone is referred to here as the causal account of temporal binding.  
The question of the roles of causality and agency is of both theoretical and practical 
value to researchers. Temporal binding has the potential to expand our knowledge of how 
the perception of time, and causality and/or agency are related, and to provide researchers 
with implicit measures of the perception of causality/agency. Studies are increasingly making 
use of temporal binding as an implicit measure of agency when studying a variety of 
disorders, personality traits and mental states. Examples include studies of schizophrenia 
(Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod & Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 2010), narcissism 
(Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015), autism spectrum disorders (Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, & Zalla, 
2014), mindfulness meditators (Jo, Wittman, Hinterberger & Schmidt 2014; Lush, Naish & 
Dienes, 2016) and the effects of ketamine (Moore et al., 2011). In such cases differences in 
temporal binding between groups are used either to provide evidence for differences in the 
experience of agency, to investigate the role of agency in temporal binding, or both. Yet, 
causal and agency accounts of temporal binding often lead to similar predictions. As such, 
interpretations of temporal binding studies may vary considerably depending on one’s 
theoretical position. Temporal binding has the potential to further our understanding of how 
we perceive time, causality and agency, but this is contingent upon deciphering the roles 
that causality and agency play in producing the effect. 
2.3.1. Causality as a necessary condition for temporal binding 
It is widely accepted that perceived causality between action and outcome (or cause 
and effect) is necessary for temporal binding to occur. To date, several studies have found 
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evidence for this (e.g. Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Moore & Haggard, 2008). However, 
although the evidence consistently points in this direction, there have been relatively few 
studies to date which have included causality and agency as distinct factors. This may be, in 
part, because, while creating conditions in which causality is present and agency is absent is 
relatively simple, it is far more difficult to design conditions in which an intentional action is 
consistently and predictably followed by an outcome, while it remains clear to the participant 
that the outcome was not caused by the action in any way. 
Buehner and Humphreys (2009) demonstrated causality to be necessary for 
temporal binding to occur using a key synchronisation task. Participants were asked to press 
a key simultaneously with two target tones, separated by a delay of 500, 900 or 1,300ms. To 
allow participants to predict the onset of the first target tone it was preceded by two 
preparatory tones of a different pitch occurring 400 and 200ms before the first target tone. 
Participants completed exposure trials prior to each experimental block, in which they were 
free to either press the keys or not, in order to learn the contingency between their keypress 
and the second tone. As such, predictability was identical across conditions, as was the 
presentation of the stimuli and presence of a keypress, but participants’ knowledge of the 
contingency between their action and the second tone was not. In two experiments, the 
times of the keypresses were compared with the time of both tones. Both experiments found 
evidence for temporal binding when the action caused the tone compared with tones 
occurring independently of the action. This indicates that intentional action alone did not lead 
to temporal binding in the absence of a causal relationship between the action and the 
subsequent tone, as measured using the key synchronisation task. Temporal binding may 
not occur simply between an intentional action and any subsequent event, therefore, but the 
subsequent event must be contingent on the action.  
Other studies provide indirect evidence for the role of causality in temporal binding as 
they have shown a decrease in temporal binding due to a decrease in Humean causal cues 
(see Chapter 1). As previously discussed, Moore and Haggard (2008) and Moore et al. 
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(2009), found evidence for greater action binding at higher than lower contingency between 
actions and outcomes. Similarly, temporal contiguity, which also contributes to causal 
inferences, has also been found to affect temporal binding, with reduced temporal binding 
when contiguity is reduced (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002, experiment 2). However, as discussed 
in the previous section, these effects appear to be specific to event perception and may not 
be generalisable to all forms of temporal binding. 
Perceived causality as a necessary condition for temporal binding has been largely 
accepted by researchers investigating temporal binding. Although this has been difficult to 
test directly, research to date has not demonstrated temporal binding in the absence of a 
causal relationship between the two events. The vast majority of temporal binding research 
is carried out under the assumption that the two events, whether action and outcome or 
cause and effect, must be perceived as directly causally related. It is arguable that this may 
the case by definition, under both agency accounts and the causal account of temporal 
binding. Because “intentional binding” as originally reported referred to a temporal binding 
between actions and their intended consequences; if temporal binding occurs due to motor 
planning processes it can only take place when the aim of the action is to bring about the 
outcome. If an outcome is perceived to occur independently of the action, no such planning 
is required. Likewise, causality as necessary for causal binding is a key feature of causal 
accounts. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will consider the perception of causality 
as necessary for temporal binding to occur.  
2.3.2. Agency accounts of temporal binding 
The focus of this section is the evidence for and against intentional action and 
agency as necessary conditions for temporal binding, rather than the precise mechanisms 
by which this might occur. Agency refers to subjective impression of actions as generated 
voluntarily by an agent (see David, Newen & Vogeley, 2008, for more detail). Intentional 
action refers to goal-directed actions, performed by an agent. For the purposes of discussing 
the temporal binding literature, this will refer to voluntary human actions, as opposed to 
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mechanical actions. Involuntary actions include actions induced through coercion, TMS or 
physical force (e.g. a participant’s finger pushed down onto a lever). Crucially, while the 
actual nature of agency is contentious and it can be argued that free will is illusory or that 
mechanical actions may be intentional as they were designed by an agent, it is the 
subjective perception of agency and intentionality that is of interest here.  
In their 2002 paper, Haggard et al. termed the temporal contraction between 
intentional actions and their consequences “intentional binding”. They proposed that the 
binding in time of actions and their intended effects was an adaptive process, serving to 
strengthen the association between them. It was suggested that this process aids the 
matching of actions to their intended effects via forward action models. Forward models 
have been proposed as a means by which motor actions are optimised by predicting the 
sensory outcome of an action. They are widely viewed as contributing to individuals’ sense 
of agency over their actions; sensory outcomes which closely match the predicted outcome 
have been found to increase feelings of agency, whereas sensory outcomes that deviate 
from forward model predictions lead to decreased feelings of agency (see David et al., 2008, 
for a review of such findings). Temporal binding has been suggested by Haggard et al. to 
strengthen feelings of agency by reducing the perceived temporal gap between actions and 
their outcomes, in line with forward model predictions. Conversely, the “repulsion effect” 
found when motor action was TMS-induced was suggested to dissociate forced movements 
from their consequences, thereby weakening the perception of agency in those cases. It is 
worth noting that this repulsion effect has not been replicated since, for instance a 2003 
study by Haggard and Clark found an absence of temporal binding in TMS-induced actions, 
but no repulsion effect. Similarly, other studies investigating the role of agency using forced 
actions other than TMS-induced movements (discussed below) have not found such a 
repulsion effect.  
Although this was the first theoretical account of temporal binding, it has not been 
without controversy (for instance, see Hughes, Desantis & Wazsak, 2013 for a systematic 
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review and critique of this account). Most research on temporal binding has not sought to 
find confirmatory evidence implicating forward models in temporal binding, yet this 
theoretical account had informed much of the temporal binding research since the effect was 
first reported. In addition, some amendments to this account had been made. For instance 
the assumption of a repulsion effect due to non-intentional movements had never been 
replicated. More recently it has been suggested that forward model predictions influenced 
event perception as part of a cue integration process, whereby the weighting of this 
information against other perceptual information affected temporal binding, but only in action 
binding (Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner & Rowe, 2013). The latter point would suggest that 
different manifestations of temporal binding - outcome binding and the shortening of the 
perceived interval between actions and their consequences – may in fact be driven by 
different perceptual processes resulting from the perception of agency. For instance, as 
previously discussed here (Sections 2.2.2. & 2.2.3.), temporal binding only appears to be 
moderated by longer or less predictable delay intervals when event perception is measured 
(using a Libet clock). 
The forward model explanation for temporal binding relies on some assumptions 
which have not been confirmed, and indeed are difficult to test. One such assumption is that 
participants implicitly expect short delays between their actions and their sensory 
consequences despite repeated exposure to the stimuli, and despite the role of forward 
models in temporal prediction. This is a counterintuitive assumption, and one that would 
mean temporal binding, suggested by Haggard et al. (2002) to aid the perception of 
intentionality, would do so by decreasing the accuracy of temporal prediction and motor 
planning. As this account is not necessarily predicted by the existence of forward models, 
evidence for the existence of forward models does not amount to evidence for their role in 
temporal binding. In addition, several findings to date are difficult to explain under the 
forward model account of temporal binding. For instance, it is not clear how forward model 
predictions would affect internal pacemaker rates, yet recent findings suggest temporal 
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binding results, at least in part, from changes to internal pacemaker rates (Fereday & 
Buehner, 2017; Fereday, et al., under review). Likewise, some findings discussed below, 
such as the lack of repulsion effect (Section 2.3.2.1), temporal binding in observed actions 
(2.3.2.2) and findings suggesting temporal binding results from explicit agency judgements, 
rather than implicit agency (2.3.2.3). 
Overall, the forward model account of temporal binding has been the most prominent 
agency account of temporal binding in the research literature, despite the shortcomings 
discussed above. However, it is not the only possible reason why the perception or beliefs of 
agency may be necessary for temporal binding to occur and, as such, evidence against this 
model does not necessarily amount to evidence against a role of agency in temporal binding. 
A further caveat is that some research on temporal binding does not cite or propose a 
specific account of temporal binding, instead assuming only that agency is necessary for the 
effect to occur. Because of this, evaluation of the evidence for and against agency accounts 
of temporal binding will focus on the role of the perception of agency rather than predictions 
specific to individual agency accounts. 
2.3.2.1. Evidence for intentionality as a necessary condition for 
temporal binding: involuntary movement 
To date several studies have investigated the prediction of agency accounts, that 
temporal binding should not take place due to movements performed involuntarily and have 
found some of evidence that this leads to a reduction, if not an absence of temporal binding. 
Two previously mentioned studies (Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard et al., 2002) made use 
of TMS to induce involuntary hand movements. TMS-induced movements are, however, 
markedly different from ordinary motor actions and are likely to be very unnatural for the 
average human, who, outside of neuroscience experiments, would have no prior experience 
of such movements. It seems likely, therefore, that these movements, which entirely bypass 
ordinary motor planning and feedback, may affect event perception in other ways.  
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Other studies made use of different forms of forced movement and found evidence 
for a decrease in temporal binding. Wohlschlager et al. (2003a) manipulated agency with the 
use of a lever, which could pull the participant’s finger down as it depressed. In voluntary 
trials participants pressed a lever at a time of their choosing, causing a tone. In involuntary 
trials, the participant’s finger was pulled with the lever, followed by a tone. In “other” trials 
participants observed another person performing the lever press. Finally, in machine trials a 
rubber hand was placed on the lever and pulled down with it, as the participant’s finger 
would be in the passive conditions. Participants estimated the time of the lever press using a 
Libet clock. Results found significant effects of agency; later estimates of the time of the 
lever-press were found when participants performed or observed an intentional action, 
compared with movements induced by the movement of the lever.  
Wohlschlager, Haggard, Gesierich and Prinz (2003) conducted three experiments 
with the same apparatus and found similar results, also with the use of a Libet clock. 
Interestingly, however, their third experiment investigated the perceived time of actions or 
mechanical events in the absence of a consequent tone. It found that mechanical lever-
presses were perceived as occurring significantly earlier than self-generated or observed 
actions. This suggests that the findings of these experiments (Wohlschlager et al., 2003a; 
Wohlschlager et al., 2003b) may have been driven at least in part by baseline differences in 
the perceived times of each type of action, rather than by differences in the magnitude of 
temporal binding. It is not possible to determine the shifts in the perceived time of actions as 
two-event and single-event conditions were not included within the same experiments. 
Additionally, the experiment designs used by Wohlshlager et al. (2003a; 2003b) 
confound causality with agency. In trials involving the self-pressing lever, the depression of 
the lever and the tone are controlled by a computer programme, and the depression of the 
lever does not cause the tone to occur. Here, the lever press and tone share a common 
cause, rather than the lever press causing the tone. This means that, across studies, 
machine and passive action conditions have a different causal mechanism, which would not 
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be expected to result in temporal binding. It should be noted here that this raises a separate 
issue: in the absence of measures of perceived causality, it cannot be determined whether 
participants perceived the causal structure intended by the experimenters or the actual 
causal structure of the apparatus. Consequently, the extent to which causality and 
intentionality were confounded can also not be determined. 
2.3.2.2. Temporal binding in observed actions 
Although most temporal binding studies have focussed on the effect of self-
generated actions on time and event perception, several studies have investigated temporal 
binding in observed actions. The first such studies, discussed above, were carried out by 
Wohlschlager et al. (2003a, 2003b). These studies suggest temporal binding can occur 
between observed actions and their consequences, as compared with mechanical action, 
but that this effect may be of a lesser magnitude than the effect of self-action. These studies 
investigated action binding alone, however, and single-event baseline measurements were 
collected in separate samples, rather than within subjects. Baseline measurements indeed 
found a bias toward an earlier awareness of the time of the mechanical event in the absence 
of a tone, which may have biased the main findings. These findings, therefore, while 
interesting, do not paint a clear picture of temporal binding in observed actions. 
More recent evidence suggests a temporal binding effect in intentional observed 
actions relative to observed non-intentional actions. In a study by Moore, Teufel, 
Subramaniam, Davis and Fletcher (2013), participants were exposed to identical stimuli, 
regardless of condition. Participants were shown videos of a finger strapped to a button. On 
each trial the finger and button depressed, followed by a tone. Participants were led to 
believe either that the button was pulling the finger down as it depressed (as in 
Wohlschlager et al. 2003a & b), or that the individual in the film was pressing the button of 
their own accord. Participants estimated the interval between the keypress and tone in 
milliseconds. Temporal estimates were significantly lower when participants believed the 
movement was passive. These results, again, suggest temporal binding can occur between 
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observed actions and their effects, compared with involuntary actions, even when the stimuli 
are identical. It should be noted, however, that as Wohlschlager et al.’s experiments, the 
causal mechanisms given to participants differ in structure. In the case of the button being 
pulled down mechanically, the movement of the button and the subsequent tone are 
controlled by the same computer programme (common cause), whereas in voluntary action 
the button causes the tone to sound. 
Other studies have addressed the question of whether temporal binding is greater for 
self-generated, compared with observed actions and found that the temporal binding effect 
in observed actions, as measured using interval estimation tasks, is smaller than the 
temporal binding effect found in self-performed actions. In a study by Engbert et al. (2008) 
participants either performed voluntary actions (lever press), involuntary actions 
(participants’ fingers were pulled down by the lever), observed human action or observed 
machine action (rubber hand pulled down by the lever). Temporal estimates (made in 
milliseconds) were significantly lower when participants performed voluntary actions, 
compared with involuntary or observed actions. These results were found for auditory 
(experiment 1), visual (experiment 2) and tactile outcomes (experiment 3). This was also 
suggested by the findings of Engbert et al. (2007), who found comparable temporal 
estimates between observed human actions and observed mechanical (rubber hand) actions 
and their consequences, using interval estimation tasks. 
A similar pattern of findings – temporal binding in observed actions, but of a smaller 
magnitude compared with temporal binding in self-performed action - was reported by 
Strother, House and Obhi (2010) using the Libet clock method. Participants were tested in 
pairs and instructed to press the space key on a computer keyboard during each trial and 
allow their finger to depress with the key if the other participant performed the action first. 
This study single-event and keypress-tone trials. In two experiments, participants showed 
later awareness of the time of the keypress and an earlier awareness of the time of the tone 
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when a keypress caused a tone, compared with single-event baseline trials. This effect was 
greater for self-action compared with observed action. 
The differences in temporal binding between self-performed and observed actions 
were not replicated using interval reproduction procedures, however. In a study by Poonian 
and Cunnington (2013), self-actions and observed actions causing a tone were compared 
with non-causal, two-tone sequences. Participants' estimates of the delay between the first 
and second event were significantly higher for both self and observed actions, compared 
with two-tone sequence. This study did not find a significant difference in reproduced 
intervals between self and observed actions. However, there have not been other 
investigations of temporal binding in observed actions using interval reproduction tasks and 
it is therefore difficult to establish whether this finding reflects a difference in temporal 
binding between interval estimation and reproduction, or whether other factors contributed to 
this finding. 
Overall, the majority of studies using both interval estimation and Libet clock tasks 
have found evidence of temporal binding in observed actions. This suggests that, if the 
perception of agency is required for temporal binding to occur, the effect results from the 
perception of any intentional action, including those not performed by the observer. By 
implication, the processes involved in predicting our actions are mirrored when observing 
actions performed by another agent. However, some of the studies discussed here have 
found evidence for a reduction in temporal binding in observed actions (Engbert et al., 2007 
& 2008; Strother et al., 2010), while others found comparable temporal binding in self-
generated and observed actions (Poonian & Cunnington, 2013). This is further complicated 
by evidence of similar temporal judgements between observed actions and mechanical 
actions (Engbert et al, 2007; 2008). A reduction in temporal binding in observed actions may 
reflect a difference in the processing of the perceived agency of one’s own actions and those 
performed by another. However, agency accounts cannot explain a comparable temporal 
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binding effect between observed actions and mechanical actions, which would imply an 
absence of temporal binding in observed actions.  
On the other hand, a causal account would predict temporal binding between self-
generated, observed and mechanical actions and their consequences. It is possible that 
perception differences between self-generated actions and other observed events, such as 
differences in predictability and sensory cues (e.g. tactile and proprioceptive feedback are 
only available to the person performing the action) have affected the magnitude of the 
temporal binding effect. Studies of temporal binding in observed actions do not clearly 
support either causal or agency accounts of temporal binding. As in other experiments, 
causality and agency are often confounded when self-causal events are compared with non-
intentional, non-causal controls (e.g. Moore et al., 2013). Similarly, in some studies non-
intentional control conditions are nevertheless causal (e.g. Engbert et al., 2007), meaning a 
reduction in binding due to the absence of agency does not necessarily indicate a lack of 
temporal binding and may have resulted from other perceptual differences between the 
tasks. As these studies have been carried out in order to investigate the effects of perceived 
agency on temporal binding, the predictions of causal accounts have not been considered in 
experiment designs. As such, results can often be explained by both causal and agency 
accounts of temporal binding.  
2.3.2.3. Evidence for intentionality as a necessary condition for 
temporal binding: beliefs of agency 
Several studies have directly manipulated beliefs of agency rather than the nature of 
the movement itself, as in the studies discussed above (Caspar, Christensen, Cleermans & 
Haggard, 2016; Desantis et al., 2011; Dogge et al., 2012). These findings of these three 
studies have suggested that temporal binding can be moderated by explicit agency, i.e. 
beliefs of agency, providing evidence for agency accounts of temporal binding, although, as 
discussed below, the evidence is not conclusive at the time of writing. Although Temporal 
binding has been previously suggested to result from implicit (pre-conscious) feelings of 
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agency (e.g. Haggard et al., 2003) there are several studies in which, where explicit and 
implicit agency were mis-matched, explicit agency appeared to take precedence in causing 
temporal binding. 
Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans & Haggard (2016) manipulated agency with the 
use of coercion and found evidence for a reduction of temporal binding due to a lack of 
perceived agency, despite the presence of intentional action. Pairs of participants were 
seated opposite each other. “Agents” were told they were able to increase their financial 
reward for the experiment by either decreasing the passive participant’s reward (group 1) or 
delivering a painful electric shock to the passive participant (group 2). Participants either 
freely chose whether to perform these actions or were instructed act by the experimenter. 
Participants’ actions also caused a tone after a random delay of 200, 500 or 800ms, 
Participants were asked to estimate the delay between their key press and the tone in 
milliseconds, between 0 and 1000. In both groups, participants made longer temporal 
estimates when their actions were coerced, compared with actions performed freely. This 
implies that temporal binding was reduced or absent in coerced actions compared with freely 
performed actions. In a second experiment, participants also completed questionnaires 
regarding their feelings of responsibility for their actions, which found significantly lower 
feelings of responsibility for coerced actions. These findings were similar to those found for 
the control conditions, in which participants either pressed the key to cause a tone, or had 
their finger pushed onto the key by the experimenter, suggesting that coercion had a similar 
effect on temporal binding to that of forced actions. Crucially, a reduction in temporal binding 
had occurred despite the presence of motor planning in coerced actions which, unlike forced 
actions, were actively performed by the participant and were not passive movements, such 
as when participants’ fingers are pulled down by the apparatus (e.g. Wohlshlager et al., 
2003a; 2003b). 
It can be argued, however, that under the causal account of temporal binding a lack 
of binding in coerced actions may have occurred due to a binding of the action towards the 
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signal (instructions to act by the experimenter) and therefore away from the outcome. 
Evidence to date suggests a sensory event can be bound due to causality and intentionality 
(Yabe, Dave & Goodale, 2017; see Section 2.3.3.2. for more detail), although it is not 
currently known whether actions can similarly bound to their causes as well as their 
consequences. Further, neither experiment contained a non-causal control condition, nor 
was causal perception measured. It is therefore not possible to ascertain whether longer 
temporal estimates reflect the absence of temporal binding, or merely a reduction in the 
magnitude of the effect (as seen in observed intentional actions, see previous section). 
Causal judgements can therefore not be entirely ruled out in explaining these findings.  
Nevertheless, Caspar et al.’s (2016) findings supported earlier findings by Desantis 
et al. (2011) who found both a lack of temporal binding in the absence of beliefs of agency, 
and evidence for agency accounts of temporal binding. Desantis et al. found, using the Libet 
clock method, a reduction in temporal binding when participants believed the consequences 
of their own actions to be caused by the actions of a confederate. Participants performed 
training sessions in which they either performed an intentional action themselves, or 
observed actions performed by a confederate, causing a tone, with the computer monitor 
showing the name of the participant whose action caused the tone. In the test session, 
participants and confederates performed intentional actions within a specified time window, 
with participants informed by the computer screen whether they or the confederate caused 
the tone, or given no instructions (the tones were, in fact, always caused by the participant). 
Compared with single-event baseline judgements, a shift of the perceived time of the tone 
toward the keypress was only found when participants believed that they had caused the 
tone or when no information was given, although agency ratings suggested participants 
believed they had caused the tone when no information was provided. No action binding was 
found in any condition, which the authors suggest may be due to the use of a social setting, 
as similar findings occurred in a social setting in a study by Strother et al. (2010). These 
findings cannot be as easily explained by the causal account of temporal binding; regardless 
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of who participants believed had caused the tone, participants believed the two events to be 
causally related and participants were aware of when the confederate’s action had been 
performed, as this had to have occurred near the time of their own keypresses. The lack of 
evidence for temporal binding relative to baseline suggests actions performed by others 
resulted in the absence of, or at least a reduction in temporal binding. However, this cannot 
be confirmed due to the absence of a non-causal control condition, as it is possible that a 
two-event sequence may have resulted in different shifts in the perceived times of the judged 
events compared with causal conditions.  
While Caspar et al.’s (2016) and Desantis et al.’s studies found evidence for reduced 
temporal binding despite implicit agency, Dogge et al. (2012) found evidence for temporal 
binding in the absence of implicit agency altogether, again using a Libet clock. In a typical 
temporal binding experiment using a Libet clock, participants performed key presses, 
voluntary or passive (a key which pulled the participants’ fingers down as it depressed, as 
used by Wohlschlager et al., 2003a & Wohlschlager et al., 2003b). A tone occurred after a 
short delay following the key press, and participants reported their judgement of either the 
time of the key press or tone, with single-event conditions used as baseline measures. 
Participants were either encouraged to think of their involuntary key presses as causing the 
tone to occur or were not given any such suggestion. A typical temporal binding effect was 
observed in the voluntary action condition. When self-causation did not occur, but was 
implied, a significant binding effect was observed. However, the outcome binding effect was 
smaller in magnitude than the one observed in actual self-causation, and no action binding 
was observed. Finally, in the absence of implied or actual self-causation, no action or 
outcome binding was found. These results again suggest that explicit agency, in the form of 
beliefs regarding self-causation, lead to temporal binding, even in the absence of motor 
planning. The absence of action binding in involuntary movements with implied self-
causation may reflect the absence of predictive binding in this instance, as participants did 
not choose the time of their finger movement. These findings appear to suggest that 
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temporal binding is at least partly caused by explicit beliefs regarding agency. However, 
agency and causality are again confounded in this design. The passive key presses, as in 
Wohlschlager et al.’s (2003a) and Wohlshlager et al.’s (2003b) studies, do not cause the 
tone, but rather share a common cause with it, although in the absence of causal 
judgements it is not possible to determine which causal structure participants believed was 
taking place. 
The examples discussed here provide evidence for both a reduction in temporal 
binding, despite implicit agency, due to a lack of explicit agency (Caspar et al., 2016; 
Desantis et al., 2011) and temporal binding in the absence of implicit agency due to explicit 
agency (Dogge et al., 2012). It appears, therefore, that, although these findings seem to 
support agency accounts of temporal binding, implicit agency is not necessary for the effect 
to occur, as suggest by Haggard et al. (2002) and that implicit agency alone is not sufficient 
for the effect to occur. What is less clear is whether these findings had occurred due to 
explicit judgements of agency, i.e. self-causation, or causation alone. As with previous 
studies discussed in this chapter, both a lack of measurements of causal ratings and a lack 
of non-causal control conditions mean the causal account of temporal binding cannot be 
entirely ruled out as an alternative explanation for the findings. 
2.3.2.4. Evidence for intentionality as a necessary condition for 
temporal binding: individual differences 
Other support for intentionality as necessary for temporal binding to occur comes 
from studies of temporal binding and individual differences. It should be noted, however, that 
these studies do not directly manipulate the perception of agency alone and provide only 
indirect evidence for agency accounts of temporal binding. In these examples, individual 
temporal binding was investigated between groups, with participants grouped by traits 
known to be associated with changes in the perception of agency. 
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Hascalovitz and Obhi (2015) investigated whether temporal binding differed in 
magnitude between participants with low or high narcissism scores, as measured by the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988) and found greater temporal 
binding. Participants were grouped into low, medium and high narcissism score groups (less 
than 10, 11-17 and 21+ out of a possible 40, respectively). In each operant trial participants 
pressed a computer mouse key, which resulted in a tone after a short delay. Participants 
also performed single event baseline trials. In every trial participants reported the time of the 
key press or tone, using a Libet clock. Outcome binding was greater for the medium and 
high narcissism groups compared with the low narcissism group, with no significant 
differences in action binding. The authors attributed this to a tendency in those with higher 
narcissism scores to view themselves as powerful and dominant. Scores in the medium 
range, however, fell well within a normal range. This suggests that rather than greater 
temporal binding among those with high narcissism scores, the results may have indicated a 
reduction in temporal binding among those with lower-than-usual narcissism scores.  
Haslovitz and Obhi (2015) noted depression as a potential confounding variable. 
Feelings of powerlessness are associated with depression (e.g. “depressive realism”, Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979) and their findings may have reflected a reduction in outcome binding due 
to depression, rather than an increase in outcome binding due to narcissism. This indicates 
that according to agency accounts temporal binding should be reduced during depressive 
states, which was indeed found by Obhi, Swiderski and Farquhar (2013). Here, depression 
was manipulated directly by asking participants to recall depressing experiences prior to the 
temporal binding task. Participants who recalled depressing, rather than neutral experiences 
reported longer intervals between their actions and their effects (tones) in an interval 
estimation task. A further experiment investigated the perceived delay between two tones 
and found that in the absence of intentionality/causality the delay intervals were judged as 
shorter in participants primed with depressive memories (other studies have also found a 
shortening effect of depression on perceived interval length, e.g. Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009). 
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This suggests that the results are unlikely to be explained by a general effect of depression 
on time perception, which would have resulted in shorter estimated intervals in participants 
primed with depressive memories compared with those primed with neutral memories. In 
both studies (Hascalobitz & Ohbi, 2015; Obhi et al., 2013) it is suggested that relatively 
reduced feelings of control over one’s environment experienced in depressed moods and by 
those with lower narcissism scores are reflected in a reduction in temporal binding. As in 
previous examples, however, causality and agency may be confounded here. Differences in 
subjective feelings of powerfulness or powerlessness may also reflect differences in the 
participants’ beliefs about their causal influence on the outside world. For instance, in the 
“depressive realism” effect, whereas non-depressed individuals tend to overestimate the 
contingency between their actions and events following their actions when there is no such 
contingency, depressed individuals make more accurate (lower) contingency judgements. 
In a similar vein, Lush, Naish & Dienes (2017) manipulated the experience of agency 
with the use of hypnosis, under the assumption that participants performing actions due to 
hypnosis would perceive these actions to be involuntary. As predicted by agency accounts of 
temporal binding, it was found that a reduction in temporal binding occurred when highly 
hypnotisable individuals were performing key presses due to the experimenter’s command, 
under hypnosis. Participants were grouped by hypnotisability scores (high and medium). All 
participants performed single-event baseline trials (key press/tone) and took part in three 
operant conditions: voluntary action, posthypnotic involuntariness (participants told their 
fingers will move involuntarily on trials in which they hear a hand clap), and passive action 
(the participant’s finger was pushed down by the experimenter). Highly hypnotizable 
participants reported significantly higher involuntariness in the posthypnotic involuntariness 
condition than the medium hypnotisability group. The study found no significant differences 
in action binding. In outcome binding, the high hypnotisability group significantly lesser 
temporal binding in the post-hypnotic and passive action conditions, whereas the medium 
hypnotisability group only showed lesser outcome binding in the passive condition compared 
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with the other two. Overall, the findings suggest that the action induced through hypnotic 
suggestion led to reduced temporal binding. Participants were not randomly allocated into 
groups, however. Participants in the two groups differed in their hypnotisability scores, which 
may be correlated with other traits. The high hypnotisability group, for instance, showed 
higher variability in their baseline action judgements.  
2.3.2.5. Evidence for intentionality as a necessary condition for 
temporal binding: summary 
The examples outlined here are illustrative of several of the methods used to 
investigate the role of agency in temporal binding. The evidence from studies investigating 
self-causation typically supports agency accounts of temporal binding but is limited by the 
lack of accounting for perceived causality. Indeed, at this juncture, the majority of the 
literature on temporal binding links the effect with agency and the role of causality, therefore, 
remains relatively underexplored. The same can be said of studies of temporal binding in 
observed actions. 
The omission of causality from experimental design primarily takes three forms. 
Firstly, causality is often confounded with agency in experiment designs. At times this is 
because non-intentional conditions are also non-causal, or because of differences in causal 
structure between conditions. Secondly, many experiments do not feature a non-intentional 
and non-causal baseline condition, such as a sequence of causally unrelated events. As 
such, it is often difficult to infer whether differences in subjective temporal judgements reflect 
a reduction in temporal binding, or the absence of the effect altogether. For instance, smaller 
interval judgements in intentional actions compared with non-intentional but causal actions 
does not necessarily confirm that temporal binding is absent in non-causal conditions, as 
such a difference may result from the nature of the task itself. Intentional actions typically 
involve motor planning, higher predictability and additional streams of sensory feedback (e.g. 
tactile and proprioceptive), which observed events do not. Finally, the vast majority of 
studies have not collected causal judgements from participants. As such, the way in which 
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causality is perceived by participants is assumed but cannot be verified. This makes the 
interpretation of findings particularly difficult when the causal perception expected from 
participants differs from the actual causal mechanisms underlying the experimental 
apparatus (e.g. Wohlschlager et al., 2003a & b). In other words, the findings discussed in 
this section found that temporal binding occurs in intentional action-outcome sequences, but 
often do not contradict the predictions the causal account of temporal binding. It is worth 
noting that, as with the bulk of temporal binding research, the majority of the studies 
discussed in this section were carried out as investigations of agency and have, for the most 
part, not tested hypotheses based on the causal account of temporal binding. 
2.3.3. The causal account of temporal binding 
Although agency is often viewed as a necessary condition for temporal binding, some 
have proposed that causality alone may be sufficient for temporal binding to occur (e.g. 
Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002). Whether causality is merely 
necessary or sufficient in causing temporal binding is the key distinguishing feature between 
the two accounts. These accounts differ further, however, in the proposed mechanisms 
behind temporal binding.  
Eagleman and Holcombe (2002) proposed that Haggard et al.’s (2002) findings may 
be attributable to causal perception alone. They suggested that as time perception contains 
a certain amount of measurement “noise” it is plausible from a Bayesian perspective that 
perceptual processes may shift the perceived time of events based on prior knowledge. As 
discussed previously, temporally contiguous events are more likely to elicit inferences of a 
causal relationship between the events (See Chapter 1, Section 1.1). Eagleman and 
Holcombe suggested that this results in a reversal of this assumption; as causality is inferred 
from temporal contiguity, temporal contiguity can be inferred from causality. That is, 
observers assume that the temporal delay between a cause and its consequence is likely to 
be shorter than the temporal delay between causally unconnected events and adjust the 
perceived time of the events and the delay between them accordingly. Buehner and 
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Humphreys (2009) further proposed that temporal binding should be termed “causal 
binding”. 
The causal binding account, therefore, parts ways with intentional binding accounts 
not only in the attribution of the effect solely to perceived causality, but in the function of 
temporal binding. Haggard et al. (2002) suggested that temporal binding strengthens the 
association between intentional actions (by the actor or another agent) and their effects. This 
approach suggests that this temporal illusion is in some way adaptive. In contrast, the causal 
binding account suggests it is the product of a top-down influence of prior beliefs on time 
perception, specifically the belief that causally related events are usually temporally 
contiguous. Temporal binding could therefore be regarded as a temporal illusion resulting 
from a typically adaptive process, rather than being adaptive in itself. The causal binding 
account may be viewed as more parsimonious, as it proposes fewer preconditions for 
temporal binding. All accounts, however, rely on theoretical assumptions regarding the 
nature of how time and causality or intentionality are perceived. 
2.3.3.1. Evidence for causal accounts of temporal binding 
To date, relatively few studies have directly compared the influence of perceived 
causality and agency on temporal binding directly, with the majority of experiments designed 
under the assumption that perceived agency is a necessary condition for temporal binding. 
As such, as discussed previously, the majority of studies on the effect of agency on temporal 
binding lack non-causal control conditions or utilise designs in which causality and agency 
are confounded. As such, many past findings can be viewed as supporting both causal and 
agency accounts, although that perceived causality is a necessary for temporal binding to 
occur remains uncontroversial (see Section 2.3.1). This section discusses findings which 
support the causal binding account, either through direct evidence for causal binding or 
challenges to agency accounts. 
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Few studies to date have attempted to investigate the predictions of the causal model 
of temporal binding directly. One such study, which has found evidence for temporal binding 
in the absence of perceived agency was carried out by Buehner (2012). Two experiments 
investigated temporal shifts in the perceived time of a visual flash between conditions in 
which the flash is caused by the participant’s button press (self-causal), a button press made 
by a machine (machine-causal), or is preceded by another flash of light which does not 
cause the second flash (control). Participants performed a key synchronisation task, in which 
they were asked to predict the time of the flash (or second flash in the control condition) by 
pressing a button. The results of two experiments found an earlier anticipation of the flash 
when it was caused by a button press, either self- or machine-caused, compared with the 
control condition. The findings of experiment 1 suggested that agency led to a larger 
perceptual shift at the fastest interval (500ms), but not at the other two. Experiment 2 did not 
replicate this, however. The findings of both experiments suggest temporal binding can 
occur in the absence of agency. 
A more recent again found evidence for the predictions of the causal account of 
temporal binding. When comparing voluntary and involuntary actions (Buehner, 2015) 
evidence of temporal binding was found when participants’ movements were involuntary. In 
voluntary trials participants pressed a key, which caused a tone after a 250ms delay. In 
involuntary trials participants’ fingers were pushed into the key by a machine. In non-causal 
trials two tones were played in sequence. Single-event baseline trials were also conducted. 
Participants estimated the times of key presses and tones in a Libet clock task. Temporal 
binding was found in both causal conditions compared with the two-tone condition, but the 
effect was of a greater magnitude when the keypress was voluntary. These findings were in 
line with those of Buehner (2012; experiment 1). The evidence for temporal binding being 
greater for self-action remains mixed, both in the findings reported by Buehner (2012; 2015), 
as well as studies comparing observed action with self-action (e.g. Engbert et al., 2007; 
Engbert et al., 2008; Wohlschlager et al., 2003a & b; see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.2). At the 
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time of writing, this effect remains relatively under-studied. It is worth noting that an 
“intentional boost” to temporal binding (Buehner, 2012) was hypothesised by Eagleman and 
Holcombe (2002), who suggested such an effect may be due to a greater certainty in causal 
beliefs when participants are able to interact with the stimuli, rather than observe them, 
although to date this has not been directly investigated.  
2.3.3.2. Evidence of temporal binding of signals to actions 
Agency accounts of temporal binding define temporal binding as occurring between 
actions and their sensory consequences. This is explicitly the case in Haggard et al.’s (2002) 
original theoretical account of the effect, as the effect was proposed to take place due to 
internal predictions of the sensory outcome of an action. Other agency accounts, while 
expanding on or differing from the forward model explanation, have not proposed temporal 
binding to take place between any other event pairs. In contrast, the causal account of 
temporal binding proposes that temporal binding may take place between any pairs of 
events, provided the first is believed by the observer to have caused the second. 
A series of experiments by Yabe and Goodale (2015) investigated temporal binding 
between signals and reactions and found results which were difficult to explain under agency 
accounts of temporal binding, while fitting with the predictions of the causal account. Yabe 
and Goodale (2015) found evidence for a forward shift in the perceived time of signals when 
they caused a participant’s movement, i.e. a temporal binding of a signal to the action it 
caused. In these experiments participants viewed a fast-rotating clock. During each trial, the 
clock would change colour and a rectangle would appear at the opposite side of the screen 
(experiments 1). Participants were either instructed to make a saccadic eye movement 
toward the rectangle when the signal appeared or continue to fixate on the clock. After each 
trial participants reported the position of the clock hand at the time of the signal (clock colour 
change). Results showed a shift of the perceived time of the signal toward the time of the 
eye movement, compared with control trials. In a second experiment participants performed 
a go-no-go task in which the colour of the signal determined whether an eye movement 
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should be made. The same shift was found on both go and no-go trials, compared with the 
control condition, suggesting temporal binding between the signal and the intention to act, 
rather than the eye movement itself. Finally, experiments 3a and 3b replicated the findings of 
experiment 2 with finger movements; either a key release action (experiment 3a) or a finger 
movement recorded by a light sensor (experiment 3b).  
Yabe, et al. (2017) expanded on this by investigating three-event chains in addition to 
the causal structures used in previous experiments (Yabe & Goodale, 2015). Here the 
signals and effects of actions were tones. Participants took part in conditions in which their 
actions caused an auditory event (AE), the action was performed in response to the event 
(EA) and single-event baseline conditions (E). In experiment 1 they also took part in event-
action-event (EAE) sequences, and action-event-action (AEA) sequences in experiment 2. In 
all conditions participants reported the times of tones using a Libet clock. Both experiments 
found shifts in the perceived times of tones toward the action, both when the tone was the 
cause of the action (EA) and when the tone was the consequence of the action (AE). 
Interestingly, when the tone was both caused by and resulted in an action (AEA trials), no 
shift was found, suggesting the event was perceptually “pulled” in both directions.  
These findings present a challenge to agency accounts of temporal binding. Yabe 
and Goodale (2015) suggested temporal binding may aid our understanding of causal 
relations between our actions and external events. This account places more emphasis on 
the role of causality, albeit still in the context of intentional actions. In contrast, the causal 
binding account predicts these findings, as well as a temporal binding of actions to the 
signals which caused them (although to date this has not been investigated). The findings of 
Yabe and Goodale (2015) and Yabe et al (2017) further suggest that differences in temporal 
binding between voluntary and involuntary actions may result from differences in the causal 
structure of trials present in experiment designs. It may be that the perceived times of 
involuntary actions are shifted toward the events which caused them, leading to what 
appears like lack of action binding. However, this cannot necessarily explain differences in 
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outcome binding. As the time of the cause determines the time of the effect, one might 
expect a commensurate shift in the perceived time of the tone toward the perceived time of 
its cause. More research is required to understand how more complex causal chains may 
influence temporal binding, and whether actions are perceptually bound to the signals which 
caused them, as would be predicted by the causal account of temporal binding. 
Nevertheless, these findings are predicted by the causal account of temporal binding, while 
difficult to explain under agency accounts of temporal binding. 
2.3.3.3. Evidence for causal binding from studies of individual 
differences 
As discussed previously (Section 2.3.2.4.), some studies of temporal binding in 
individual differences have found results consistent with the predictions of agency accounts 
of temporal binding (although they might also be explainable by the causal account). Other 
studies, however, have found results which were inconsistent with those predictions and 
which were in fact more consistent with the predictions of causal accounts.  
A key such challenge to agency accounts of temporal binding comes from 
differences in temporal binding between schizophrenia patients and matched controls 
(Haggard et al, 2003; Voss et al, 2010). Haggard et al (2003) carried out a similar temporal 
binding task to that reported by Haggard et al (2002) on schizophrenia patients and matched 
controls. Schizophrenia patients were of interest due to the abnormal experiences of agency 
such as delusions of influence present in many patients and have suggested to be linked to 
inaccuracies in motor predictions (see Frith, 2012, for a review). Contrary to the predictions 
of agency accounts, patients showed a greater temporal binding effect than controls, both in 
terms of absolute shifts in comparison with a non-intentional and non-causal control.  
Voss et al (2010) expanded on these findings by investigating the roles of prediction 
and retrospective inference and found that patients showed a greater effect of retrospective 
inference, again using a Libet clock task. The likelihood of the tone occurring was 
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manipulated between conditions (high likelihood = 75%, low likelihood = 50%). Patients 
showed action binding relative to baseline in all conditions, and greater action binding on 
trials in which the tone occurred compared to those in which no tone occurred. In controls, 
on the other hand, action binding relative to baseline measures was only found when the 
likelihood of the tone was high, on both tone and no-tone trials. Action binding in 
schizophrenia patients was not affected, therefore, by the probability of the outcome. This 
suggests a reduced predictive component and increased post-dictive component of temporal 
binding in participants with schizophrenia. The authors explained the overall difference in the 
magnitude of temporal binding between schizophrenia patients and healthy controls in terms 
of disruption to motor prediction processes in patients. The authors suggest that while 
schizophrenia patients often misattribute their own actions to external sources, here they 
showed an over-attribution of external events to their own actions, indicating a mismatch 
between implicit and explicit agency. It can be argued, however, that this may be due to 
aberrant probabilistic reasoning in schizophrenia (e.g. Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; 
Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988); patients exhibited greater action binding in the absence of a 
tone, which may alternatively suggest that patients failed to distinguish between the different 
levels of probability.  
These findings suggest the tendency to attribute one’s own actions to external 
sources did not seem to impair temporal binding, and in fact may have increased its 
magnitude. Under agency accounts of temporal binding this requires the assumption that 
explicit and implicit agency were at odds in this case, and therefore that temporal binding 
results from implicit, rather than explicit processes contributing to the perception of agency. 
However, as discussed in Section 2.3.2.3., other studies have found evidence for an effect of 
explicit beliefs regarding agency and causality on temporal binding (e.g. Desantis et al., 
2011; Dogge et al., 2012) rather than implicit agency. Alternatively, the causal binding 
account would suggest that differences in the magnitude of temporal binding may reflect a 
higher certainty in causal relationships, regardless of whether these are associated with 
51 
 
megalomania or delusions of influence. For instance, the “jumping to conclusions” bias, the 
bias towards making probabilistic judgements with less statistical information, has been 
found to occur significantly more often in schizophrenia patients than healthy controls (Moritz 
& Woodward, 2005), and in the general population among those who exhibit more paranoid 
ideation (Freeman, Pugh & Garety, 2008). 
Schizophrenia studies are limited due to a lack of random assignment; schizophrenia 
patients differ from healthy control in factors other than feelings of agency, for instance. 
Other studies have made use of ketamine to induce psychosis-like symptoms in order to 
further investigate the findings discussed above and found greater temporal binding in 
participants who were administered ketamine, compared with the placebo group (Moore et 
al, 2011; Moore et al, 2013). Again, as it is often used as a drug model of psychosis, 
ketamine is suggested by the authors to have a similar effect on the sense of agency. 
Interestingly, Moore et al. (2013), using a libet clock task, found a greater predictive 
component in action binding in the ketamine group as well as greater action binding overall, 
unlike the findings of previous studies with schizophrenia patients. Although it should be 
noted that ketamine is not a perfect drug model of psychosis, these findings show two 
examples in which mental states associated with reduced explicit agency had not led to a 
decrease in temporal binding, and the under- or over-reliance on prediction cannot explain 
both sets of findings.  
The interpretation of studies of temporal binding in individual differences may lead to 
a number of potential pitfalls. Firstly, it should be noted that the experience of agency is not 
the only psychological difference between groups. Secondly, there is the possibility of 
unfalsifiable predictions: since both reduced and increased temporal binding in 
schizophrenia patients and participants who were administered ketamine can be explained 
by agency accounts of temporal binding. Thirdly, there is a danger of circular reasoning. 
Findings which appear to show a positive relationship between agency and temporal binding 
can be seen both as evidence for agency accounts of temporal binding, and for the role of 
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agency in certain disorders or personality traits. Nevertheless, the findings discussed in this 
section are inconsistent with the view that a decreased sense of agency necessarily results 
in temporal binding, as these examples show conditions associated with a reduced sense of 
agency resulting in an increase in temporal binding. In contrast, the causal account of 
temporal binding can account for the findings in studies of schizophrenia and temporal 
binding.  
2.3.3.4. Causal accounts of temporal binding: summary 
In summary, the scope of agency accounts of temporal binding has greatly expanded 
since they were first attributed to forward models (Haggard et al, 2002). After sixteen years 
of research they must account for the necessity of a causal relationship between actions and 
outcomes in temporal binding, temporal binding in the observed actions of others, the lack of 
a repulsion effect in between involuntary actions and their effects and a possible dissociation 
between explicit agency and temporal binding in some cases, such as in schizophrenia. 
Recent findings have further challenged agency accounts in demonstrating a temporal 
binding of signals to their resultant actions, and evidence for temporal binding in the absence 
of agency.  
In contrast, the causal binding account has been relatively under-researched. While 
there is evidence that agency accounts may fail to account for some findings, evidence 
against other accounts of temporal binding does not necessarily constitute evidence for 
causal binding. At this time, some studies have found direct evidence for temporal binding in 
the absence of agency, which cannot be easily explained by agency accounts of temporal 
binding. It remains unclear why some studies have found a further “boost” to temporal 
binding due to agency, for instance whether this is due to differences in sensory feedback, 
increased certainty of causal relationships, or perhaps additive effects of the perception of 
causality and agency on time perception. Further investigations of the predictions made by 
causal and agency accounts of temporal binding are needed to determine whether either 
can better explain the effect. 
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2.4. Temporal binding in phenomenal causality 
Although causal inference has a central role in understanding temporal binding (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3), little attention has been paid to the role of phenomenal causality. 
Consequently, the question of whether the effects of causality on time perception are limited 
to inferred causality or are applicable to phenomenal causality remains unanswered. Further, 
phenomenal causality being at least as sensitive to temporal cues as inferred causality, if not 
more so (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3), it may be expected to exert a an even greater 
influence on time perception. This, in addition to the large body of research on stimuli which 
lead to visual causal impressions makes stimuli eliciting visual impressions of causality a 
potentially powerful tool in investigating the effects of causal perception on time perception.  
The existence of temporal binding in phenomenal causality would be consistent with 
the causal account of temporal binding. As phenomenal causality is affected by similar 
temporal cues to those affecting inferred causality, a reversal of the assumption that 
temporally contiguous events are more likely to be causally related may lead to changes in 
time and event perception. Two recent studies provide indirect evidence for the possibility of 
causal binding in phenomenal causality. While not investigating temporal binding directly, 
these have demonstrated reversals of other causal cues: spatial contiguity and temporal 
priority (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016). Such effects are 
consistent with causal binding accounts, which predict top-down effects of causal perception 
might apply to other Humean assumptions; for instance, Eagleman and Holcombe (2002) 
speculated that causally related events may be perceived as closer together in space. 
This has been confirmed by Buehner and Humphreys (2010). Two studies compared 
launching animations and delayed launches and found a contraction in the perceived spatial 
distance between the two launching objects at the point of collision, in conditions in which 
participants reported stronger visual impressions of causality. All animations contained a 
spatial gap filled with a grey bar. On some trials, participants reported causal ratings. On 
others, participants were asked to estimate the length of the grey bar seen in the animation 
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after viewing the animation. On these trials a similar grey bar with the same height but 
different width was presented to participants after the animation had ended. Participants 
estimated the length of the bar by extending it to the same length as the bar seen in the 
animation. Causal ratings were significantly higher for immediate launches and, as 
predicted, the reported size of the spatial gap was significantly smaller. A second experiment 
replicated these findings with the addition of two more animation types: priority violation (the 
“launched” object moved before the “launcher”) and upward launch, whereby the “launched” 
object moved vertically rather than horizontally. Again, estimates of the spatial gap were 
consistent with causal ratings, with more apparently causal animations eliciting smaller 
reported gaps. 
In addition to Buehner and Humphreys’ (2010) findings suggesting a reversal of the 
assumption of spatial contiguity between causally related events, Bechlivanidis and Lagnado 
(2016) reported a reversal of the perceived order of events in launching animations. In 
experiment 1, two groups of participants were shown one of two clips. One group was shown 
three objects: A (left), B (centre) and C (right). In each animation object A moved right and 
stopped upon reaching object B. Object C then moved right, followed by object B, which 
stopped at the original location of object C. The second group was presented a similar clip, 
but with the absence of object A. Here, object C moved first, followed by object B. 
Participants were then asked to report the order of events. Additionally, causal impressions 
were reported using a slider. The majority of participants who had observed the three-object 
animation reported the “causal” order of events (A, followed by B, followed by C) rather than 
the actual order, whereas the majority of participants in condition 2 correctly identified object 
C as moving before object B. Likewise, participants who had seen the three-event animation 
were significantly more likely to perceive object B as causing the movement of object C 
compared with those who had seen the two-object animation. In a second experiment the 
two-object animation was replaced with a three-object animation in which object B remained 
stationary while objects A and C moved in the same manner as in the other three-event 
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animation. Instead of answering questions about the temporal order seen in the animation, 
participants were shown two comparison animations, one of which was identical to the one 
seen previously and the other was a “domino effect” in which object A moved first, followed 
by the movement of object B, followed lastly by the movement of object C. Surprisingly, the 
majority of participants shown a three-object animation in which all objects moved chose the 
incorrect comparison animation, with the reverse found for group 2. These findings suggest 
participants perceived a temporal order consistent with the causal mechanism they were 
expecting. I.e., if the three objects moved right in sequence and stopped when reaching the 
next object, participants assumed this must have taken the form of a sequence of collisions. 
The above findings are line with the predictions of the causal account of temporal 
binding. However, direct investigations of temporal binding in phenomenal causality are 
scarce. At the time of writing, only one experiment has directly investigated temporal binding 
in phenomenal causality. Cravo, Claessen and Baldo’s (2009) findings suggested evidence 
for temporal binding when both visual causal impressions and intentional actions were 
present. This study made use of launching stimuli similar to those used by Michotte 
(1963/46; a schematic diagram of these stimuli can be seen in Figure 2.1.). Each trial began 
with two discs present on the screen and the borders of the stimuli were marked with vertical 
white lines on the right and left sides of the display. Each trial contained one of two 
animation types. The “collision” animations were based on Michotte’s launching effect stimuli 
and were intended to appear more causal. At the beginning of each collision trial, one object 
was shown adjacent to the left border of the display and the other in the centre. The leftmost 
object then moved toward the central object and stopped upon contacting the central object. 
Following a delay of either 200 or 300ms, the central object moved rightward, at the same 
velocity as the first object to move, until reaching the right border. In “non-collision” 
animations, intended as a non-causal control condition, both objects were presented 
alongside one another at the centre of the screen at the beginning of each trial. The object to 
the left moved first, toward the left border of the display. After the first object had reached the 
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border and stopped, the second object moved to the right following a delay of 200ms or 
300ms, as in collision animations. The experiment made use of a fully factorial design, with 
the two animation types presented in either “active” or “passive” blocks. In passive blocks 
participants viewed the animations. In active blocks participants controlled the first object to 
move using computer mouse buttons, whereby holding down the left mouse button caused 
the object to move to the left and holding down the right mouse button caused it to move to 
the right. Causal and temporal ratings were collected in separate blocks, for each condition. 
In causal blocks (10 trials per condition) participants were asked to report the extent to which 
they perceived the first moving object as causing the second object to move on a scale of 0-
10. In temporal blocks participants were asked to estimate the delay duration in milliseconds, 
between 0 and 1000ms. Significantly higher causal ratings were found for collision 
animations than for non-collision animations and in short intervals compared with long 
intervals. However, contrary to the predictions of the causal account of temporal binding, 
significantly shorter temporal estimates were only found in active blocks, with similar 
temporal estimates in all passive trials, and non-causal, active blocks. 
 
Figure 2.1. A schematic diagram of the stimuli used by Cravo et al. (2009) in the collision 
and non-collision conditions. Figure reproduced with permission. 
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These findings have since been reported as evidence for perceived causality being 
necessary, but not sufficient for temporal binding to occur (e.g. Moore & Obhi, 2012). There 
are, however, several limitations to this interpretation of the evidence. Most importantly, it 
does not take into consideration the distinction between inferred and phenomenal causality. 
On each active trial participants had caused all subsequent visual events by moving the left 
object to its stopping point. This was evident to participants; the left object only moved when 
participants held down the mouse key and the remainder of each animation played when the 
object controlled by participants reached its stopping point. The visual causal impressions 
elicited by the animations, on the other hand, were stronger for collision compared with non-
collisions. As such, visual causal impressions and inferred causality were at times at odds, 
with only active-collision trials both appearing causal and containing an actual causal 
relationship between the participant’s actions and the visual events that followed. 
Furthermore, only two animation types were used in the study and the findings cannot 
necessarily be applied to all cases of phenomenal causality or generalised to inferred 
causality.  
Returning to the common interpretation of Cravo et al.’s findings, it appears that the 
mere presence of perceived causality is often assumed to be sufficient for temporal binding 
to take place and causality’s role in temporal binding is restricted either to a binary, present 
or absent status, or a single continuous variable. However, in 75% of the conditions used by 
Cravo et al. some form a perceived causal relationship was present: phenomenal causality 
in all collision trials, inferred causality in all active trials, and both in active-collision trials. It is 
unknown how phenomenal and inferred causality may interact, if at all, under either agency 
or causal accounts of temporal binding.  
2.5. The aims and scope of the thesis 
While the findings discussed above suggest the possibility of temporal binding in 
phenomenal causality, it remains uncertain due to the dearth of research on the subject and 
the absence of any published replication attempts of Cravo et al.’s (2009) study. It must be 
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considered that phenomenal and inferred causality result from different processes 
(Schlottman & Shanks, 1992) and cannot necessarily be said to have the same influence on 
time perception. This thesis aims, therefore, to further investigate temporal binding in 
phenomenal causality; whether it exists, how the effects of visual causal impressions on time 
perception may differ from those of inferred causality, and whether this supports the causal 
account of temporal binding.  
Several hypotheses may be considered on the basis of previous research. If 
temporal binding results from the relationship between time perception causality in general, 
temporal binding should occur due to phenomenal causality. However, a lack of temporal 
binding in phenomenal causality may suggest that temporal binding results specifically from 
the cognitive processes leading to causal inferences and not visual impressions of causality. 
It is less clear why, under agency accounts, phenomenal causality would contribute to 
temporal binding. Temporal binding has been suggested to contribute to the attribution of 
outcomes to one’s actions (Haggard et al., 2002), with similar processes taking place when 
the actions of others are observed (Wohlschlager et al., 2003a). The prevailing assumption 
is that temporal binding results from motor prediction processes underestimating delays 
between actions and their sensory outcomes, provided that these outcomes are predicted by 
the action. To explain Cravo et al.’s (2009) findings, this requires the assumption that the 
illusion of causality is sufficient for such motor predictions to take place. Furthermore, visual 
impressions of events as non-causally related would result in a lack of temporal binding, 
even when the stimuli giving rise to these impressions are caused by the observer’s actions. 
Whether temporal binding occurs in phenomenal causality is of theoretical importance for 
both causal and agency accounts of temporal binding. This raises the question of why more 
investigations of temporal binding in phenomenal causality had not been carried out. 
The majority of phenomenal causality stimuli that exist to date present a difficulty in 
their application to temporal binding research. Namely, the apparent cause and effect 
sequence is typically immediate (e.g. collision-launch), with a very short or entirely absent 
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temporal gap between the two. Temporal delays diminish causal impression to such an 
extent that they may be used as non-causal control stimuli (e.g. Buehner & Humphreys, 
2010). Launching animations, while extensively studied and effective in producing strong 
causal impressions, are highly sensitive to delays. The threshold at which delays cause 
stimuli to appear non-causal varies depending on context, such as the range of delay 
intervals presented and the types of animations presented (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3 for 
more detail). Consequently, variations in design, such as the types of animations used and 
the order of presentation, may lead to unintended causal or non-causal impressions. Indeed, 
despite the relative difference in causal ratings between animation types, Cravo et al. (2009) 
reported mean causal ratings only marginally higher than the mid-point of the measurement 
scale in “causal” animations, with delays of 300ms. Further, the less distinct the causal 
impressions between animation types are, the greater the possibility that some participants 
may not perceive one condition as more causal than the other, affecting the findings. An 
optimal, visually causal stimulus would therefore maintain causal impressions in the 
presence of temporal delays, irrespective of the duration of the delay. 
The effects of temporal delays have been found to be overcome with the use of cues 
to generative transmission (White, 2015). Generative transmission refers to the transference 
of causal influence across a temporal and/or spatial gap. For instance, Shultz (1982) found 
that children as young as two showed a preference for generative transmission cues over 
temporal or spatial contiguity. One such example is the effect of a blower blowing out a lit 
candle at a distance (Shultz, 1982, experiment 1); while the blower is not spatially 
contiguous with the candle it is understood that air provides a medium by which the rotation 
of the fan blades can extinguish the flame at a distance. White (2015) used an abstract, 
visual representation of such a medium to retain causal impressions in launching animations 
containing both a temporal and spatial gap (see Figure 2.2 for an example of these stimuli). 
In experiment 1 the gap was filled with an array of rectangles which changed colour in 
sequence from the direction of the launcher object to the direction of the target (launched) 
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object. Here, causal impressions were stronger compared with stimuli in which the gap 
objects did not change colour, or an empty gap. Interestingly, longer delays did reduce 
causal impressions, although to a lesser extent than in the absence of the colour change 
sequence. Experiment 2 used a reversed colour change sequence - from the direction of the 
target to the direction of the launcher – as a control condition and found similar results; the 
colour change sequence only led to stronger causal impressions when it occurred in the 
same direction as the movement of the launching objects. This demonstrates that the 
increase in causal ratings is not due to the presence of a colour change sequence alone, but 
that it must take place in the direction of the causal sequence. 
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Figure 2.2. A schematic diagram of stimuli used by White (2015) to cause visual impressions 
of generative transmission. A moving object was seen moving rightward from the left side of 
the screen (a). Upon “collision” with the leftmost gap object, the gap objects began to 
change colour in sequence, from left to right (b & c). Finally, the rightmost object began to 
move rightward after all gap objects had changed colour. Figure reproduced with permission. 
 
Further, the findings of four additional experiments suggests this is not merely the 
result of a “tool effect”, whereby the colour change sequence implies the movement of an 
intermediate object. Experiment 3 showed that causal ratings were higher as the number of 
gap objects increased, resulting in a more continuous cue to generative transmission. 
Experiments 4a, b and c used different gap events and found similar results. When the gap 
objects “jumped” up rather than changing colour (experiment 4a), shrank (experiment 4b) or 
disappeared (experiment 4c) in sequence, high causal ratings were observed despite the 
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presence of spatial and temporal gaps. These findings cannot be explained by participants 
perceiving the gap sequences as a third, intermediary object. It remains the most credible 
explanation that the increase in causal ratings is due to the perception of the transmission of 
causal force from the launcher to the target, through the medium represented by the gap 
objects. 
Such stimuli allow us to overcome the drawbacks of delayed launch stimuli, such as 
those used by Cravo et al. (2009). High causal ratings can be retained over much longer 
time duration between the stopping of the launcher and “launch” of the target object than 
those usually tolerated, with less susceptibility to context effects. Reversed gap sequences 
provide a useful non-causal control; the stimuli are visually similar and contain a similar 
temporal sequence of events. For these reasons, the experiments described in this thesis 
made use of stimuli with cues to generative transmission to investigate temporal binding in 
phenomenal causality, with the aim of shedding more light on the role of causality in 
temporal binding. 
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3. Chapter 3: Investigations of Temporal Binding in Phenomenal Causality 
Stimuli Using Interval Estimation and Interval Reproduction Methods 
As discussed previously, previous temporal binding research has largely overlooked 
phenomenal causality (with the exception of Cravo et al., 2009), with inferred causality and 
phenomenal causality often conflated in discussions of causality in the temporal binding 
literature. While the causal account of temporal binding makes clear predictions regarding 
temporal binding in phenomenal causality, the interpretation of such an effect requires 
additional assumptions in agency models. Consequently, investigation began with 
investigations of the predictions of the causal account of temporal binding. Temporal binding 
in phenomenal causality, in the absence of agency would suggest both evidence for the 
causal account and for an effect of phenomenal causality on time perception. A lack of such 
an effect may indicate that phenomenal causality does not affect time perception in the same 
manner as inferred causality. Experiments 1-3 were designed to test for an effect of 
perceived causality on perceived delay intervals. Experiments 4-6 tested alternative 
explanations for the findings, aside from those predicted by the causal account of temporal 
binding. The slope analyses presented in Section 3.10 test for a direct relationship between 
causal impressions and perceived interval durations across experiments 1-6.  
3.1. Stimuli 
The experiments discussed in this chapter employed several different animations 
adapted from those used previously by White (2015; discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5). In 
experiments 1-5 experiments the animations were presented inside a visual aperture placed 
in the centre of the screen, with a grey background. All animations contained two moving 
objects: the launcher (black) on the left side of the screen and the target (white) on the right 
side of the screen. Both moved from left to right. The launcher was always the first to move, 
followed by the movement of the target after a delay (delay intervals are detailed in the 
methods), with the two never coming directly in contact with one another. The animation 
types differed mainly in the contents of the spatial and temporal gap between the stopping of 
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the launcher and the launch of the target. In all but one the gap was filled with a series of 
eight rectangles (gap objects) which were spatially separated. Below are descriptions of the 
gap sequence types used in experiments 1-6. 
The “forward” gap sequence type can be seen in Figure 3.1 (below). Here, the gap 
objects changed colour from grey to black in sequence, from the direction of the launcher to 
that of the target. This sequence began at the point at which the launcher made contact with 
the leftmost gap object, with the launch of the target taking place at the end of the sequence. 
Previous research (White, 2015) indicates that this acts as a visual cue to generative 
transmission, and observers are likely to perceive the sequence of events as a causal 
launch whereby the launcher brings about the movement of the target. As such, this 
animation type is used here as a baseline “causal” stimulus. 
 
Figure 3.1. Screenshots (cropped) of the forward gap sequence type (experiments 1-6). The 
launcher is offscreen at the beginning of the trial (image 1) and moves toward the gap 
objects (image 2). Upon collision the gap sequence begins (image 3) until all the gap objects 
had changed colour (image 5), at which point the target begins to move to the right. 
 
In the “backward” gap sequence type (Figure 3.2, below) a similar colour change 
sequence takes place in the reverse direction, from right to left, i.e. from the direction of the 
target to the direction of the launcher. The movement of the launching objects and the timing 
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of the colour changes remained identical. This gap sequence was used as a baseline “non-
causal” animation, as past research indicates that such a sequence results in significantly 
weaker causal impressions than the forward gap sequence (White, 2015). 
 
Figure 3.2. Screenshots (cropped) of the backward gap sequence type (experiments 1-6). 
The gap sequence (images 3-5) took place in the reverse direction to that seen in forward 
gap sequence animations. 
 
“Empty gap” animations (Figure 3.3) were used to test the suitability of the backward 
gap sequence type as a non-causal control. Here, the gap objects are absent and the visual 
and spatial gap between the launching objects is empty. Several studies (discussed in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3) have established that visual causal impressions are significantly 
lessened by the presence of visual and spatial gaps between launching objects, with lower 
causal impressions the larger the gaps (e.g. Michotte, 1946/63; Yela, 1952).  
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Figure 3.3. Screenshots (cropped) of the empty gap sequence type (experiment 1). The 
launching objects moved in the same way as in other animations but were separated by an 
empty gap. 
 
The “offset” gap sequences (Figure 3.4) were the same as the forward gap 
sequences, with the launching objects vertically offset from the gap objects. It was 
hypothesised that these will lead to lower causal impressions than forward gap sequences, 
but higher than the backward gap sequences. This was based on previous findings showing 
that causal impressions elicited by launching animations decrease as the spatial gap 
between the launching objects increases (e.g. Michotte, 1946/63), but impressions of 
“launching at a distance” are possible, depending on the size of the spatial gap. Here, it was 
hypothesised that, in a similar fashion, the spatial separation between the gap stimuli and 
the launching objects would serve to lessen causal impressions compared with the other 
forward gap sequence type, while maintaining higher causal impressions than the backward 
gap sequence, which implies no generative transmission. This gap sequence type is useful 
in adding a further degree of causal impression. While differences in the perceived length of 
delays between the forward and backward and gap sequence animations might be 
accounted for by other perceptual differences, a consistent effect of causal impressions on 
perceived delays across three animation types would be less likely to result from the visual 
differences between these animations. 
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Figure 3.4. Screenshots (cropped) of the offset gap sequence type (experiments 2 and 3). 
The gap sequence and movement of the launching objects are the same as in the forward 
gap sequence type, but the launching objects are vertically offset from the gap objects 
 
Two “continuous” gap sequences were used in experiment 1: continuous colour 
change, and continuous colour change with covariation cues (Figures 3.5 and 3.6, 
respectively). In continuous colour change animations, the colour change sequence took 
place continuously, from grey to black and then from black to grey during the entire length of 
the animation. The launcher only became visible when all eight gap objects had changed 
colour. The movement of the launching object was controlled such that the gap objects were 
all grey at the moment of collision, followed by a grey-to-black colour change sequence. As 
such, these animations were identical to the forward gap sequence animations between the 
stopping of the launcher and movement of the target, but with the colour change sequence 
occurring before the collision and continuing after the launch. This animation was used to 
test whether participants were relying on inference, rather than visual impressions, when 
reporting causal ratings. Here, covariation between the “collision” of the launcher with the 
gap stimuli and the onset of the gap sequence is low: the gap sequence is seen to take 
place both prior to and following the collision event. Similarly, not all colour change 
sequences result in the launch of the target. If participants infer causal judgements from 
1
5
3
2
6
4
68 
 
covariation cues - rather than visual impressions of generative transmission, as suggested 
by White (2015) - causal ratings would be expected to be lower as a result. 
The “continuous gap sequences with covariation” animations were used as a control 
for continuous gap sequences. Here, a continuous colour change sequence took place, but 
was altered following the collision. At the beginning of the trial this was a grey-to-white 
sequence which changed to a grey-to-black sequence on collision. As such, these 
animations were very similar to the continuous gap sequence, but the nature of the 
sequence was altered by the collision and a launch only occurred following a grey-to-black 
sequence, rather than a grey-to-white sequence.  
 
Figure 3.5. Screenshots (cropped) of the continuous gap sequence type (experiment 1). A 
forward grey-to-black gap sequence (images 1-3) took place at the beginning of each 
animation, followed by a black-to-grey sequence. This took place twice before collision 
(image 7). The colour change sequences continuous after the launch (images 9 and 10). 
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Figure 3.6. Screenshots (cropped) of continuous gap sequences with covariation 
(experiment 1). These were similar to the continuous gap sequence, with the exception that 
colour change sequences took place from grey to white and from white to grey prior to the 
collision. 
 
3.2. Measures of perceived intervals 
Measures of the perceived interval length were used, as they are most appropriate 
for use with the stimuli described above. As discussed in Chapter 2, Libet clocks have been 
the most commonly measure in studying temporal binding. However, as participants were 
required to attend to visual stimuli in these experiments, it would have required their 
attention to be split between the rotating clock hand and the launching and gap objects. 
Direct interval estimation and interval reproduction have both been used successfully in the 
past to replicate the temporal binding effect and do not require participants to attend to 
additional visual stimuli (e.g. Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Moore et al., 2009). In direct 
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interval estimation tasks participants report their perceived duration of time intervals between 
two events in milliseconds (0-1000). In interval reproduction tasks the participant holds down 
a key for the perceived duration of each interval. 
 Both measures were used in these experiments: direct interval estimation in 
experiments 1 and 2, and interval reproduction in experiment 3 onward. Direct interval 
estimation has the advantage of having been more extensively used, and therefore more 
established, in temporal binding research and in time perception research in general. The 
task is less natural to participants, however, most of whom would not have much experience 
of measuring time intervals in milliseconds. This method may create a risk of participants 
responding in a stereotyped way, for instance by rounding temporal judgements. There is 
further a risk of anchoring effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) whereby estimates are made 
relative to the previous estimate made, rather than being independent, absolute estimates. 
Direct interval estimates further necessitate the use of an arbitrary upper threshold to the 
rating scale to avoid participants providing largely outlying estimates due to a 
misunderstanding of the scale. This means participants’ responses are capped, affecting the 
range and distribution of each participant’s responses. Lastly, the use of a numeric scale 
may create a greater risk of demand characteristics as participants are able to accurately 
match temporal ratings to causal judgements, depending on what they believe the intention 
of the experimenter to be. Interval reproduction tasks overcome these issues to an extent. 
Although anchoring and demand characteristics may still affect findings, participants cannot 
be as deliberate in adjusting their estimates due to these influences, as they do not have 
access to objective feedback of their estimate as they are when the estimate is typed. 
Further, participants can make use of the full resolution of the scale as it does not require 
them to explicitly measure their estimates in milliseconds. In addition, no arbitrary upper 
threshold is needed. The drawback of using interval reproduction tasks is that they have not 
been used as often in temporal binding research. Nevertheless, both tasks have been shown 
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to be useful in studying temporal binding. Here, both were used in order to establish that any 
effects, or lack of effects, found are replicable across different measures of time perception. 
3.3. Experiment 1 
3.3.1. Methods 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
31 Cardiff University students and staff (4 male, age range 18-52, one not reported) 
were recruited using Cardiff University’s Experiment Management System. Participants took 
part in exchange for a payment of £3. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. 
3.3.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
The experiment was run using an i-Mac 2 ” computer, running Apple Mac OS X 
10.9.4 (Mavericks). Stimuli were presented on the monitor, at a resolution of 2,560 by 1,440 
pixels (59.5 by 33.5cm) and refresh rate of 60Hz. Participants responses were recorded 
using a computer keyboard. The experiment was run using PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019). 
All instructions were presented on the screen with a text height of 20 pixels (0.46cm) 
and wrap width of 800 pixels (18.59cm). The experiment made use of five animation types: 
the forward, backward, empty, continuous and continuous-with-covariation gap sequences 
described above. In all animations a red fixation cross (15 by 15 pixels, 0.35 by 0.35cm) was 
visible 44 pixels (1.02cm) above the centre of the screen. The gap objects and launching 
objects were rectangular, 32 pixels wide by 64 pixels high (0.74 by 1.49cm). Gap objects 
were separated by a 4 pixel (0.09cm) gaps. The animations were presented inside a visual 
aperture 926 pixels wide and 600 pixels tall (25.12cm by 13.95cm), which was placed at the 
centre of the screen and surrounded by a black border. 
All animations were presented at fast, medium and slow speeds, and with 
corresponding short, medium and long delays between the stopping of the launcher object 
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and “launch” of the target object. At all animation speeds the rate of the colour change 
sequence was proportionate to the speed of the launching objects, such that the gap 
sequences were of the same duration as the duration taken for the launching objects to 
travel the width of the row of the spatial gap. The colour change sequence occurred at the 
same speed as the movement of the launching objects, therefore. At fast speeds, the 
launching objects travelled 18 pixels (0.42cm) per frame, and the gap sequence took place 
at a rate of one colour change every 2 frames (33.33 milliseconds). At medium speeds the 
launching objects travelled at 12 pixels (0.28cm) per frame and the gap sequence took place 
at one colour change every 3 frames (50 milliseconds). Lastly, at slow speeds the launching 
objects travelled at 9 pixels (0.21cm) per frame and the gap sequence took place at a rate of 
one colour change every 4 frames (66.67 milliseconds). The target object launched after the 
same period of time as a single gap object colour change, such that the temporal delays 
between the stopping of the launcher and movement of the target were 266.67, 400.00 or 
533.33 milliseconds at fast, medium and slow speeds, respectively. 
To account for the number of colour change sequences required to take place before 
the collision in continuous gap sequence animations, the launcher entered the aperture after 
800, 1,200 and 1,600ms at fast, medium and slow speeds, respectively. In all other 
animations, the same timing was retained to ensure that the length of each trial did not vary 
within speed conditions. For the same reason, after the beginning of the “launch”, each trial 
ended after twice the duration of the temporal delay between collision and launch.  
3.3.1.3. Design and procedure 
The study used a two-factor design, with the five gap sequence types and three 
animation speeds described in the materials section. All gap sequence types were presented 
at all animation speeds, with a total of 15 unique animations.  
For each of the 15 animations, participants completed 5 causal and 5 temporal trials. 
In causal trials, participants were asked to report their impression of whether the launcher 
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object caused the target object to move on a scale of 0-100 (0 = “definitely no”, 100 = 
“definitely yes”). Participants were prompted with the following instructions: “did you have the 
impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of the white rectangle?”. In 
temporal trials participants were asked to report their perceived length of the temporal delay 
between the stopping of the launcher object and the movement of the target object (referred 
to as the black and white objects) in milliseconds, between 0 and 1,000. Participants were 
reminded that there are 1,000 milliseconds in a second prior to the temporal trials.  
Participants completed causal and temporal trials in separate blocks. Within each 
block the order of presentation of the 75 trials, including all combinations of speed and gap 
sequence type, was randomised. The presentation order of the two blocks was 
counterbalanced, with each participant randomly assigned to carry out either the causal or 
temporal block first. Each block contained five practice trials, during which data was not 
collected. In these, the five gap sequence types were presented at randomly selected 
speeds, such that each gap sequence type was presented once. 
Participants were tested individually. Upon arrival, all participants were presented 
with an electronic consent form. After consent was granted, participants were presented with 
instructions prior to beginning the experiment, and before the practice and experimental 
blocks. Participants were instructed about the nature of the task and the animations which 
would be presented (full instructions can be seen in Appendix A). For causal trials, the 
instructions explained the task and only mentioned that the animations may or may not 
appear causal to the participant, without any implications regarding which animation types 
are designed to give a stronger causal impression. Similar instructions were provided for the 
temporal block, explaining the nature of the task. In both blocks of trials participants were 
informed that they may alert the experimenter at any time if they have questions regarding 
the task. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and given their payment.   
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3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Exclusions 
One participant’s data was lost due to a technical error and is not included in the 
analysis. In two cases, a technical fault allowed participants to enter temporal estimates over 
1,000 milliseconds. These trials were excluded from analysis (one trial for each of the two 
participants). 
3.3.2.2. Causal ratings 
For each condition, the mean causal rating was computed per participant. Overall, 
participants reported the highest mean causal impressions for the forward gap sequences 
(81.19, SD = 14.34). Lower mean causal impressions were reported for the continuous + 
covariation gap sequences (72.79, SD = 17.96) and continuous gap sequences (69.85, SD = 
18.49). The lowest mean causal ratings were reported for the backward (35.73, SD = 25.40) 
and empty gap sequences (31.91, SD = 25.60).  
Causal ratings varied to a lesser degree between animation speeds; the highest 
mean causal ratings were found at fast speeds (61.79, SD = 14.76), followed by the medium 
(57.40, SD = 14.50) and slow speeds (55.70, SD = 17.03). See Figure 3.7 for a summary of 
these findings. 
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Figure 3.7. Mean causal rating by gap sequence type and animation speed. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Each participant’s mean causal ratings were analysed using a two-way, repeated-
measures ANOVA. The assumption of sphericity, as tested using Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity, was violated in all comparisons; the main effect of gap sequence type (χ2(9) = 
77.53, p < .001, ε = .61), animation speed (χ2(2) = 20.41, p < .001, ε = .66) and the 
interaction between the two (χ2(35) = 75.09, p < .001, ε = .57). As such, the degrees of 
freedom reported below have been corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
The analysis found significant main effects of gap sequence type (F(2.42, 70.29) = 
57.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .66) and animation speed (F(1.32, 38.22) = 8.78, p = .003, ηp2 = .23). 
The interaction was not statistically significant (F(4.56, 132.22) = 1.76, p = .13, ηp2 = .06). 
Planned contrasts were carried out on the two main effects. Repeated contrasts were 
used, with the gap sequence types tested in the expected order from most to least causal: 
forward, continuous + covariation, continuous, backward and empty gap. Based on previous 
research, both the backward and empty gap sequences were expected to appear least 
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causal, as they contained no cues to generative transmission; it remained uncertain, 
however whether a difference would be observed between the two. Likewise, both of the 
continuous colour change gap sequence types were novel and it was not known whether 
they would elicit different causal impressions. However, there was no theoretical reason to 
expect they would lead to greater perceived causality than the forward gap sequence types, 
while both may be expected to lead to lower causal ratings if they were affected by 
contingency. 
These comparisons found significant differences in causal ratings between the 
forward and continuous + covariation gap sequences (F(1, 29) = 8.71, p = .006, ηp2 = .23), 
between the continuous + covariation and the continuous gap sequences (F(1, 29) = 11.48, 
p = .002, ηp2 = .28) and between the continuous and backward gap sequences (F(1, 29) = 
56.347, p < .001, ηp2 = .66). There was no significant difference in causal ratings between the 
backward and empty gap sequences (F(1, 29) = .70, p = .41, ηp2 = .02).  
Similarly, repeated contrasts were carried out on the speed conditions, with the fast 
and medium, and medium and slow conditions being compared, due to previous findings 
showing that causal ratings decrease as the temporal gap between the stopping of the 
launcher and movement of the target increases (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3). A significant 
difference in mean causal ratings was found between the fast and medium speeds (F(1, 29) 
= 17.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .37), but not between the medium and slow speeds (F(1, 29) = 1.60, 
p = .22, ηp2 = .05). 
3.3.2.3. Interval estimate errors 
Each participant’s mean temporal estimate was calculated for each condition. To 
produce the estimate errors, the real gap intervals (266.67, 400 and 533.33ms in the fast, 
medium and slow conditions, respectively) were subtracted from each mean estimate. 
Overall, the mean estimate errors were lowest for the forward gap sequences 
(2.58ms, SD = 145.09ms), followed by the continuous + covariation gap sequences 
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(15.87ms, SD = 157.77ms), the continuous gap sequences (16.76, SD = 153.24ms), the 
backward gap sequences (43.56, SD = 154.69ms) and the empty gap sequences 
(135.71ms, SD = 157.91ms). Notably, the estimate errors were much higher for the empty 
gap sequences than all other gap sequence types. 
The estimate errors suggest a tendency to overestimate at all animation speeds, with 
mean estimate errors of 36.44ms at fast speeds (SD = 110.76ms), 49.65ms at medium 
speeds (SD = 141.35ms) and 42.60ms at slow speeds (SD = 176.12). A summary of the 
temporal estimate errors can be seen in Figure 3.8.  
 
Figure 3.8. Mean estimate errors by gap sequence type and animation speed. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The data were analysed using a two-way, repeated-measures ANOVA. The 
assumption of sphericity, as tested using Mauchly’s test of sphericity, was violated for the 
main effects of gap sequence type (χ2(9) = 72.90, p < .001, ε = .42) and animation speed 
(χ2(2) = 30.57, p < .001, ε = .60). The assumption of sphericity was not violated for the 
interaction term (χ2(35) = 35.19, p = .47). The degrees of freedom reported below have been 
corrected with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction where appropriate. 
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The analysis found significant main effects of gap sequence type (F(1.67, 48.49) = 
14.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .34) and a significant interaction between gap sequence type and 
animation speed (F(8, 232) = 2.41, p = .02, ηp2 = .08). There was no significant main effect of 
animation speed (F(1.2, 34.85) = .41, p = .5 , ηp2 = .01). 
As causal binding would predict estimate errors to be the converse of causal ratings, 
i.e. higher causal ratings would be expected to lead to lower temporal estimate errors, the 
same planned contrasts were used here as for the causal ratings. Planned comparisons 
were not carried out on the different speeds, as the main effect was not found to be 
statistically significant. Of the pairwise comparisons carried out on the gap sequence types, 
a significant effect was only found when comparing the backward and empty gap sequence 
types (F(1, 29) = 15.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .35). No significant effects were found when 
comparing the forward and continuous gap sequence with covariation (F(1, 29) = 1.99, p = 
.17, ηp2 = .06), the two continuous gap sequence conditions (F(1, 29) = .01, p = .93, ηp2 < 
.001), or the continuous gap sequence and backward gap sequence (F(1, 29) = 2.99, p = 
.10, ηp2 = .09). As no interaction between animation type and speed was found in the causal 
ratings analysis, any interactions found here were not of theoretical interest as they do not 
present clear evidence for or against temporal binding (see Appendix B for an exploration of 
the interaction between gap sequence type and animation speed).  
3.3.3. Discussion 
Causal rating corroborated previous findings. Participants made a clear distinction in 
causal ratings between forward gap sequences and backward or empty gap sequences. 
Significant differences in causal ratings between the forward and continuous + covariation, 
and the continuous + covariation and continuous gap sequences, suggested that covariation 
may have played a role in causal judgements. However, these differences were much 
smaller in magnitude and effect size than the differences between backward gap sequences 
and continuous gap sequences, suggesting that covariation cannot account for the bulk of 
the difference in causal ratings between the forward and backward gap sequence types. 
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Additionally, the covariation between the colour change sequence and launch in the 
backward gap sequence type did not appear to increase causal ratings compared with the 
empty gap sequence animations. Overall, the forward and backward gap sequence types 
succeeded in eliciting distinct causal (forward) and non-causal (backward) impressions, 
while being visually similar. The similarity of causal ratings between the backward and empty 
gap sequence types suggests the backward gap sequence type acts as an effective non-
causal control condition as it does not moderate the effect of the temporal and spatial gap on 
causal ratings. 
Analyses of temporal estimate errors did not find evidence for temporal binding in 
phenomenal causality. The main effect of gap sequence type on estimate errors appears to 
be driven by a substantial over-estimation of empty gap intervals compared with other 
animation types, while there was no evidence for any other significant differences in estimate 
errors. This is surprising given that past research has shown that time intervals tend to be 
overestimated when they are filled with stimuli, including visual stimuli (the “filled duration 
illusion”, e.g. Buffardi, 1971). However, the empty gap sequence animations differ from 
others in predictability. When the gaps were empty, participants did not have as reliable a 
cue to the point in time at which the launcher will stop. Similarly, the colour change 
sequences, regardless of direction, allowed participants to anticipate the time of the launch 
regardless of the animation speed. The effect of the empty gap sequences on interval 
estimate errors appears, therefore, to be driven by factors other than perceived causality. 
Predictability may be one such factor, although it is not possible to determine whether this 
was the case based on the findings of experiment 1.  
One possibility is that the lack of significant differences in temporal estimate errors is 
due to a lack of statistical power. However, the sample size used here (30 participants) is 
larger than many repeated-measures temporal binding studies, and smaller samples have 
been used to replicate the effect in the past. The number of trials per condition was relatively 
small, however, which may have increased the variance of mean temporal estimates.  
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Experiments 2 and 3 retained the forward and backward gap sequence types, as 
these were effective in yielding distinct high and low causal impressions, respectively. In 
Experiment 2 the measures of interval perceptual and causal judgements were also retained 
but increased to 10 trials per condition. Experiment 3 made use of an interval reproduction 
task in which participants were asked to hold down a key for the duration of the gap interval 
in order to test whether the same results are replicated across different measures of interval 
judgements. The offset gap sequence type (see Figure 3.4 in Section 3.1) was added as an 
intermediary level of perceived causality, between the extreme high and low ratings found for 
forward and backward gap sequences. The aim of using three levels of causal impressions 
rather than two was to prevent an effect of animation type from being inconclusive. Due to 
perceptual differences between the forward and backward gap sequence animations it would 
not possible to entirely discount factors unrelated to causality as contributing to any effects 
found. Such factors are, however, less likely to explain a pattern of findings consistent with 
causal binding at three levels of perceived causality and containing different perceptual 
differences.  
3.4. Experiment 2 
3.4.1. Methods 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
31 Cardiff University students (3 male, age range 18-24) were recruited using Cardiff 
University’s Experiment Management System. Participants took part in exchange for course 
credit. Participants who took part in experiment 1 were not permitted to sign up for this study. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
3.4.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
All visual stimuli were presented on a computer monitor, with a computer keyboard 
used for participant input. The computer monitor was 47cm wide by 30cm tall. Stimuli were 
presented at a resolution of 1,680 by 1,050 pixels, at a refresh rate of 60 frames per second. 
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The experiment programme was coded and run in PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019). All 
instructions were presented on the monitor. 
The experiment made use of the forward, offset and backward gap sequence 
animations. The stimuli dimensions, set in pixels, were retained from experiment 1. Due to 
the difference in monitor size and resolution, the absolute sizes of the stimuli differed from 
experiment 1, with the relative sizes of visual objects remaining the same. The fixation cross 
was 0.42cm by 0.42cm in size and positioned 1.23cm above the centre of the screen. The 
launching and gap objects were 0.90cm wide and 1.79cm tall, with gap objects separated by 
0.11cm gaps. In offset gap sequence animations the launching objects were presented 100 
pixels (2.80cm) below the vertical centre of the screen. 
The timings of each event remained unchanged from experiment 1. The absolute 
velocity of the launching object changed along with object sizes, such that the launching 
objects moved at 0.50 cm per frame at fast speeds, 0.36cm at medium speeds and 0.25cm 
at slow speeds. The durations of the gap intervals remained at 266.67ms, 400.00ms or 
533.33ms in fast, medium and slow animations. 
3.4.1.3. Design and procedure 
  The experiment used a factorial design, with three gap sequence types (forward, 
offset and backward) and three animation speeds (fast, medium and slow). Altogether there 
were 9 different animation types. See the materials section for more detail on the gap 
sequence types and speeds.  
Two outcomes measures were collected in separate tasks. After viewing each 
animation participants were asked to report either causal ratings or temporal estimates. The 
causal judgement task and interval estimation task used in experiment 1, including the 
instructions, were used in experiment 2, with the number of trials per condition increased to 
10 (90 causal judgement trials and 90 interval estimation trials in total).  
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Causal and temporal trials were presented in separate blocks, with a 
counterbalanced order. Each block contained 10 trials per condition (90 in total), preceded 
by a practice block containing one trial of each gap sequence type, at a randomly selected 
speed. Data was not recorded during practice trials. Each block was preceded by a set of 
instructions (see Appendix A for full instructions). The two measures were tested in separate 
counterbalanced blocks. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two block 
orders. All animation types at each speed were presented in a randomised order within each 
block. 
Up to three participants at a time were tested in separate rooms. Upon arrival 
participants were presented with an electronic consent form. After granting consent, 
participants were presented with electronic instructions before each block of trials and 
informed that they may ask the experimenter for help if they do not understand the task. 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment.  
3.4.2. Results 
3.4.2.1. Exclusions 
Two exclusions were made in total, based on predetermined criteria. One 
participant’s data was removed from analysis due to a consistent tendency to report longer 
intervals as shorter intervals. To determine this, each participant’s mean temporal estimates 
were calculated across the three animation speeds and animation types, and participants 
who did not report shorter intervals at fast speeds than at medium speeds, and shorter 
intervals at medium than slow speeds across all animation types, were removed from the 
analysis. It should be noted that this exclusion criterion was deliberately conservative. A 
second participant was removed from the analysis due to outlying data (over three standard 
deviations from the sample mean in one condition and over 2.5 in three others) and a mean 
estimate of 56.89ms (equivalent to 3.41 frames).  
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3.4.2.2. Causal ratings 
Each participant’s mean causal rating was calculated per condition for inclusion in 
the analysis. As expected, participants reported the highest mean causal ratings for the 
forward gap sequences (71.30, SD = 18.52), followed by the offset gap sequences (49.72, 
SD = 23.51) and the backward gap sequences (24.93, SD = 22.67). Overall, participants 
reported higher mean causal ratings for faster animation, with the highest ratings for the fast 
animations (55.60, SD = 19.10), followed by the medium (47.12, SD = 18.37) and slow 
speeds (43.33, SD = 17.68). A summary of this data can be seen in Figure 3.9. 
 
Figure 3.9. Mean causal ratings by gap sequence type and animation speed. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A two-way, repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out on the mean causal 
intervals. The test for the main effect of gap sequence type violated the assumption of 
sphericity, as tested using Mauchly’s test of sphericity (χ2 = 12.41, p = .002). The degrees of 
freedom reported for this test have been corrected with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
(ε = .73). The assumption of sphericity was not violated by the main effect of animation 
speed (χ2 = 4.68, p = 0.10) or the interaction term (χ2 = 12.53, p = .19).  
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There was a significant effect of gap sequence type on causal ratings (F(1.45, 40.92) 
= 35.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .56), as well as a significant main effect of animation speed (F(2, 50) 
= 68.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .71) and a significant interaction (F(4, 100) = 4.92, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.15).  
Planned contrasts were carried out, comparing the forward gap sequence with the 
offset gap sequence type, and the offset gap sequence with the backward gap sequence 
type. Similarly, comparisons were carried out between the fast and medium speeds, and the 
medium and slow speeds. Significant differences were found between the forward and offset 
gap sequences (F(1, 28) = 33.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .54), as well as between the offset and 
backward gap sequence types (F(1, 28) = 12.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .32). Additionally, significant 
differences were found between the fast and medium speeds (F(1, 28) = 42.69, p < .001, ηp2 
= .60) and the medium and slow speeds (F(1, 28) = 41.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .60). 
The interaction between gap sequence type and speed (slow and medium) appeared 
due to an increase in the difference between the forward and offset gap sequences. This 
change was of a small magnitude (1.35 on the 0-100 rating scale), however, and large 
differences between the offset and forward gap sequences can still be seen at all animation 
speeds. See Appendix B for more detail on this interaction. 
Overall, as expected, participants reported the highest causal ratings for the forward 
gap sequence type, followed by the offset gap sequence type and, lastly, the backward gap 
sequence type. The differences in causal ratings between these appear consistent and of a 
large magnitude. While significant differences in causal ratings between the different 
animation speeds were observed, these were of a much smaller magnitude. 
3.4.2.3. Interval estimate errors 
Each participant’s mean temporal estimate was calculated per condition, for inclusion 
in analysis. Estimate errors were produced by subtracting the actual duration of the temporal 
gap by from each mean interval estimate (milliseconds). Overall, estimate errors were similar 
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for all gap sequence types, with the highest mean estimate errors reported for offset gap 
sequences (61.66ms, SD = 128.00ms), followed by the forward gap sequences (46.13ms, 
SD = 119.29ms) and the backward gap sequences (43.89ms, SD = 106.19ms). Participants 
tended to overestimate the delay intervals at all speeds, with the highest mean 
overestimation at slow speeds (85.51ms, SD = 150.07ms), followed by medium speeds 
(63.59ms, SD = 128.35ms) and fast speeds (2.59ms, SD = 93.26ms). See Figure 3.10 for a 
summary of the mean estimate errors. 
 
Figure 3.10. Mean estimate errors by gap sequence type and animation speed. Error bars = 
95% confidence interval. 
 
A two-way, repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the mean estimate errors. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity found sphericity violations in the main effects of gap sequence 
type (χ2(2) = 8.43, p = .02) and animation speed (χ2(2) = 6.67, p = .04), and the interaction 
between the two (χ2(9) = 17.15, p = .047). As such, all degrees of freedom reported here 
have been corrected with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction, where appropriate (ε = .79, 
.82 and .76, respectively).  
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There was no significant main effect of gap sequence type on estimate errors 
(F(1.58, 44.16) = 1.10, p = .33, ηp2 = .04). A significant main effect of animation speed was 
found, however, suggesting estimate errors were higher at longer intervals (F(1.64, 45.94) = 
10.03, p = .001, ηp2 = .26). There was no significant interaction between the two (F(3.04, 
85.08) = .37, p = . 8, ηp2 = .01). Planned contrasts comparing the fast and medium, and slow 
and medium speeds found a significant difference between the fast and medium speeds 
(F(1, 28) = 14.08, p = .001, ηp2 = .34), but not between the medium and fast speeds (F(1, 28) 
= 1.60, p = .22, ηp2 = .05). 
3.4.3. Discussion 
As in experiment 1, no evidence for temporal binding was found, although causal 
judgements suggest that stimuli were effective in eliciting distinct causal impressions, with 
the highest causal ratings for forward backward gap sequences, the lowest for backward gap 
sequences and intermediary causal ratings for the offset gap sequences. Notably, the lowest 
estimate errors were found for the backward gap sequence animations in direct contradiction 
with causal accounts of temporal binding, although this effect was not statistically significant. 
Experiment 3 was a replication of experiment 2 using interval reproduction, rather 
than interval estimation. This change was made to test whether the same findings occur 
when using a different measure of perceived intervals and to test the suitability of interval 
reproduction tasks in researching temporal binding in phenomenal causality. Interval 
reproduction has the benefit of being a faster and more intuitive task. The use of a different 
measure of time perception can clarify whether the findings of experiments 1 and 2 were 
affected by the measure used, or whether these effects can be replicated across different 
measures of interval perception. In addition, the experiment design was altered such that 
causal and temporal trials were interleaved in order to ensure participants attended to the 
apparent causality or lack thereof in the stimuli. Here, participants were not informed before 
viewing each animation whether they will be asked to make causal or temporal judgements.  
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3.5. Experiment 3 
3.5.1. Methods 
3.5.1.1. Participants 
31 Cardiff University students were recruited via Cardiff University’s Experiment 
Management System (age range 18-33, 5 male; data missing from one participant). 
Participants were excluded from taking part if they had participated in any of the previous 
experiments on temporal binding in phenomenal causality. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Participants took part in exchange for course credit or a payment 
of £3.  
3.5.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
The experiment was carried out using a computer screen with participant responses 
recorded using a keyboard. The experimental programme was run in PsychoPy (Peirce et 
al., 2019). All stimuli were presented at 60 frames per second, on a screen size of 59.5 by 
33.5cm and screen resolution of 2,560 by 1,440 pixels.  
As in experiment 2, participants were presented with the forward, offset and 
backward gap sequence animations at fast, medium, and slow speeds. Stimulus sizes in 
pixels were retained from experiment 2, with changes to the absolute sizes of stimuli due to 
the change in monitor. Instructions were presented with a text height of 0.46cm. The 
aperture in which animations were presented was 21.53cm wide by 13.95cm in height. The 
fixation cross was 0.35cm by 0.35cm and presented 1.02cm above the centre of the screen. 
The gap and launching objects were 0.74cm wide and 1.49cm in height. The gap objects 
were separated by 0.09cm gaps. Finally, in offset animations, the launching objects were 
placed 2.32cm lower than the gap objects. 
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The delay intervals and the timing of all visual events remained the same as in 
experiments 1 and 2. The speed at which the launching objects travelled was 0.42cm per 
frame at fast speeds, 0.28cm at medium speeds and 0.21cm at slow speeds. 
3.5.1.3. Design and procedure 
The experiment used the same two-way repeated-measures factorial design as 
experiment 2, with 3 animation types and 3 speeds.  Participants performed 20 experimental 
trials of each condition (9 conditions in total). 10 were causal trials, as in experiments 1 and 
2. Temporal trials measured the perceived duration of the delay between the stopping of the 
launcher and movement of the target object using an interval reproduction task. Participants 
were asked to hold the control key on the keyboard for the duration of the interval. 
Participants were only asked to provide one of the two measures on each trial. All 
experimental trials were included in a single block. Prior to each trial, participants were not 
informed as to which task – causal judgements or interval reproduction – they would be 
asked to perform after viewing the animation.  
All animation types, speeds and measures were presented in a randomised order 
within a single block. Before the experimental block, participants performed a practice block 
of six trials (3 causal and 3 temporal), in which each animation type was presented twice at a 
randomly selected speed.  
Participants were tested individually. All participants were required to agree to an 
electronic consent form before the experiment began. Instructions were presented on the 
screen as needed (see Appendix A for the full main instructions) and participants initiated 
the beginning of each block of trials. At the end of the session participants were paid and 
debriefed as to the purpose of the experiment. 
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3.5.2. Results 
3.5.2.1. Exclusions 
Four participants were excluded according to predetermined exclusion criteria. The 
mean reproduced intervals were calculated for each participant in each of the speed 
conditions and participants were excluded from analysis if they failed to estimate short 
intervals (266.67 milliseconds) as shorter than medium intervals (400.00 milliseconds), and 
medium intervals as shorter than long intervals (533.33 milliseconds) overall and in at least 2 
of the three animation types. One participant’s data was lost due to a technical error, leading 
to a total of 26 included in the analysis. 
3.5.2.2. Causal ratings 
The mean causal ratings per participant, per condition, were calculated for use in the 
analysis. As expected, mean causal ratings were highest in the forward gap sequence 
animations (71.40, SD = 16.30), followed by the offset gap sequence animations (59.81, SD 
= 18.91) and the backward gap sequence animations (41.12, SD = 20.20). Additionally, 
there was a smaller difference between the animation speeds, suggesting that faster 
animations were perceived as more causal, with the highest mean causal rating found in fast 
speeds (62.80, SD = 15.10), followed by medium speeds (57.43, SD = 15.47) and slow 
speeds (52.10, SD = 16.32). A summary of these findings can be seen in Figure 3.11. 
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Figure 3.11. Mean causal ratings by gap sequence type and animation speed. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A two-way, repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out on the mean causal ratings. 
As the assumption of sphericity, as tested with Mauchly’s test of sphericity, was not met for 
the main effects of gap sequence type (χ2(2) = 7.63, p = .02) and speed (χ2(2) = 12.34, p = 
.002), the degrees of freedom reported here have been corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser correction (ε = . 9 and ε = .71, respectively). The assumption of sphericity was not 
violated for the interaction between gap sequence type and animation speed (χ2(9) = 11.39, 
p = .25). 
Significant main effects of gap sequence type (F(1.57, 39.30) = 36.32, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.59) and animation speed (F(1.43, 35.67) = 40.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .62) were found. 
Additionally, a significant interaction was found between gap sequence type and animation 
speed (F(4, 100) = 3.10, p = .02, ηp2 = .11).  
Planned contrasts were carried out according to the expected causal ratings. The 
forward gap sequence was compared with the offset gap sequence, and offset gap 
sequence was compared with the backward gap sequence. Significant differences were 
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found in both comparisons (F(1, 25) = 34.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .58 and F(1, 25) = 26.55, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .51, respectively). Based on the previous two studies, the medium animation 
speed was expected to result in lower causal ratings than the fast animation speed, and 
higher ratings than the slow animation speed. Significant differences were found between 
the medium animation speed and the slow animation speed (F(1, 25) = 19.47, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.44) and the fast animation speed (F(1, 25) = 26.55, p = .02, ηp2 = .52). 
The interaction effect appeared to be driven by a difference in the effect of animation 
speed (slow and medium) between the forward and offset gap sequence types. As in 
experiment 2, the magnitude of this difference was small relative to the measurement scale 
(3.23 on a scale of 0-100) and would not be expected to result in a significant effect on 
perceived interval lengths. The analysis of this interaction can be seen in Appendix B. 
Overall, these findings replicate those of experiment 2, with higher causal ratings for 
the forward gap sequence type compared with offset gap sequences, and higher causal 
ratings for offset compared with backward gap sequence types. Faster animation speeds led 
to higher causal ratings overall, although the differences found here were of a smaller 
magnitude than those found between different animation types. 
3.5.2.3. Interval reproduction errors 
The mean reproduced interval per condition was calculated for each participant. For 
the analysis, the actual gap intervals were subtracted from the mean reproduced interval to 
produce the estimate errors (see Figure 3.12 for the mean estimate errors). All reproduction 
errors are reported in milliseconds. Overall, the mean reproduction errors were lowest for the 
forward gap sequences (352.76, SD = 242.11), followed by the offset and backward gap 
sequences (371.83, SD = 249.63 and 379.29, SD = 276.17, respectively). Participants 
showed a tendency to overestimate gap intervals of all lengths, as reflected by positive 
reproduction errors, with intervals at medium speeds (400 millisecond gap) being the most 
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over-estimated (398.22, SD = 258.47), followed by the slow (364.52, SD = 278.08) and fast 
(341.14, SD = 241.06) speeds. 
 
Figure 3.12. Mean reproduction errors by gap sequence type and speed. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A two-way, repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out on the mean reproduction 
errors. As Mauchly’s test of sphericity found a significant violation of sphericity in the 
animation speed main effect analysis (χ2(2) = 12.34, p < .001), this analysis has been 
corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (ε = .62). The assumption of sphericity 
was met for the animation type main effect (χ2(2) = 5.83, p = .054) and the interaction (χ2(9) 
= 10.10, p = .34). 
A significant main effect of animation speed was found (F(1.25, 31.18) = 4.01, p = 
.046, ηp2 = .14). There was no significant effect of gap sequence type (F(2, 50) = 1.73, p = 
.19, ηp2 = .07) or a significant interaction (F(4,100) = .05, p = .995, ηp2 < .001). Planned 
contrasts found significant differences between the medium and fast speeds (F(1, 25) = 
7.83, p = .01, ηp2 = .24) and between the medium and slow speeds (F(1, 25) = 8.64, p = 007, 
ηp2 = .26). 
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3.5.3. Discussion  
Experiment 3 found largely similar results to experiment 2. Causal ratings were 
consistent with those found in experiments 1 and 2. Although participants showed an overall 
tendency to overestimate when reproducing delay intervals, this is not a concern for 
temporal binding research as the relative differences between estimates are of interest, 
rather than the overall accuracy of estimates. This effect is likely due to differences in the 
perceived duration of intervals between visual and tactile stimuli, as visual events have been 
found to be perceived as longer than tactile events (e.g. Tomassini, Gori, Burr, Sandini & 
Morrone, 2011). Despite larger over-estimation at medium speeds, participants consistently 
judged shorter intervals as shorter than longer intervals (with the exception of the four 
participants excluded from the analysis for failure to do so). Overall, although there is no 
evidence of interval reproduction being an inappropriate measure of interval estimation, 
experiment 3 found no evidence for temporal binding, in line with the findings of experiment 
2.  
3.6. Interim discussion: Experiments 1-3 
The three studies described above made use of stimuli novel to temporal binding 
research to investigate temporal binding in phenomenal causality. No evidence for temporal 
binding was found. Specifically, no effect of gap sequence type on interval estimate errors 
was found in any of the three experiments, despite clear effects of gap sequence types on 
causal impressions. Causal judgements suggest that the stimuli were effective in producing 
distinct causal impressions, which were reliable across participants and experiments. While 
participants tended to overestimate interval durations in both direct interval estimation and 
interval reproduction tasks, this does not detract from any effects or lack thereof reported 
here. As these are subjective measures of time perception, it is the relative differences 
between conditions that are of interest, rather than a comparison between estimated 
intervals and the objective duration of those intervals. As both measures had been used in 
the past to replicate the temporal binding effect (e.g. Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; 
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Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009), it is unlikely the absence of 
temporal binding here can be explained by the use of either measure.  
It cannot be entirely ruled out that the findings may have been affected by the 
physical features of the stimuli used in these studies. While care was taken to ensure that all 
animation types are as perceptually similar as possible, some differences could not be 
eliminated. The differences in the direction of the colour change sequence between the 
forward and backward gap sequence animations may have led to differences in eye 
movement between these conditions. In the backward colour change sequences attention is 
drawn first to the left side of the screen, followed by a shift to the right side of the screen at 
the beginning of the colour change sequence, and finally from the left side of the screen 
where the sequence ends to the right side of the screen, where the launch of the target 
object occurs. In contrast, in forward gap sequence animations the motion of the launching 
objects and the colour change sequence take place consistently from left to right. Saccadic 
eye movement has been shown to reduce the perceived duration of time intervals (Morrone, 
Ross & Burr, 2005). Although participants were instructed to fixate their gaze on the fixation 
cross, it cannot be guaranteed that all participants followed these instructions. However, this 
does not appear to be a likely explanation of the absence of temporal binding. The effect of 
differences in eye movement between conditions would have to have offset temporal binding 
in all three conditions in experiments 2 and 3 to account for the absence of an effect of 
animation type on perceived intervals. 
Another possibility is that the predictability of the time of the launch may have 
eliminated a temporal binding effect which would otherwise occur, as participants had a 
visual cue to the onset of the launch. In experiment 1 participants showed a greater 
overestimation of delay durations when the gap was entirely empty, suggesting that the 
presence of the colour change sequences affected time perception, regardless of causal 
impressions. However, research on the effect of predictability on temporal binding, although 
inconclusive, suggests that the increased predictability of the delay interval leads to a 
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greater temporal binding effect, rather than a reduction in temporal binding (Cravo et al., 
2011). 
The possibility that perceptual influences other than causal impressions may have 
eliminated a temporal binding effect which otherwise have occurred cannot be ruled out 
based on experiments 1-3.The possible theoretical implications of the lack of evidence for 
causal binding in experiments 1-3 must be considered in the context of external variables 
which may have affected the findings. The possible influence of non-causal variables on the 
findings, discussed above, cannot be ruled out on the basis of experiments 1-3. As such, 
experiments 4 and 5 were carried out in order to test for effects of the physical features of 
the colour change sequences and the visual differences between the forward and backward 
gap sequence types. 
3.7. Experiment 4 
In experiment 4 participants viewed launching animations in which the gap 
sequences were hidden behind an occluder, in addition to the forward and backward gap 
sequence types used in experiments 1-3. This was done to remove the possible influence of 
perceptual differences between the animation types on time perception; in occluded 
animations the launching objects remained visible throughout, while the gap objects were 
hidden. As such, occluded animations were visually identical. Any differences in eye 
movement or non-causal effects of the colour change sequences could not explain 
differences in the perceived length of delay intervals, provided causal impressions differ 
between occluded animations. 
Previous research has found that people can perceive a launching effect as taking 
place behind an occluder (e.g. Kiritani, 1999), when presented with an object moving behind 
an occluder, followed by a different object emerging from the other side after an appropriate 
delay. It was hypothesised, therefore, that participants may similarly perceive a gap 
sequence as occurring behind an occluder. To encourage participants to perceive the gap 
96 
 
sequence as taking place behind the occluder, each such trial began with the gap objects 
and target object visible on the screen, as in visible-gap trials. Shortly after the occluding 
object descended, covering the gap objects. The occluding objects further covered half of 
the target object and the final position of the launcher to prevent any impression of the 
launcher object colliding with the occluder. Figure 3.13 shows the sequence of events seen 
in occluded animations. 
 
Figure 3.13. Screen shots (cropped) of the occluded animations used in experiment 4. At the 
beginning of each animation the gap objects and target were visible (1), followed by the 
occluded descending and covering the gap objects (2-3). The launching objects moved in 
the manner as in the stimuli used in experiments 1-3 (4-6). 
 
 Forward and backward gap sequences were presented in separate blocks to 
ensure participants would only perceive the intended gap sequence as taking place when 
the gap was occluded. This was done as the occluded animations were identical and differed 
only in the context in which they were presented. In each block half the trials were occluded 
and occluded- and visible-gap stimuli were presented at a random order. Causal rating and 
interval reproduction trials were interleaved to ensure that participants continue to attend to 
causal impressions throughout. 
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Experiment 4 made some further alterations to the designs used in experiments 1-3. 
The number of gap sequence types was reduced to two (forward and backward), as was the 
number of animation speeds (slow and fast). This was done to allow for the inclusion of the 
visibility variable and the increase of the number of interval reproduction trials to 40 per 
condition. The number of trials was increased to reduce the variability of reproduced 
intervals due to measurement noise. In contrast, causal ratings appeared highly reliable in 
experiments 1-3. This is unsurprising since, as reported by Michotte (1946/63), visual 
impressions of causality are stable and require no multiple exposure in order to occur. As 
such, the number of causal trials remained 5 per condition.  
3.7.1. Methods 
3.7.1.1. Participants 
31 Cardiff University students were recruited using Cardiff University’s experiment 
management system. Participants took part in exchange for course credits (5 male, age 
range 18-34). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Students were not 
permitted to participate if they had taken part in any of experiments 1-3. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
3.7.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
The experiment programme was run using PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019). The 
experiment was run on an i-Mac 2 ” computer with the Apple Mac OS X 10.9.4 (Mavericks) 
operating system. The monitor was 59.5cm wide 33.5cm in height, with a resolution of 2,560 
by 1,440 pixels. by The refresh rate was 60 frames per second. The computer mouse and 
keyboard were used for participant responses. All instructions were presented onscreen, at 
the beginning of each block of trials. 
The text and visual stimuli were of the same sizes and proportions as experiments 1 
and 3. The occluder was 7.39cm wide and 4.65cm in height (318 by 200 pixels) and 
positioned at the horizontal centre of the screen. At the beginning of occluded trials the 
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occluded descended from its initial position of 23.24cm (1,000 pixels) above the centre of the 
screen to the centre of the screen at a speed of 0.23cm (10 pixels) per frame.  
The launcher was initially positioned 23.24cm (1,000 pixels) to the left of the leftmost 
gap object in all trials. On each trial the launcher began to move to the right after the 
occluder was in place (in occluder trials) or a 100 frame (1666.67ms) delay (visible-gap 
trials). This was done to ensure identical trial lengths in both visible-gap and occluded trials. 
The animation speeds and delay intervals were the same as in experiments 1-3 (fast and 
slow speeds). In occluded trials the delay interval was identical to the duration of the gap 
sequences. 
3.7.1.3. Design and procedure 
This experiment employed a three-way factorial design. The three factors were as 
follows: gap sequence direction (forward/backward), occlusion (occluded/visible) and 
animation speed (fast/slow). There were eight conditions altogether.  
These animations were presented in two main blocks, the order of which was 
counterbalanced between participants who were each randomly assigned to one of the two 
block orders. In the causal block, participants were presented with the forward gap sequence 
animations, with either occluded or visible gaps, and at both animation speeds. Each 
animation types (four in each block) was presented multiple times. The order of presentation 
within each block was randomised. The non-causal block was similar to the causal block, 
with the exception that the gap sequence direction was always backward. This was done to 
ensure participants could assume that the gap sequence taking place behind the occluding 
object was always the same within each block, while the occluded animations were visually 
identical, regardless the experimental block. 
Causal ratings and reproduced intervals were collected for all conditions. Causal 
trials were identical to those used in experiments 1-3. In temporal trials participants were 
instructed to hold down the left mouse button for the duration of the temporal gap between 
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the launching object stopping and the target object moving as in experiment 3. Similarly to 
experiment 3, causal and temporal trials were interleaved. 
Participants were tested individually. After agreeing to an electronic consent form, 
participants were presented instructions explaining the task (the main instructions presented 
before the first block of trials can be seen in Appendix A).The blocks began with practice 
sections containing one temporal and one causal trial per condition (4 causal and 4 temporal 
practice trials in each block), presented in a random order. These were followed by 40 
temporal and 5 causal experimental trials per condition (160 temporal trials and 20 causal 
trials per block). The presentation order of animation speeds and occluded and visible-gap 
trials was randomised in each block. At the end of the experiment, participants were 
debriefed.  
3.7.2. Results 
3.7.2.1. Exclusions 
Four participants were excluded from analysis in total. Two participants were 
excluded from analysis for failure to follow instructions – these participants consistently failed 
to distinguish between long and short intervals (one participant had mean reproduced 
intervals of 94.50ms for short and 94.28m for long intervals; the other 140.91ms and 
145.13ms for short and long intervals, respectively). Both participants reported short 
intervals as longer on average, on at least one of four comparisons.  
One participant was excluded due to a technical error resulting in loss of data. One 
final participant was excluded from analysis due to outlying data. This participant’s mean 
reproduced intervals were between 3.31 and 4.10 standard deviations from the group mean 
in all conditions. 
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3.7.2.2. Causal ratings 
The mean causal rating was calculated per participant, for each condition, for 
inclusion in the analysis. A summary of the mean causal ratings can be seen in Figure 3.14. 
Overall, participants reported perceiving forward gap sequence animations as appearing 
more causal than backward gap sequence animations, but only when the gap sequences 
were visible. Longer intervals led to lower causal impressions than shorter intervals. In 
visible-gap trials, mean causal ratings were higher for forward gap sequences (71.36, SD = 
13.74) than for backward gap sequences (M = 55.58, SD = 19.72). Causal ratings appear 
similar in occluded trials regardless of the experimental block, and similar in magnitude to 
visible backward gap sequence trials of the same speed. As in experiments 1-3, causal 
ratings were higher for animations presented at fast speeds (M = 64.68, SD = 14.97) 
compared with slow animations (M = 51.28, SD = 14.85). 
 
Figure 3.14. Mean causal ratings by animation type, speed and visibility. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A three-way, repeated measures ANOVA found significant main effects of gap 
sequence direction (F(1, 26) = 7.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .22), visibility (F(1, 26) = 32.26, p < .001, 
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ηp2 = .55) and animation speed (F(1, 26) = 36.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .58). Additionally, 
significant interactions were found between gap sequence direction and visibility (F(1, 26) = 
35.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .58), and gap sequence direction and speed (F(1, 26) = 4.47, p = .04, 
ηp2 = .15). Both the interaction effect between visibility and animation speed (F(1, 26) = 1.29, 
p = .27, ηp2 = .05) and the three-way interaction (F(1, 26) = 1.19, p = .29, ηp2 = .04) were not 
statistically significant.  
A simple effects analysis found a significant difference between gap sequence 
directions when the gap objects were visible (F(1, 26) = 19.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .43), but not 
occluded (F(1, 26) = 0.17, p = .68, ηp2 = .007). Additionally, a significant difference between 
gap sequence directions was found only for slow animations (F(1, 26) = 3.11, p = .002 ηp2 = 
.32), but not fast animations (F(1, 26) = 3.11, p = .09, ηp2 = .11). 
3.7.2.3. Interval reproduction errors 
To produce the temporal reproduction errors, the actual gap intervals were 
subtracted from each participant’s mean reproduced intervals. A summary of these findings 
can be seen in Figure 3.15. Overall, participants overestimated all time intervals, as in 
experiment 3. Participants overestimated the duration of intervals in occluded animations (M 
= 242.15ms, SD = 209.61ms) to a greater extent than in animations in which the gap 
sequence was visible (M = 161.38ms, SD = 192.04ms). There appears to be possible 
evidence of a temporal binding effect, but only in visible, slow animations. In slow visible 
animations mean reproduction errors were 63.07ms shorter for forward gap sequences, 
whereas they were only 12.59ms shorter in fast visible animations. 
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Figure 3.15. Mean reproduction errors by animation type. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
  
A three-way, repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of visibility 
on reproduction errors (F(1, 26) = 36.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .59). Additionally, a significant 
interaction between gap sequence direction and visibility (F(1, 26) = 7.46, p = .01, ηp2 = .22), 
and a three-way interaction (F(1, 26) = 11.29, p = .002, ηp2 = .30) were found. No significant 
main effects of gap sequence direction (F(1, 26) = 1.02, p = .32, ηp2 = .04) or animation 
speed (F(1, 26) = .14, p = .71, ηp2 = .01) were found, or significant interactions between gap 
sequence direction and animation speed (F(1, 26) = .33, p = .58, ηp2 = .30) or visibility and 
speed (F(1, 26) =.01, p = .94, ηp2 < .001).  
A simple effects analysis found a significant difference in temporal reproduction 
errors between forward and backward gap sequences, but only in visible, slow animations 
(F(1, 26) = -5.44, p = .03, ηp2 = .17). No significant difference between the forward and 
backward gap sequence types was found in fast, visible gap sequences (F(1, 26) = .47, p = 
.50, ηp2 = .02) or in occluded, fast gap sequences (F(1, 26) = .24, p = .63, ηp2 = .009) or 
occluded, slow gap sequences (F(1, 26) = .19, p = .67, ηp2 = .007). 
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3.7.3. Discussion 
Experiment 4 used occluding objects to eliminate the possible influence of perceptual 
differences between the forward and gap sequence animations on time perception. 
Occluded animations were placed among forward or backward gap sequence animations in 
separate blocks to create the assumption that these gap sequences were taking place 
behind the occluder. This manipulation failed to yield the expected causal impressions, 
however. Participants reported similar causal impressions for occluded animations 
regardless of which block they were in. These causal impressions were comparable to the 
visible backward gap sequence animations, indicating no moderating of the effects of the 
temporal and spatial gaps between launching objects on causal impressions. Although this 
experiment failed to eliminate the possible role of perceptual differences (other than causal 
impressions) between the forward and backward sequence types, it provided some, albeit 
inconclusive, evidence for temporal binding in phenomenal causality. 
The findings from this study diverged from those of experiments 1-3 in a number of 
ways. Firstly, causal impressions for backward gap sequence animations were less distinct 
than those reported for forward gap sequence animations. This is indicated by a lack of a 
significant effect of gap sequence direction on causal ratings in fast animations. This may 
have been caused by context effects, due to the presentation of forward and backward gap 
sequences in separate blocks. Presenting the gap sequence types in separate blocks may 
have decreased the contrast between them, thereby making the backward gap sequence 
animations appear more causal than they otherwise would, in the absence of a direct 
comparison between the two. Several studies have found context effect in phenomenal 
causality, where causal impressions of are affected by exposure to other stimuli, less or 
more visually causal (e.g. Brown & Miles, 1968; Powesland, 1959; Young et al., 2005). 
However, in occluded causal ratings did not significantly differ between those presented 
alongside visible forward gap sequences and visible backward gap sequences. If context 
effects had affected causal impressions, significantly lower causal ratings would be expected 
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when occluded animations were presented alongside the more causal-appearing forward 
gap sequences. 
Nevertheless, in contrast with experiments 1-3, the analysis suggests temporal 
binding in visible animations. As a statistically significant difference in causal ratings was 
found only in visible, slow animations, a significant difference in reproduced intervals would 
only be expected in those animations. Such an interaction effect was found, as reproduction 
errors were significantly lower in forward animations than backward animations, when these 
were visible and at slow speed. No significant differences were found between the gap 
sequence types in occluded animations or fast speeds. In other words, temporal estimate 
errors appeared to mirror causal ratings, with shorter reproduced intervals reported for 
conditions with higher causal ratings. As such, experiment 4 provided the first evidence for 
temporal binding in phenomenal causality in the absence of intentionality in the stimuli 
studied here. However, interpretation of this evidence should remain tentative, as no such 
effect was found in experiments 1-3. The findings can be interpreted either as emerging 
evidence for temporal binding in phenomenal causality or as a chance finding. Further, it 
should be noted these statistical tests do not necessarily indicate a direct relationship 
between causal impressions and interval perception at the level of the individual. 
The effect of occlusion on reproduced intervals is similar to the effect of empty 
temporal and spatial gaps in experiment 1. The absence of a visible colour change 
sequence filling the temporal and spatial gap led to significantly greater overestimations than 
visible gaps. This suggests that the presence of a regular colour change sequences had 
altered interval perception in experiments 1-4. If this had affected all gap sequence 
conditions equally, evidence for temporal binding or lack thereof can still be detected in the 
analysis. The possibility that the colour change sequences had altered time perception in a 
way that eliminated temporal binding in experiments 1-3 can not be ruled out, however, 
although it is not known how temporal binding interacts with other temporal illusions.  
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3.8. Experiment 5 
As experiment four failed to elicit differing causal impressions for visually identical 
stimuli, experiment 5 aimed to specifically investigate the potential effect of differences in 
eye movement on the findings of experiments 1-4. On some trials the launching events were 
replaced by “signals”, whereby the launching objects remained stationary throughout and 
disappeared in sequence. The object to the left of the gap objects disappeared first, followed 
by the gap sequence. The right object disappeared at the end of the colour change 
sequence. This was intended to provide non-causal stimuli in which the observer’s attention 
is drawn to the same parts of the screen as in launching animations. 
Figure 3.16 shows screen shots of a signal animation with a forward gap sequence. 
In all signal animations all objects were visible at the start of each trial. The leftmost object 
(black) disappeared at the start of the trial, followed by either a forward or a backward gap 
sequence. At the end of the gap sequence, in place of a launch, the second signal object 
disappeared. The signal objects were taller than the gap objects and offset horizontally to 
ensure participants can distinguish between the signal and gap objects. It was hypothesised 
that signal animations may lead to lower causal ratings, as no “collision” event took place 
between the first signal object and the gap sequences, unlike in launching sequences.   
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Figure 3.16. Screenshots (cropped) of a signal animation with a forward gap sequence. All 
objects were visible at the beginning of each trial (1). This was followed by the 
disappearance of the first signal object (2) and a gap sequence (3-5). After the end of the 
gap sequence the second signal object disappeared (6). 
 
Signal and launching animations were presented in separate blocks, each containing 
all combinations of the gap sequence direction and speed factors. The same causal and 
temporal trials were used as in experiment 4, along with similar instructions. As experiment 4 
found no significant difference in causal ratings at fast speeds, both speeds were made 
slower to ensure causal impressions were distinct.  
3.8.1. Methods 
3.8.1.1. Participants 
32 Cardiff University students (3 male, one not reported, age range 18-21) 
participated in exchange for course credits. Participants were recruited via the School of 
Psychology’s experiment management system. Participants who took part in experiments 1-
5 were excluded from participation in this study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
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3.8.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
The experiment programme was run using PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019). The 
experiment was run on a Mac Mini computer running the MacOS High Sierra 10.13.6 
operating system. Stimuli were presented on a 47cm by 30cm monitor at a resolution of 
1,680 by 1,050 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 frames per second. All instructions were 
presented on the screen at a height 0.56cm (20 pixles). Participant responses were recorded 
using the computer mouse and keyboard. 
The absolute sizes and positions of all gap sequence objects, the visual aperture and 
the fixation cross were identical to those used in experiment 2. Some alterations were made 
to the stimuli, however. This study made use of the forward and backward gap sequence 
stimuli, as used in previous experiments. In addition, novel animations were used, in which 
the black and white objects did not “launch” as in the previous experiments, but disappeared 
in sequence. The disappearing objects had a height of 2.35cm (84 pixels), in order to 
differentiate them from the gap objects, which had a height of 1.79cm (64 pixels). Signal 
objects were horizontally offset from the gap objects by 0.22cm (8 pixels). The aperture, 
fixation cross and text sizes as well as the width of the signal/launching and gap objects 
were retained from previous experiments. In launching animations, the launching objects 
had a height of 2.35cm, as in signal animations.  
In launching animations, the launching objects moved at 0.17cm (6 pixels) per frame 
at slow speeds and 0.34cm (12 pixels) per frame at fast speeds. In both signal and 
launching animations, the gap sequences were 800ms or 400ms in duration at slow and fast 
speeds, respectively. In launching trials the launcher object was positioned 16.79cm (600 
pixels) to the left of the centre of the screen at the beginning of each launching trial. In signal 
animations the first signal (the first signal object disappearing) occurred one second after the 
beginning of the trial. Trials ended 2.4 seconds or 2.8 seconds after the end of the gap 
sequence in fast and slow trials, respectively.  
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3.8.1.3. Design and procedure 
The study used a repeated-measures, 3-way factorial design. Each factor contained 
two levels. The animation type was either a “launch” or “signal” (see apparatus and 
materials). The colour change sequences took place either from left to right (forward, i.e. 
from the direction of the first object to move/disappear in the direction of the second object to 
move/disappear) or from right to left (backward). All animations were presented at either a 
fast or slow speed.  
Causal ratings and reproduced intervals were collected for each condition. For 
launching trials this was the same as the procedure used in experiment 4. In causal trials 
following signal animations the instructions changed to “Did you have the impression that the 
black rectangle made the white rectangle disappear?”. The same interval reproduction task 
as used in experiment 4 was used in temporal trials. Again, the instructions were altered for 
signal animations to “Please hold the left mouse button for the duration of time between then 
the left (black) rectangle disappeared and when the right (white) rectangle disappeared”. 
Signal and movement animations were presented to all participants, in separate 
blocks. Each of the two possible block orders (signal followed by movement, or movement 
followed by signal) was presented to 16 of the 32 participants, who were randomly assigned 
to one of the two possible orders. The animations were presented in both speeds and with 
both types of gap sequences. The order of trials within each block was randomised.  
Each block contained three sections. The first section was the causal section, 
consisting of the causal ratings task. This section which contained 10 trials per condition (40 
overall). This was followed by practice temporal trials (2 per condition, 8 overall), during 
which reproduced intervals were produced by the participants, but not recorded. This was 
followed by the experimental temporal block, which contained 40 trials per condition (360 
overall).  
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Participants were tested individually. At the beginning of the experiment participants 
were presented with an electronic consent form. After consent was granted, detailed 
instructions were provided for each part of the experiment (see Appendix A). At the end of 
the experiment participants were debriefed.  
3.8.2. Results 
3.8.2.1. Exclusions and transformation 
Four participants were excluded from analysis based on pre-determined exclusion 
criteria. Participants were to be excluded if they consistently failed to distinguish between 
400ms and 800ms intervals. Specifically, exclusions were made if participants reported a 
higher mean interval for the 400ms intervals than for the 800ms overall, or if they did so on 
two or more of the four conditions (animation type x gap sequence type). Both of the 
participants excluded from analysis failed to distinguish between long and short intervals on 
average across all trials, as well as in three of the four conditions. It should be noted that this 
test is conservative, in that it only excludes participants who performed at or below chance 
level. Two further participants were excluded due to outlying data (3+ standard deviation 
from the mean). One participant showed outlying data in four of the eight conditions, and the 
other in three of the eight. 
The temporal data was found to be consistently non-normally distributed, as tested 
using the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05 in 5 of the 8 conditions). As a positive skew was 
observed in all conditions, the data was transformed using a log transformation (base 10). 
The transformation was made on the raw scores rather than estimate errors to avoid 
adjusting negative values with an arbitrarily chosen constant, as the choice of constant has 
been shown to affect p values (Feng et al., 2014). The transformed data meets the 
assumption of normality in all conditions, as tested using the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality 
(p > .05). The data before and after transformation can be seen in Figures 3.18 and 3.19, in 
section 3.8.2.3. 
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3.8.2.2. Causal ratings 
The mean average causal rating for each condition, per participant, was included in 
the analysis. See Figure 3.17 for a summary of these findings. Participants reported higher 
mean causal ratings in animations with forward gap sequences (M = 73.61, SD = 16.98) 
than animations with backward gap sequences (M = 28.73, SD = 20.09). Mean causal 
ratings also appear higher for fast speeds (M = 43.83, SD = 12.47) compared with slow 
speeds (M = 38.03, SD = 12.74). Causal ratings for signal animations were higher than 
expected and appear to be similar to those reported for launching animations. 
 
Figure 3.17. Mean causal ratings by gap sequence type, movement speed and animation 
type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
A repeated-measures, three-way ANOVA found significant main effects of gap 
sequence direction (F(1, 27) = 136.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .84) and speed (F(1, 27) = 25.27, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .48). Additionally, a significant interaction was found between animation type and 
speed (F(1, 27) = 10.57, p = .003, ηp2 = .28). No significant main effect of animation type was 
found (F(1, 27) = 1.98, p = .17, ηp2 = .07). Likewise, no significant interactions were found 
between animation type and gap sequence direction (F(1, 27) = .23, p = .23, ηp2 = .009), gap 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Fast Slow Fast Slow
Movement Signal
M
e
a
n
 c
a
u
s
a
l 
ra
ti
n
g
s
 (
0
-1
0
0
)
Animation speed and type 
Forward gap
sequence
Backward gap
sequence
111 
 
sequence direction and speed (F(1, 27) = .89, p = .35, ηp2 = .03) or the three-way interaction 
(F(1, 27) = .23, p = .64, ηp2 = .008). 
A simple effects analysis found a significant difference between the movement and 
signal animation types at fast speeds (F(1, 27) = 6.09, p = .02, ηp2 = .18), but not at slow 
speeds (F(1, 27) = .05, p = .72, ηp2 = .005). At a descriptive level, however, this difference 
was of a much smaller magnitude than the difference between gap sequence types and may 
not be large enough to lead to a detectable effect on interval perception. 
3.8.2.3. Reproduced intervals 
The mean reproduced intervals and log-transformed (base 10) intervals are 
presented in Figures 3.18 and 3.19 respectively. Overall reproduced intervals were 
consistently higher for slow animation speeds (M = 742.22ms, SD = 254.30ms) than fast 
animation speeds (M = 957.47ms, SD = 282.13ms). Surprisingly, mean reproduced intervals 
were lower for backward gap sequences (843.06ms, SD = 265.38ms) than for forward gap 
sequences (857.63ms, SD = 262.05ms), unlike in previous experiments. The reproduced 
intervals were shorter for launching animations than for signal animations in all conditions 
with the exception of slow backward gap sequences, with a mean reproduced interval of 
837.59ms (SD = 238.12ms) for launching animations and 836.10ms (SD = 299.12ms) for 
signal animations.  
112 
 
 
Figure 3.18. Mean reproduced intervals by gap sequence type, movement speed and 
animation type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 3.19. Mean reproduced intervals (log10 transformed) by gap sequence type, 
movement speed and animation type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
All analyses made use of the transformed data. A three-way, repeated-measures 
ANOVA found significant main effects of gap sequence direction (F(1, 27) = 9.43, p = .005, 
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ηp2 = .26) and animation speed (F(1, 27) = 114.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .81). Additionally, 
significant interactions were found between gap sequence direction and animation type (F(1, 
27) = 14.40, p = .001, ηp2 =  .35), and gap sequence direction and speed (F(1, 27) = 10.01, p 
= .004, ηp2 =  .27). No significant main effect of animation type was found (F(1, 27) = .31, p = 
.58, ηp2 =  .01). No significant interaction between animation type and speed (F(1, 27) = 2.61, 
p = .12, ηp2 =  .09) or a significant three-way interaction (F(1, 27) < .001, p = .99, ηp2 <  .001) 
were found. 
A simple effects analysis found significant differences between the forward and 
backward gap sequence types, but only at fast speeds (F(1, 27) = 16.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .38) 
or signal animations (F(1, 27) = 19.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .42). The same comparison was not 
statistically significant at slow speeds (F(1, 27) = .18 p = .68, ηp2 = .007) or for movement 
animations (F(1, 27) = .08, p = .78, ηp2 = .003). Therefore, the main effect of gap sequence 
direction does not appear to reflect a reversal of the expected temporal binding effect, as 
such an effect would be expected to take place across both animation types based on the 
causal ratings.  
3.8.3. Discussion 
The signal animations in experiment 5 failed to create non-causal perceptually 
matched controls for the launching animations. Surprisingly, the lack of movement and 
collision between the “launcher”, and the spatial gap between the disappearing objects and 
the gap objects did not significantly decrease causal ratings for the most part. The exception 
to this is the fast, forward gap sequence animations in which a significant difference was 
observe, although causal ratings were still higher for forward gap sequence, signal 
animations, compared with backward gap sequence, signal animations. As such, this 
experiment cannot confirm or disconfirm an effect of shifts in eye movements between the 
right and left sides of the screen on time perception.  
114 
 
Nevertheless, experiment 5 yielded some interesting findings. The perceived effect of 
the leftmost object on the rightmost object, regardless of whether they “launched” or 
disappeared in sequence indicates that the gap sequence does not merely preserve 
launching impressions when temporal and spatial delays are present. Here, forward gap 
sequences appeared to lead to the perception of a causal link between the disappearing 
objects where none would be expected in the absence of such a gap sequence, regardless 
of the temporal and spatial gap between them. This effect was as consistent as that seen for 
launching animations. The signal animations provide a replication of the findings of 
experiments 1-3 in a novel set of causal and non-causal animations. 
3.9.  Experiment 6 
Along with experiments 1-3, experiment 5 found further evidence for a lack of 
temporal binding in phenomenal causality due to perceived causality alone, while the 
findings of experiment 4 found possible evidence of temporal binding. However, a possible 
interaction between causality and intentionality has not been explored up to this point. 
Agency accounts of temporal binding predict that temporal binding will only take place when 
agency is present in addition to a perceived or inferred causal relationship between an action 
and its outcome. As discussed previously, Cravo et al. (2009) found evidence for this using 
launching animations with delays between the stopping of the launcher and the movement of 
the target object. In their findings a clear interaction between perceived causality and 
intentionality can be seen. Temporal estimates were significantly lower when participants 
triggered a “launching” effect animation, compared with non-causal animations in which the 
launching objects moved apart in sequence. However, this only occurred when the launcher 
was moved by the participant and not when the animation was observed passively. The 
authors concluded that these findings show that both causality and agency are necessary for 
temporal binding to occur. 
It can be argued, however, that this design contains a mismatch between the visual 
causal impression caused by launching animations and the actual causal mechanism 
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present in the task. Participants were effectively able only to play or pause the animation by 
holding down a mouse button; the speed and trajectory of the launcher were set and not 
controlled by the participant. The remainder of the animation was equally contingent upon 
the mouse button being held down for a certain amount of time regardless of whether it 
appeared causal. The design and conclusion of this study make no distinction between 
visual impressions of causality and inferred causality and therefore make interpretation 
difficult. Accounts which hypothesise that temporal binding results from or contributes to 
motor planning processes (such as the account put forward by Haggard et al., 2002) would 
predict that temporal binding should occur between an action and its intended consequence, 
rather than by concurrent impressions of causality and agency. It can therefore be predicted, 
based on such accounts, that temporal binding should occur between the participants’ 
actions and subsequent visual events, regardless of visual causal impressions. As such, 
studying the combined effects of agency and phenomenal causality on interval perception 
may contribute to the understanding of how agency and causality interact to produce 
temporal binding. 
Experiment 6 was in part a replication of Cravo et al.’s (2009) study, using the 
forward and backward gap sequence animations used in experiments 1-5. These animations 
were used, as in experiments 1-5, to ensure that animations are as perceptually similar as 
possible and that the animations are distinctly “causal” or “non-causal” in appearance more 
reliably than empty temporal gaps. In active conditions, participants were in full control of the 
launcher, rather than merely initiating its movement. The launcher was controlled by the 
mouse and moved in the same speed and direction as the mouse movements. Participants 
could move the launcher freely in each trial, but the gap sequence only began when the 
launcher collided with the leftmost gap object from the left, at an equal or higher speed to 
that of the colour change sequence. This was done to ensure that participants were aware 
their own actions were responsible for the following events.  
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For comparison, in other conditions participants viewed linear gap object movements, 
as in experiments 1-5, or simulated agent movement. In the simulated movement condition 
the movements of the launcher from a pilot session of the self-causal condition were played 
back to participants. This condition was used as a control condition, to ensure that the 
differences in the pattern of movement of the launcher between the linear animations and 
the self-causal animations did not affect the findings. The causal and temporal tasks were 
retained from experiments 4 and 5. 
If causal accounts of temporal binding are correct, no effect of movement type on 
reproduced interval should be found. In particular, significantly lower reproduced intervals in 
forward compared with backward gap sequences would not be expected, in line with the 
findings of experiments 1-5. Under agency accounts, if phenomenal causality does not 
contribute to temporal binding, temporal binding should be observed in self-causal conditions 
regardless of the gap sequence direction, as the “launch” events were caused by the 
participants’ actions regardless of the gap sequence. If phenomenal causality contributes to 
temporal binding, however, the effect would only be predicted in self-causal forward gap 
sequence animations by agency accounts of temporal binding. 
3.9.1. Methods 
3.9.1.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 30 Cardiff University undergraduate participants 
participating for course credit. The age range was 18-23 (4 not reported) and the gender 
ratio was 2 males and 22 females (6 not reported). Participants were precluded from taking 
part if they had participated in the previous experiments reported here. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
3.9.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
The experiment programme was run using PsychoPy (Peirce, et al., 2019). The 
experiment was run on Stone EcoSaver80+ computer running Windows 10. The monitor 
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was 48cm wide by 27cm in height, with stimuli presented at a resolution of 1,600 by 900 
pixels and a refresh rate of 60 frames per second. The computer mouse and keyboard were 
used for participant responses.  
This study made use of the forward and backward gap sequence stimuli, as used in 
previous experiments. Due to the difference in the display size and resolution, the absolute 
sizes of the stimuli differed while the relative sizes between the objects remained the same. 
The launching and gap objects were 1.92cm tall and 0.96cm in width. Gap objects were 
separated by 0.12cm gaps. The fixation cross was 0.45cm tall by 0.45cm in width and 
presented 1.80cm (60 pixels) above the centre of the screen. All text was set to a line height 
of 0.60cm. In all animations the launcher was placed 18cm (600 pixels) left of the centre of 
the screen at the start of each trial. Launcher objects moved at a speed of 0.36cm (12 
pixels) per frame in all linear animations, while target objects moved at 0.36cm per frame at 
fast speeds and 0.18cm (6 pixels) per frame at slow speeds. As in experiment 5, the delay 
intervals were 400ms (3 frames per gap object) in fast conditions and 800ms (6 frames per 
gap object) in slow conditions. Following the launch of the target object, each trial lasted for 
a further 2 seconds (120 frames) during which the target object moved out of the visible 
screen. 
In this experiment, animations were not presented within an aperture to allow 
participants to move the launcher freely on self-causal trials. Unlike in previous experiments, 
in linear movement trials the launcher object moved at the same speed regardless of the 
length of the gap or the movement speed of the target object. This was done to ensure that 
the target object always moved at the same speed or slower than the launcher object, while 
still leading to the same causal impressions. This was necessary because on self-causal 
trials participants moved the launcher before knowing the speed of the gap stimulus. This 
additionally prevented the gap sequence and the movement of the target from being faster 
than the movement of the launcher. 
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In linear movement animations the launching objects moved horizontally at a 
constant speed. In self-causal movement animations participants controlled the movement of 
the launcher object using the computer mouse, whereas the launched object moved in a 
linear path. In self-causal trials the launcher object’s position was set by the position of the 
mouse. The “launch” would only occur in these animations if the launcher collided with the 
leftmost gap object from the left, at a speed equal to or faster than that of the faster of the 
two launching speeds. This was done to ensure that the gap sequence was never faster 
than the movement of the launcher. Participants were able to move the launcher freely, 
although it would stop upon any contact with the target or gap stimuli. The gap sequence 
only initiated when the launcher made contact with the rightmost gap object, moving 
rightward. 
In simulated self-movement animations participants were shown launcher 
movements using mouse positions captured from the self-causal condition, as performed by 
a pilot participant. 40 trials were selected in which the launcher object did not move past the 
gap objects or collide too slowly to initiate the gap sequence. These were used in every 
simulated self-movement condition in a randomised order, such that each of the replayed 
launcher animations were used once for each combination of animation type, animation 
speed and movement type.  
3.9.1.3. Design and procedure 
The study used a repeated-measures, 3-way factorial design. The movement of the 
launcher object was either generated by the participant (self-causal), replayed launched 
object movement from a pilot participant (simulated self-movement), or horizontal and at a 
constant speed (linear movement). The colour change sequences took place either from left 
to right (forward, i.e. from the direction of the first object to move in the direction of the 
second object to launch) or from right to left (backward). Animations were presented at either 
a fast or slow speed.  
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There were 12 animation types altogether. The three movement types were 
presented in separate blocks, while the gap sequence direction and speed were interleaved 
(i.e. 4 animation types in each block). Each block contained 3 sections, presented in the 
following order: causal trials, practice temporal trials and experimental temporal trials. In 
each block there were 10 causal trials per condition (40 in total), 2 practice temporal trials 
per condition (8 in total) and 40 experimental temporal trials per condition (160 in total). The 
self-causal block began with an additional practice session in which participants practiced 
moving the launcher (twice per condition) being asked for causal ratings or reproduced 
intervals. Within each section the trials, varying in speed and gap sequence direction, were 
presented in a randomised order. For simulated self-movement conditions, each of the 40 
pre-recorded launcher movement patterns was played once in each condition in the 
experimental temporal trials, and randomly selected movement patterns were played in the 
causal and practice temporal sections. The order of the three main blocks was 
counterbalanced between participants, which each participant randomly assigned to one of 
the six possible block orders (each possible order was presented to five different 
participants).  
Causal trials were identical to those used in previous experiments. Participants were 
only asked whether they had a visual impression of the launcher causing the target to move. 
Temporal trials used the interval reproduction task from experiments 4 and 5.  
At the beginning of the experiment participants were presented with a consent form. 
Following this, detailed instructions were provided for each block and section of the 
experiment (see Appendix A for the main instructions presented at the beginning of each 
block). Participants were tested in groups of up to 10 at a time in separate cubicles. All 
participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
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3.9.2. Results 
3.9.2.1. Exclusions 
Four participants in total were excluded from the analysis. One participant was 
excluded from analysis based on pre-determined exclusion criteria. Participants were to be 
excluded if they consistently failed to distinguish between 400ms and 800ms intervals. 
Specifically, exclusions were made if participants reported a higher mean interval for the 
400ms intervals than for the 800ms overall, or if they did so on two or more of the four 
conditions (movement type x gap sequence type). Two participants’ data was missing due to 
technical errors. One participant was excluded due to outlying data (over 3 standard 
deviations from the mean in 7 of the 12 conditions). 
3.9.2.2. Causal ratings 
The mean causal ratings per participant, per condition, were included in the analysis. 
See Figure 3.19 for a summary of these findings. As in previous experiments, causal ratings 
were higher for forward gap sequences (M = 71.21, SD = 19.88) than backward gap 
sequences (M = 38.05, SD = 27.89), and higher for shorter gap intervals (M = 58.80, SD = 
19.24) than for longer gap intervals (M = 50.45, SD = 22.57). Additionally, causal ratings 
appear to be more extreme for linear animations, with higher causal ratings for forward gap 
sequences and lower causal ratings for the backward gap sequences, compared with the 
other movement conditions. 
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Figure 3.20. mean causal ratings by gap sequence type, movement speed and movement 
type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The assumption of sphericity, as tested by Mauchly’s test of sphericity, was met for 
the movement type main effect (χ2(2) = 3.47, p = .18), its interactions with gap sequence 
direction (χ2(2) = 1.39, p = .50) and animation speed (χ2(2) = 2.12, p = .35) and the three-
way interaction (χ2(2) = 2.28, p = .32). A three-way, repeated-measures ANOVA found 
significant main effects of animation speed (F(1, 25) = 17.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .41) and gap 
sequence direction (F(1, 25) = 41.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .62) on causal ratings. Additionally, a 
significant interaction between movement type and gap sequence direction was found (F(2, 
50) = 4.62, p = .01, ηp2 = .16). 
Planned contrasts were used to explore the interaction between movement type and 
gap sequence direction. As The simulated self-movement condition was visually similar to 
the self-causal condition, but contained no intentional action, it would be expected that 
causal ratings in the simulated self-movement condition would fall between those found for 
the other two movement types. Repeated contrasts were used, therefore, with each of the 
other movement types compared with the simulated self-movement condition. A significant 
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interaction between movement type and gap sequence direction was found only when the 
simulated self-movement condition was compared with the linear movement condition (F(1, 
25) = 8.00, p = .009, ηp2 = .24), but not when comparing simulated-self movement with self-
movement (F(1, 25) = .40, p = .53, ηp2 = .02). These findings suggest that causal ratings 
were significantly more extreme overall (higher for forward gap sequences and lower for 
backward gap sequences) in linear self-movement animations than for self-movement or 
simulated self-movement animations. However, forward gap sequences appeared to result 
in much higher causal ratings than backward gap sequences in all movement types and as 
such significant differences in reproduced intervals would be expected if temporal binding 
had taken place. 
3.9.2.3. Interval reproduction errors 
The mean reproduced interval was calculated per participant, per condition. To 
calculate the reproduction errors, the actual gap length (400ms in the fast animations, 
800ms in the slow animations) was subtracted from each mean reproduced interval. See 
Figure 3.20 for the mean estimate errors. Participants made greater overestimations of short 
delay intervals (M = 307.70ms, SD = 293.54ms) than long delay intervals (M = 95.50ms, SD 
= 399.77ms). Participants appear to have consistently made greater over-estimations for 
self-causal animations (M = 221.94ms, SD = 344.54ms), followed by the simulated (M = 
201.55ms, SD = 388.84ms) and linear animations (M = 181.32ms, SD = 383.11ms). The 
findings do not show evidence for temporal binding, as reproduction errors were greater for 
forward gap sequences (M = 205.78ms, SD = 344.54ms) than for backward gap sequences 
(M = 197.42ms, SD = 333.61ms).  
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Figure 3.21. Mean reproduction errors by gap sequence type, movement speed and 
movement type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The mean estimate errors per participant, per condition, were used in the main 
analysis. The assumption of sphericity, as tested by Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated 
in the main effect of movement type (χ2(2) = 10.15, p = .006, ε = .74) and the three-way 
interaction (χ2(2) = 6.88, p = .03, ε = .80); adjusted degrees of freedom are reported where 
appropriate. The assumption of sphericity was not violated in the interaction between 
movement type and gap sequence direction (χ2(2) = 3.14, p = .21) and movement type and 
speed (χ2(2) = .15, p = .93). 
A three-way, repeated-measures ANOVA found significant main effects of animation 
speed (F(1, 25) = 36.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .59). No significant main effects of movement type 
(F(1.49, 37.18) = .27, p = .70, ηp2 = .01) or gap sequence direction (F(1, 25) = 3.38, p = .08, 
ηp2 = .12) were found. Similarly, no significant interactions were found between movement 
type and gap sequence direction (F(2, 50) = .01, p = .99, ηp2 < .001), movement type and 
speed (F(2, 50) = .09, p = .91, ηp2 = .004) or gap sequence direction and speed (F(1, 25) = 
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3.00, p = .10, ηp2 = .11). No significant three-way interaction was found (F(1.60, 40.02) = .25, 
p = .73, ηp2 = .01).  
These findings show significant overestimation of shorter intervals compared with 
longer intervals. Estimate errors were lower for backward gap sequences (non-causal 
animations), the opposite of what would be expected due to causal or intentional binding. 
3.9.3. Discussion 
Experiment 6 did not find evidence for temporal binding, regardless of agency. 
Causal ratings were similar to those observed in experiments 1-5, while no effect of agency 
on reproduced intervals was found. As in experiment 5, reproduced intervals were found to 
be significantly shorter for backward gap sequence animations compared with forward gap 
sequence animations.  
Causal ratings were similar regardless of the type of movement (self-causal, 
simulated self-causal or linear), indicating the results cannot be explained by differences in 
phenomenal causality between the three types of movement. Likewise, the differences in the 
launcher movement between conditions is unlikely to have affected the findings, as no 
significant difference was found between the simulated self-movement control condition and 
the self-movement condition. This does not rule out the possibility that interval perception 
might have been affected by the participant’s hand movements in the self-causal condition, 
however. This explanation nevertheless appears unlikely, as an effect of hand movement 
unrelated to agency would be expected to affect reproduced intervals in both forward and 
backward gap sequence animations, and no such effect was found. 
The findings are therefore consistent with previous findings in suggesting that either 
phenomenal causality does not contribute to temporal binding, or that certain features of the 
stimuli used have eliminated the temporal binding effect. As this study was not a direct 
replication of Cravo et al.’s (2009) research, it is not possible to determine the reliability of 
Cravo et al.’s findings based on the current findings. It is evident, however, that the 
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combined presence of perceived causality and intentionality do not necessarily lead to 
temporal binding. 
3.10. Slope analyses 
The findings of experiments 1-6 suggest lack of temporal binding in phenomenal 
causality, both when agency is absent and present, in the stimuli used here. Temporal 
binding experiment designs typically assume that temporal estimates should mirror causal 
impressions/judgements: the higher the perceived causality, the lower the estimated interval 
should be. Such findings may not necessarily reflect individual differences, however. In most 
temporal binding research causal ratings are not collected and, therefore, a direct 
comparison between causal impressions and interval estimates would not be possible. Here, 
however, both measurements had been collected for each participant. 
This comparison was carried out by regressing mean temporal estimates over mean 
causal ratings per participants and analysing the mean slopes in each experiment. A 
comparison of the relationship between causal ratings and temporal estimates better 
accounts for the range of differences between causal ratings among participants. Unlike the 
ANOVA analyses, the slope coefficient of each participant is affected by the relative distance 
between causal ratings. Furthermore, the regression slopes are calculated based on the 
causal ratings reported by the participant, rather than assumptions based on the group mean 
for each condition. 
3.10.1.    Analysis 
The mean causal ratings and temporal estimate errors per condition were computed 
for each participant in each experiment. Each condition, i.e. all combinations of gap 
sequence type, speed and other factors, contained two data points – one causal and one 
temporal mean. Based on this, regressions lines were calculated for each participant 
between the mean causal ratings and mean temporal estimates. If causal binding had 
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occurred, a significantly negative slope was expected, reflecting that higher causal 
impressions had led to lower estimated interval errors and vice versa. 
Participants who were excluded from other analyses were not included in the slope 
analyses. One further participant was excluded from the analysis of experiment 4, as this 
participant reported identical mean causal ratings in all conditions included in the analysis 
and a regression line could therefore not be calculated. Conditions in which no gap colour 
change sequence was visible were further removed from the analysis. This was done as 
temporal estimate errors in experiments 1 and 4 found large overestimation of delay 
intervals when no gap sequence was visible. As causal ratings did not significantly differ 
between backward gap sequences and empty or occluded gap sequences, causal 
impressions cannot account for the overestimation of delay intervals in the absence of a gap 
sequence. This effect, therefore, likely occurred due to perceptual differences, unrelated to 
causal impressions. These conditions would introduce a confound into the analyses, 
therefore, whereby empty and occluded gap sequences artificially inflate a negative 
relationship between causal impressions and temporal estimate errors. A comparison of the 
differences between the mean slopes in experiments 1 and 4, with and without 
empty/occluded gap conditions, can be seen in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1.  
Mean slope coefficients between the mean causal rating and mean temporal 
estimate/reproduction errors, per condition, for experiments 1 and 4. Columns show the 
mean slope coefficients for the data included in the analysis, and the data including all 
conditions. 
 Mean slope coefficient 
(analysis data) 
Mean slope coefficient (all 
conditions included) 
Experiment 1 -1.14 
(2.52) 
-2.20 
(3.67) 
Experiment 4 -0.43 
(6.73) 
-1.55 
(5.39) 
Note: standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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 The mean slope coefficients per experiment, in addition to the mean slope 
coefficient across experiments 1-6 can be seen in Figure 3.21, below. Negative mean slope 
coefficients were found in experiments 1-4, whereas positive slope coefficients were found in 
experiments 5 and 6. 
As negative slopes are of theoretical interest here, one sample tests were carried out 
on the slope coefficients of each experiment to test for significant deviations from 0. In six of 
the seven comparisons the assumption of normality, as tested by the Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality, was not met (p < .05). As such, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used for all 
comparisons. Significant negative slopes were found in experiment 1 (Z = 111, p = .006) and 
experiment 2 (Z = 131, p = .03). However, no significant negative slopes were found in 
experiments 3 (Z = 154, p = .60), 4 (Z = 159, p = .35), 5 (Z = 369, p > .99) or 6 (Z = 369, p = 
.97). Likewise, a test including all experiments found no significant negative slope (Z = 
6,916, p = .55). 
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Figure 3.22. Mean slope coefficients by experiment. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Although significant negative slope coefficients were found in experiments 1 and 2, 
no such effects were found in experiments 3-6 or in the analysis of the combined data from 
all experiments. As was the case in other analyses of these experiments, no clear evidence 
for temporal binding was found. It should be noted that while this analysis better accounts for 
individual differences in visual impressions of causality, it does not take into account the 
multiple factors included in the ANOVA analyses. Nevertheless, in combination, both sets of 
findings suggest no clear effect of causal impressions of interval estimation errors, contrary 
to the predictions of causal accounts of temporal binding if temporal binding occurs in 
phenomenal causality. Agency accounts of temporal binding would predict neither a negative 
nor positive slope in experiment 1-5, as no relationship between perceived causality and 
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reproduced intervals would be expected in the absence of intentional actions. However, in 
experiment 6, due to inclusion of intentional action conditions in three of the nine conditions, 
a relationship between perceived causality and reproduced intervals would be expected with 
no relationship in the other six conditions. Overall, therefore, this would result in a negative 
slope. Contrary to this prediction, a positive mean slope coefficient was found in experiment 
6. Overall, based on the predictions of both causal and agency accounts of temporal binding, 
no evidence of temporal binding in phenomenal causality was found. 
3.11. Experiments 1-6: discussion 
Experiments 1-6 made use of a variety of two-dimensional animations in order to 
investigate temporal binding in phenomenal causality. Several animation types, including 
novel stimuli, were identified as eliciting reliably high, middling or low causal impressions. 
The first three experiments did not find evidence of temporal binding occurring due to visual 
impressions of causality. Following experiments 1-3, several amendments were made to the 
design including the increase of the number of temporal reproduction trials to 40 per 
condition. Although experiment 4 found some evidence for temporal binding, this was not 
replicated in experiments 5 and 6. Overall, the findings of experiments 1-6 point to a lack of 
temporal binding in the stimuli used here.  
One possibility, that these findings were due to an absence of intentionality or 
agency, was investigated in experiment 6. No evidence for temporal binding was found, 
regardless of agency and perceived causality, suggesting that a lack of perceived agency 
did not lead to the lack of temporal binding in experiments 1-5. The inclusion of a simulated 
self-action condition ruled out perceptual differences between human movements and 
computer-generated movements as causing the lack of temporal binding.  
If a lack of perceived agency cannot account for the absence of temporal binding in 
experiments 1-6, two possibilities remain: that these findings indicate that temporal binding is 
not affected by visual impressions of causality, or that the findings came about due to the 
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stimuli used. In experiment 4 the gap stimuli were obscured to eliminate any effects of the 
gap stimuli other than visual causal impressions. Although the two gap sequence directions 
were presented in separate blocks, and gap objects were visible at the beginning of each 
trial before being occluded, participants reported causal impressions comparable to those of 
backward gap sequences. As causal ratings did not significantly vary between occluded gap 
sequences, it cannot be determined whether the visual features of the gap sequences had 
eliminated a possible temporal binding effect. Nevertheless, experiment 4 yielded other 
noteworthy findings. It appears that the visual cue to generative transmission must be seen 
in order to preserve causal impressions across temporal and spatial gaps. As in experiment 
1, the lack of a gap sequence resulted in higher temporal estimates, indicating that the 
presence of the colour change sequence affected the perceived interval length, regardless of 
whether it affected causal impressions. It cannot be ruled out that this could have eliminated 
a temporal binding effect that would otherwise have been observed, although it is unclear 
why this might be the case. 
Experiment 5 employed a different manipulation whereby on some trials the 
“collision” and “launch” were replaced the disappearing of the two launching objects in 
sequence, on either side of the spatial gap (signal animations). These animations were 
intended to lead to low causal impressions and therefore be able to rule out an effect of 
differences in eye movement or between forward and backward gap sequence animations. 
Surprisingly, participants reported high causal ratings when signal animations contained 
forward gap sequences. While the experiment did not rule out any effects of difference in 
shifts in attention, it provided further evidence for a lack of temporal binding in phenomenal 
causality.  
The results of experiments 4-6 found additional evidence for a lack of temporal 
binding in phenomenal causality, while providing evidence against a lack of agency as a 
possible explanation. Experiment 4 demonstrated a clear effect of a gap sequence on 
reproduced intervals, suggesting the most credible alternative explanation for the findings is 
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that temporal binding had been eliminated due to the regular sequence of colour changes. 
The onset of both the cause and outcome events were entirely predictable by external visual 
cues, in contrast with other temporal binding studies in which the exact onset of the outcome 
may not be predicted as precisely. In the majority of temporal binding studies, for instance in 
Haggard et al.’s 2002 studies, the outcome may be predicted by the time of the action. 
However, this takes place following delay and therefore, although a fixed delay is objectively 
very predictable, participants are reliant on their subjective perception of time and 
predictions of the delay duration based on prior trials. Due to the statistical noise present in 
time and event perception, as discussed previously, it is possible that perceptual processes 
are affected by additional prior assumptions such as temporal contiguity in causality, as 
suggested by Eagleman and Holcombe (2002). In the majority of animations in experiment 
6, however, external visual cues to the onset of the “launch” are present in the form of the 
colour change sequences. Because the colour change sequences took place at a constant 
speed, they were also a reliable cue to the portion of the delay which had already elapse. 
This means that the delay duration need not necessarily have to be predicted in advance in 
order to accurately predict the onset of the “launch”. This may have led to a lesser reliance 
on other cues, such as causality and agency, in judgements of interval length.  
It is also possible that, despite instructions to fixate on the fixation cross, participants 
made saccadic eye movements in backward gap sequence trials, leading to a compression 
of the perceived interval length on those trials. The experiments reported in Chapter 4 
investigated the possible role of other factors, not tested in experiments 1-6. Experiment 7 
was an investigation of temporal binding due to visual events, using similar measures to 
those used in experiments 1-6. In addition, the effect of external visual cues to the onset of 
the outcome event and the duration of the gap interval was tested in experiment 8. 
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4. Chapter 4: Investigations of the Roles of Causality and Predictability in 
Temporal Binding 
 As discussed in chapter 3, the lack of temporal binding in experiments 1-6 does not 
necessarily reflect an absence of temporal binding in phenomenal causality. Experiments 7 
and 8 differed from the other studies described in this thesis in being investigations of 
temporal binding in inferred causality. These were run in order to test some alternative 
hypotheses which may account for the findings of previous experiments. By process of 
elimination, the findings of experiments 7 and 8 provide a better understanding of which 
explanations best account for the findings of experiments 1-6. In order to do this, two 
temporal binding investigations were carried out using inferred causality in order to test 
whether the introduction of features such as visual stimuli or manipulations of predictability 
affect the findings. 
Experiment 7 made use of self-causal, machine-causal (causal but not intentional) 
and non-causal sequences of events to further investigate whether temporal binding may 
occur in the absence of agency. Novel apparatus were designed to ensure that key features 
of experiments 1-6 were present. The experiment made use of interval reproduction as a 
measure of perceived interval length. Participants had only visual cues to the onset of both 
judged events regardless of causality and agency, as in launching animations, including 
when intentional actions were performed. In contrast with the majority of temporal binding 
studies, intentional actions did not result in tactile, proprioceptive or auditory feedback at the 
moment of the first judged event. Similarly, the predictability of the first event in each judged 
sequence was equal in both causal conditions regardless of agency. The onset of the first 
event in non-causal sequences was controlled to be as predictable as possible, although it 
does from causal conditions in that, despite being objectively as predictable, there were no 
external visual cues to the onset of the first judged event. Instead, the sequence was 
continuous, such that the first event in each sequence occurred after a fixed delay following 
the preceding event. Here, therefore, the predictability of the first event in sequence has 
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been increased in non-agency conditions compared with previous studies comparing agency 
and non-agency conditions. If either predictability of the first event in each sequence or the 
absence of non-visual sensory feedback had affected the findings of experiments 1-6, 
therefore, the same lack of temporal binding would be observed in the results of experiment 
7. A second aim of experiment 7 was to further investigate whether temporal binding can 
occur in the absence of agency. To date, this question had not been resolved and has 
received little attention (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3).  
Experiment 8 investigated the effect of external visual cues to the onset of the 
outcome on temporal binding. Using a more typical temporal binding task, the predictability 
of the onset of the tone was manipulated between conditions to investigate its effect on 
outcome binding. Here, a continuous visual cue to the onset of the tone was used as an 
analogue to the colour change sequences used in previous experiments. While experiments 
1 and 4 showed that the presence of a gap sequence shortened the perceived durations of 
delay intervals compared with empty temporal gaps, it is not clear the presence of a gap 
sequence had additionally eliminated temporal binding. Experiment 8 focussed on the effect 
of predictability on outcome binding specifically, as it is the predictability of the outcome and 
the overall duration of the delay interval that are affected by the gap sequences in 
experiments 1-6, in contrast with other temporal binding studies. 
In summary, experiments 7 and 8 were designed to be able to eliminate several 
possible accounts of the previous findings between them, namely the predictability of the 
time of the cause and outcome, the use of the visual modality alone and the absence of 
inferred causality and intentionality (with the exception of experiment 6). These were 
investigated as they were potential explanations for the findings of experiments 1-6 not ruled 
out by previous findings. 
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4.1. Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 was carried out in part as a direct comparison of the predictions made 
by causal and agency accounts of temporal binding. Some studies have found direct 
evidence for temporal binding due to causality alone (e.g. Buehner, 2012; 2015), while there 
is a general consensus that causality must be present for the effect to occur (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3 for a discussion of the role of causality in temporal binding). However, at the time 
of writing there is a notable scarcity of research directly investigating the roles of 
intentionality and causality in temporal binding - whether either or both are necessary or 
sufficient for the effect to occur. This question is central to the research previously described 
in this thesis. Whether temporal binding results from causality alone determines the 
interpretation of the findings of experiments 1-6. The reasons for temporal binding not 
occurring in phenomenal causality may differ, depending on which theoretical position best 
accounts for temporal binding. 
Experiment 7 further eliminated possible confounding variables, allowing a better 
comparison with experiments 1-6. All events presented to participants were visual in nature, 
with no other sensory feedback corresponding to their onset. As in launching animations, the 
onset of the first event in each sequence was equally predictable regardless of causality and 
intentionality. As such, an absence of temporal binding would suggest that the use of the 
visual modality, or the predictability of events may have resulted in the absence of temporal 
binding in phenomenal causality. It should be noted that some temporal binding experiments 
had been carried out using visual outcomes (e.g. Ruess, et al., 2017; 2018). However, 
Ruess et al. (2017) found evidence for a decrease in temporal binding when the outcome 
event was visual. It is possible that a similar effect would be found when the preceding event 
is visual in addition to the outcome.  
Novel apparatus were designed in which the typical keypress-tone sequence had 
been replaced with a light sensor which responded to a laser beam pointed in its direction  
by switching on an LED bulb (see the materials section for more details). In self-causal trials 
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participants allowed the laser to pass through to the light sensor using a perforated wooden 
paddle. Participants moved the paddle in the path of the laser beam on each trial, allowing 
the beam to briefly pass through the perforation. In machine-causal trials, a wheel with a 
perforation equal in size to the perforation in the paddle rotated continuously, allowing the 
laser beam to pass briefly through once per rotation. In non-causal trials, the laser was 
replaced with a small red LED bulb, which switched off once per trial. In all trials, a light 
mounted on top of the light sensor switched on following a random short delay after the laser 
beam reached the light sensor (causal conditions) or following the switching off of the red 
LED (non-causal condition.  
Experiment 7 made several improvements on previous studies of the role of causality 
in temporal binding. Two key drawbacks of past research were discussed in Chapter 2: the 
lack of non-causal control stimuli and the lack of measurement of causal judgements. The 
first issue is present in the majority of studies reporting diminished or absent temporal 
binding in the absence of agency. The absence of non-causal, non-intentional control 
conditions results in ambiguous findings, whereby a reduction in or complete absence of 
temporal binding cannot be distinguished by differences in temporal estimates. A non-causal 
control condition is crucial in ruling out the possibility of an “intentional boost” to temporal 
binding, as discussed previously. The absence of causal judgement data further muddies the 
waters, as the possibility that causal inferences may differ between intentional and non-
intentional causal events cannot be ruled out. Likewise, non-causal controls might well lead 
to unintended causal inferences made by participants. Past temporal binding experiments 
had generally been carried out under the assumption that participants will perceive the 
causal structures intended by the experimenter, whether these were actual or illusory.  
Interval reproduction was used to collect estimates of delay durations, and a debrief 
questionnaire was used to collect causal ratings after the experiment had ended. The 
experiment was designed to test 4 hypotheses, based on current accounts of temporal 
binding. Under causal accounts, reproduced intervals were expected to be lower in both 
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causal conditions compared with the non-causal control condition (self-causal = machine-
causal < non-causal control). Under agency accounts, lower reproduced intervals were 
expected in the self-causal condition, compared with the machine causal and non-causal 
conditions (self-causal < machine-causal = non-causal control). Finally, based on the 
findings of Buehner (2012; 2015), an “intentional boost” hypothesis was tested, in which 
temporal binding would be increased due to intentionality, while still present when comparing 
the machine-causal and non-causal conditions (self-causal < machine-causal < non-causal 
control). This is of particular interest as Buehner (2012; 2015) found inconclusive evidence 
for the possibility of such an intentional boost, which has not been investigated since. The 
fourth was the null hypothesis, which predicted no effect. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the 
predictions of each model. The design and hypotheses of this experiment were intended 
primarily for a Bayesian analysis comparing the relative likelihood of all 4 hypotheses based 
on the findings.  
 
Figure 4.1. The patterns of findings predicted by each model tested for in Experiment 7 
(mean reproduced interval by condition). 
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4.1.1. Methods 
4.1.1.1. Participants 
Thirty Cardiff University students and staff (2 male, age range 18-33) participated in 
exchange for a payment of £3 or course credits. Participants were recruited using Cardiff 
University’s Experiment Management System. 
4.1.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
A schematic diagram of the apparatus can be seen in Figure 4.2. The laser and light 
sensor modules (see description below) were situated on a platform placed on top of a desk. 
The platform was 9.80cm in height, with the laser beam passing at a height of 14.50cm 
above the desk. The two modules were separated by a horizontal gap of 18.80cm. A wheel 
(21.50cm diameter), with a round 1cm diameter hole positioned in the location through which 
the laser beam passed, was placed between the two modules. The wheel was attached to a 
motor, housed within the platform, which allowed it to spin clockwise at a speed of 
approximately one revolution per four seconds. 
 
Figure 4.2. A schematic diagram of the apparatus used in experiment 7. A light sensor 
module (1), containing a Raspberry Pi computer and LED bulb was positioned across from 
the laser module (3). The rotating wheel (2) was positioned between the light sensor and 
laser modules and controlled by a geared motor (4), housed inside a box adjacent to the 
laser module. 
 
1 3 
2 
4 
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The light sensor module consisted of a 7x7x10cm box housing a Raspberry Pi 
computer, with a 1cm diameter LED bulb mounted at its top and the light sensor on its front 
,facing the laser module. A separate, portable, 5mm red LED bulb was also connected to the 
computer, but only visible to participants during the non-causal condition (see design and 
procedure). For the self-causal condition (see design and procedure), a rectangular wooden 
paddle (6cm in width and 14cm in height, with handle at its centre) with a 1cm diameter hole 
was used to allow the laser beam to pass to the light sensor, while the wheel position was 
fixed with the perforation placed in the path of the laser beam.   
Participants were placed at a chin rest behind the laser module. Participant 
responses were recorded using a computer mouse connected to a separate computer. 
Finally, a debrief questionnaire was used to measure perceived causality using a 9-point 
Likert Scale. For each condition, participants were presented with the question “in the 
condition where [condition description] did it seem like [first event] was causing [second 
event] (1 = definitely yes, 5 = not sure, 9 = definitely no)?”  
The Raspberry Pi computer placed inside the light sensor module was used to 
control the light sensor, both LED bulbs and the geared motor. This programme was created 
in Python 2.7. The data collection programme running on the second computer was 
programmed and run using the standalone PsychoPy application (Peirce, et al., 2019). 
4.1.1.3. Design and Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. After completing a consent form, participants 
were given safety instructions and were allowed to adjust the height of their seat. 
Instructions were presented verbally at the beginning of the experiment and before each 
block of trials. Throughout the experiment participants kept their head in the chin rest, 
ensuring that the light sensor, wheel and laser beam were visible. Participants were 
instructed to fixate their gaze on the laser point during the self-causal and mechanical-causal 
conditions, and on the 5mm diameter LED bulb during the non-causal control condition. 
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Participants took part in three conditions, in separate blocks, with order of conditions 
counterbalanced between participants. Each condition consisted of 40 trials, during which 
participants observed a critical two-event sequence lasting for an interval between 200 and 
400ms (randomized, described below) and were asked to reproduce this interval by holding 
down the left mouse key for their perceived duration. Prior to each experimental block, 
participants completed as many practice trials as they needed (minimum: three, regardless 
of performance) to understand the task. Task comprehension was assessed by the 
experimenter by observing the participants performing the task to ensure that participants 
were performing the correct movement (if any) and reporting time intervals after each trial. 
Probing questions were used to ensure that participants were reporting the correct time 
intervals and that they did not have any further questions.   
The conditions were as follows (see Figure 4.3 for a photographs of each 
experimental condition):  
Self-causal: Participants performed an intentional action that generated a causal 
consequence after a short delay. The wheel was placed with the hole aligned to the laser 
beam and light sensor and remained stationary throughout (i.e. the laser beam could pass 
through to the light sensor, when allowed through by the participant). The light sensor 
responded to the laser beam by switching on the 10mm red LED at the top of the housing 
after a randomised delay of 200-400ms, and switching off after the same randomised 
interval once the laser beam was no longer received. Participants were told that the sensor 
responds to the beam after a delay, and this was demonstrated by the experimenter prior to 
the practice trials by using hand movements to either block the laser or allow it through. 
Participants were not told any additional information about these delays. Participants were 
instructed to place the paddle at the bottom of the apparatus, with the hole beneath the laser 
beam, such that the paddle blocked the beam. Participants were instructed to keep the 
paddle positioned adjacent to the wheel and move it upwards in front of the laser beam in 
each trial, such that the laser would pass through the hole. This was done to keep this 
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condition as perceptually similar as possible to the mechanical-causal condition (see below). 
Participants were instructed to reproduce the time interval between the laser beam reaching 
the light sensor and the LED lighting up before placing the paddle back for the next trial.   
Mechanical-causal: The wheel rotated continuously at a speed of approximately 4 
seconds per revolution and blocked the laser beam from reaching the sensor, except when 
the hole came in line with it (once every 4 seconds). The light sensor was switched on and 
functioned in the same way as in the self-causal condition. This was demonstrated prior to 
the practice trials; the experimenter demonstrated that when the laser beam was blocked the 
light sensor did not respond at all, regardless of the position of the wheel, and that the light 
sensor always responded after the laser passed through the hole in the wheel. Participants 
were instructed to reproduce the interval between the laser reaching the sensor and the LED 
lighting up as in the self-causal condition. Note that in both the self-causal and mechanical-
causal conditions, the critical causal event 1 (the laser reaching the light sensor) coincided 
with the perceptual experience of the laser spot (temporarily) being no longer visible against 
the paddle or wheel. 
Non-causal control: Participants reproduced the interval between two sequential LED 
flashes. The wheel was positioned in the same way as in the self-causal condition. The laser 
module was switched off, and the 5mm LED was placed in the hole in the wheel. At the 
beginning of each trial, the 5mm LED switched on for one second before switching off, 
followed by the 10mm LED at the top of the housing switching on for 200-400ms. Following 
this, participants were asked to reproduce the time interval between the 5mm LED switching 
off and the 10mm LED switching on. Participants were not told any information about the 
causal relationship between the two lights, but only that they turned on and off in a regular 
sequence. In order that the switching off of the first light would be equally predictable as the 
laser passing through the wheel in the mechanical-causal condition participants were 
informed that the first light will switch off after exactly one second on each trial. It should be 
noted, however, that while this is objectively as predictable, here participants are reliant on 
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internal cues – the perceived duration of time which had passed, rather than external visual 
cues, as in the two causal conditions. This sequence repeated automatically for the duration 
of the condition, with an overall trial length matching the duration of a single wheel 
revolution. Participants were instructed to fixate their gaze on the 5mm LED bulb throughout. 
At the end of experiment participants were asked to fill in the debrief questionnaire, 
where they were asked to report whether they believed the first event caused in the interval 
they were judging caused the second event to occur, per condition. These causal ratings 
were taken as a manipulation check, to ensure participants correctly perceived the causal 
structure of the self-causal and mechanical-causal conditions (the laser beam causing the 
light sensor to respond) and the non-causal control condition (both lights shared a common 
cause). Following this, participants were debriefed as to the purpose of this experiment. 
 
Figure 4.3. Photographs of all experimental conditions from the participants’ perspective. 
Self-causal condition (left): the paddle is set with the hole below the laser beam at the 
beginning of a trial. Mechanical-causal condition (centre): the wheel is rotating clockwise and 
the laser beam is obstructed. Non-causal control (right): the laser beam is replaced with a 
red LED bulb positioned where the laser point can be seen in the other two conditions. 
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4.1.2. Results 
4.1.2.1. Exclusions 
Three participants were excluded for failing to follow instructions (consistently making 
multiple estimates per trial, or making estimates during, rather than between, trials). One 
further participant was excluded due to a technical error. For all other participants, individual 
trials for which there were two estimates and estimates which overlapped with the time of the 
event being judged were removed from analysis (8 participants with excluded trials, mean 
average 4.88 exclusions out of 120 trials). 
4.1.2.2. Causal ratings 
The distribution of causal ratings can be seen in Figure 4.4. While median causal 
ratings were above the mid-point of the scale in all conditions, causal ratings are were higher 
for the self-causal and machine-causal conditions than for the non-causal condition. A 
Friedman’s ANOVA was used due to the ordinal nature of the causal scores. The analysis 
found a significant main effect of condition on causal ratings (X2(2) = 15.58, p < .001). Post-
hoc testing using Bonferroni corrections found significantly lower scores for the non-causal 
control condition (median = 6) compared with the self-causal condition (median = 8, Z = 
24.50, p < .001) and the mechanical-causal condition (median = 8, Z = 37.00, p = .002). No 
significant difference was found between the self-causal and mechanical-causal conditions 
(Z = 87.5, p = .95). 
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Figure 4.4. A box plot of causal ratings by experimental condition. 
 
4.1.2.3. Temporal estimates: transformation 
A preliminary analysis of the data found substantial variability in the range of interval 
reproductions between participants (see Table 4.1 for pre-transformation data). Additionally, 
a Shapiro-Wilk test found significant deviations from the normal distribution in two of the 
three conditions (p < .05). In order to reduce the influence of individual differences and 
reduce the positive skew of the data, temporal reproductions were converted to z-scores. To 
do this, each participant’s grand mean reproduced interval was subtracted from each 
reproduction. The difference from the mean of each score was divided by the standard 
deviation of all estimates. The mean z-score per condition for each participant was used for 
the temporal reproduction analysis. Following transformation, the assumption of normality 
was met for all conditions (p > .05). The mean z-scores can be seen in Figure 4.5. 
Descriptive statistics for untransformed temporal reproductions. 
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Table 4.1.  
Descriptive statistics for untransformed temporal reproductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean z scores of temporal reproductions by condition. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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A Bayesian analysis was carried out using the BayesFactor package for R statistics 
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given the data than the null model. Three further models were analysed, as predicted by the 
agency accounts of temporal binding (self-causal < mechanical-causal = non-causal control), 
the causal account of temporal binding (self-causal = mechanical-causal < non-causal 
control) and the “intentional boost” hypothesis (self-causal < mechanical-causal < non-
causal control). The highest Bayes factor was found for the model predicted by the 
intentional boost account (BF10 = 91.82), and as such it is the preferred model compared 
with the models predicted by agency accounts (BF10 = 44.57) and the causal account (BF10 
= 16.22). 
A one-way frequentist ANOVA was carried out to confirm these findings. This 
analysis found a significant main effect of condition on the z score-transformed 
reproductions, F(2,50) = 4.47, p = .02, η2 = .15. Planned simple contrasts were used to 
investigate the differences between the mechanical-causal condition and both other 
conditions. A significant difference was found between the mechanical-causal and self-
causal conditions (F(1, 25) = 4.33, p = .048, η2 = .15), but not between the mechanical-
causal and non-causal control (F(1, 25) = 1.53, p = .23, η2 = .06). The frequentist analysis, 
therefore, appears to favour the intentional binding account. It should be noted, however, 
that the non-significant difference between the mechanical-causal condition and non-causal 
control condition may indicate inconclusive evidence rather than evidence against the effect.  
4.1.3. Discussion 
Experiment 7 compared predictions made by both agency and causal accounts of 
temporal binding with the use of novel apparatus. In contrast with other temporal binding 
research, participants had access to visual feedback alone at the time of both and first and 
second judged events, regardless of causality or agency. Causal ratings suggest that while 
participants reported higher causal judgements for self-causal and machine-causal actions 
compared with the non-causal 2-light sequences, causal judgements for the non-causal 
control condition were surprisingly high, with more than half above the mid-point of the 
ratings scale. This occurred despite the fact that the non-causal sequence was 
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predetermined and took place continuously, without input from the experimenter following 
the initiation of the block of trials, and without explanation for how the switching off of the first 
light caused the second light to switch on. Here, the contingency between the two events 
appeared to contribute to incorrect inferences of the causal mechanism controlling the two 
events. This further illustrates the difficulty in interpreting past findings where no causal 
judgements were recorded, as participants’ inferences of causal mechanisms may differ 
substantially from those intended. 
Nevertheless, significantly higher causal judgements were recorded for both self- and 
mechanical-causal conditions compared with the non-causal control and, crucially, agency 
did not appear to result in an increase in causal judgements. The Bayesian analysis found 
the model best supported by the data to be of causal binding with an intentional boost, while 
the frequentist analysis was less conclusive, finding a significant difference in reproduced 
intervals between the mechanical- and self-causal conditions, but not between the non-
causal control and mechanical-causal conditions. It should be noted that the frequentist 
ANOVA tested two individual hypotheses in isolation while the Bayesian analysis allowed the 
comparison of entire models consisting of multiple comparisons. As such, this may indicate 
that the frequentist findings lacked the statistical power to detect a small causal binding 
effect, rather than an absence of causal binding. This may have occurred due to smaller-
than-expected differences in causal judgements between non-causal and causal conditions 
resulting in a smaller effect size. 
The notion of an “intentional boost” to causal binding has received little attention to 
date and is difficult to account for using either causal or agency accounts of temporal 
binding. Experiment 7 did not find evidence for this boost occurring due to an increase in 
certainty of the causal mechanism (as hypothesised by Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002), as 
causal ratings did not significantly differ between these two conditions. It cannot be ruled out, 
however, that an “intentional boost” could have resulted from low-level perceptual 
differences between the tasks and, in particular, the presence of hand movements during 
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intentional trials may have effected interval perception due to changes in internal clock 
speeds. In addition to the previously discussed effect of saccadic eye movements on time 
perception (Morrone et al., 2005), evidence has been found for a compression in the 
perceived time interval between two sensory events during hand movements (Tomassini, 
Gori, Baud-Bovy, Sandini & Morrone, 2014). An “intentional boost” to temporal binding may 
therefore be a product of motor actions made during the judged events or interval between 
them. This “intentional boost” may also account for the differences in the magnitude of the 
temporal binding effect reported in investigations of temporal binding in observed actions 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.2). 
Regarding temporal binding in phenomenal causality, however, these findings 
suggest that temporal binding in the absence of agency is indeed possible; the Bayesian 
analysis found greater support for the causal binding + intentional boost model, although this 
model was found to be only 2.06 times more likely than the next-best-supported model 
predicted by agency accounts of temporal binding. These findings further demonstrate that 
multi-sensory feedback is not necessary for temporal binding to occur. This raises the 
question of why similar effects were not found in experiments 1-6. In particular, experiment 6 
found no evidence for either temporal binding or an intentional boost, using the same sample 
size and interval reproduction task used in experiment 7. Experiment 7 demonstrates that 
tactile non-visual feedback at the onset of the judged events is not necessary for temporal 
binding to take place. A key feature of experiments 1-6 not investigated in experiment 7 was 
the presence of visual cues to the length of the interval and the onset of the outcome events. 
Experiment 8 sought to address this possible explanation. 
4.2. Experiment 8 
As mentioned previously, one possible reason for a lack of temporal binding in the 
stimuli used Experiments 1-6 is that participants had been able to use gap sequences to 
predict both the duration of the delay interval while the delay was taking place and the onset 
of the “launch” event. In launching animations with a gap sequence, the onset of the second 
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event (launch) is signalled by the gap sequence, whereas in typical temporal binding 
experiments the onset of the outcome is only predicted by the first event, separated by a 
delay. This may have led to an elimination of any temporal binding if participants relied on 
this external cue in estimating delay durations, rather than predictions based on causal 
impressions. Under the causal account of temporal binding, this would reflect an increased 
weighting of sensory cues over prior assumptions of temporal contiguity, resulting in 
temporal judgements that are less influenced by prior assumptions. 
Some studies suggest, contrary to this hypothesis, predictability increases rather 
than diminishes temporal binding (e.g. Cravo et al., 2011, Haggard et al., 2002). Other 
studies, however found no such effect, both the use of the Libet clock method (Ruess, et al., 
2017) and measures of interval perception (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; Humphreys and 
Buehner, 2009). Although the question of whether predictability increases the temporal 
binding effect remains unsolved, all evidence points to there either being no effect or an 
increase in temporal binding. 
This evidence is limited in its application to the findings of Experiments 1-6, however. 
In the experiments mentioned above predictability varied due to the consistency of delay 
intervals between trials. In contrast, in experiments 1-6 delay durations varied between trials 
but were entirely predictable by the rate of the colour change sequences. This was a much 
more reliable cue to the onset of the outcome event as it did not require participants to rely 
on previous estimates of duration. Instead, the gap sequence was available as a visual cue 
on each trial. 
Experiment 8 attempted to create equally predictable outcome stimuli, while 
eliminating other variables which may have affected judgements of delay duration. The 
experiment made use of the Libet clock method and investigated estimates of the time of 
outcome alone. The results of experiments 5 and 7 already suggest no effect of the 
predictability of the onset of the first event. In experiment 5, the onset of the first judged 
event was less predictable in signal than launching animations but did not result in significant 
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differences in temporal estimate errors. Because of this, and as previous studies have 
shown outcome binding to account for the bulk of the temporal binding effect (e.g. Haggard 
et al., 2002), this experiment focussed on outcome binding alone.  
The study made use of the Libet clock method and keypress-tone event sequences 
typical to temporal binding to ensure that conditions are in place to reliably replicate the 
temporal binding effect. In all conditions a white circle was present in the centre of the Libet 
clock. In “signal” conditions, the circle began to fill with a green colour, radiating outward 
from the centre of the clock from the beginning of each delay interval. In each signal trial, the 
circle at the centre of the clock became entirely green at the moment that the outcome event 
occurred (tone). This was compared to no-signal conditions in which no colour change took 
place. This sequence was designed to differ from the colour change sequences in 
experiments 1-6 to ensure the equal predictability of the tone, while eliminating any other 
factors which may affect the findings. This experiment made use of 500ms delay intervals to 
allow sufficient time for the participants to make use of the visual signal.  
4.2.1. Methods 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
40 Cardiff University students (8 male, age range 18-27) participated in exchange for 
course credits or a payment of £5. Participants were recruited via the School of Psychology’s 
experiment management system. Participants who took part in Experiments 1-7 were 
excluded from participation in this study. The number of participants was increased to 40 to 
account for a smaller effect resulting from the focus on outcome binding alone, rather than 
the entire delay interval.  
4.2.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
The experiment programme was run using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2019). The experiment 
was run on Mac-Mini computer. Stimuli were displayed on a monitor 47cm wide and 30cm in 
height, at a resolution of 1,680 by 1,050 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 frames per second. 
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All instructions were presented on the screen with a line height of 0.56cm (20 pixels), 
including the consent form and markers on the Libet clock. 
This experiment made use of a Libet clock (Libet et al., 1983). See Figure 4.6 for an 
image of the clock used in this experiment. The clock face was presented at the centre of the 
screen with a radius of 5.60cm (200 pixels). Sixty minor tick marks were presented along the 
clock face, with major markers and labels (intervals of 5 from 0 to 55 present every 5 tick 
marks. A clock had extended from the centre to the edge of the clock face. The clock hand 
rotated at a speed of 2,560ms per revolution (7.11ms per degree, or 2.34 degrees per 
frame).At the centre of the clock was a white circle with a black outline, with an 84cm (30 
pixel) radius, and a smaller, black circle at its centre (0.14cm, or 5 pixel radius). These were 
presented over the clock hand. 
 
Figure 4.6. A screen shot (cropped) of the Libet clock presented to participants in experiment 
8, with the clock hand at the 5-minute mark (30 degrees). 
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4.2.1.3. Design and procedure 
The study used a repeated-measures, 2-way factorial design. Each factor contained 
two levels. Additionally, participants completed two baseline tasks. The Libet clock was 
present in all trials. The starting position of the clock hand was randomised for each trial. 
Participants were instructed to fixate their gaze on the centre of the clock during all trials. At 
the end of each trial the clock hand continued to revolve for a random interval between 1,500 
and 2,500ms in order to prevent an afterimage of the clock hand position at the time of the 
tone, and to prevent participants from being able to infer where the clock hand was from its 
position at the end of each trial. All time intervals, with the exception of the length of the 
outcome tones, were determined in frames for optimal accuracy, so these intervals were 
always set in bins of 16.67ms. 
In key-press (causal) trials participants were instructed to press the space key at a 
time of their choosing, which caused a tone (1,000hz, 50ms duration) to sound after a 
500ms delay. Participants were instructed to press the key at a time of their choosing, but 
only after the clock had completed a full revolution. If this condition was not met, the trial 
would restart. This was done in order to prevent participants from attempting to press the 
key immediately after the trial began. Participants were also asked to press the key 
spontaneously, without planning in advance where the clock hand would be when it was 
pressed. 
In two-tone (non-causal) trials participants performed no action. Instead, a tone 
(1,000hz, 50ms duration) sounded in place of a key-press. The first tone would sound at a 
random time between the time at which the clock hand completed a full revolution, and 
2,566.67ms later (i.e. the end of the second revolution). The second tone would sound after 
a 500ms delay, as in the key-press trials. 
In signal trials the centre of the clock began to change colour from white to green 
when the space was pressed (in key-press trials) or when the first tone sounded (two-tone 
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trials). This colour-change radiated outward from the centre of the clock to the edge of the 
inner circle. This colour change took 500ms, such that the tone would sound when the inner 
circle changed colour completely. In no-signal trial the inner circle of the clock remained 
white throughout. 
In addition, there were two single-tone baseline conditions. In both a tone sounded at 
a random time between 500ms after the clock hand completed its first full revolution and 
500ms after the clock hand completed its second full revolution; this timing was identical to 
the time of onset of the second tone in two-tone trials. In signal baseline trials the clock hand 
changed colour gradually from white to green as in other signal trials (see description 
above). In no-signal baseline trials the inner circle of the clock remained white throughout. 
There were six conditions in total: signal baseline, no-signal baseline, key-press + 
signal, key-press + no-signal, two-tone + signal, and two-tone + no-signal. As baseline 
measures were intended to be subtracted from the other conditions in the analysis, this was 
a two-factor design (key-press/two-tone x signal/no-signal). All participants took part in all 
conditions. The six conditions were presented in separate blocks of 5 practice trials and 40 
experimental trials. 
After each trial participants were asked to report the position of the clock hand at the 
time of the onset of the tone (in key-press trials) or second tone (in two-tone trials). 
Participants did so by entering a number between 0 and 60 (matching the interval markers 
on the clock) using the computer keyboard. A clock was present on the screen showing 
participants the clock hand position that matches their estimate. 
Participants were tested individually. After completing an electronic consent form, 
instructions were presented on the screen prior to each block of trials. The trial types 
described above occurred in separate blocks of trials. The order of these blocks was 
randomised for each participant. At the end of the experiment participants were debriefed 
and given their payment. 
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4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Exclusions 
One participant was excluded from analysis due to a loss of data as result of a 
technical fault. Two participants were excluded from analysis due to outlying data in 
perceptual shifts (over 3.5 standard deviations from the group mean). No participants were 
excluded based on other pre-determined exclusion criteria. Participants were to be excluded 
if they made estimates different by over 90 degrees from the actual value on 16 or more 
trials per block. Participants were to be included in the analysis if they made estimates within 
90 degrees of the actual value on 25 or more trials in each condition, corresponding to top 5 
percentiles expected if they entered values at random.  
4.2.2.2. Data cleaning  
For each participant, each estimate was converted to degrees (multiplied by 6). Each 
estimate was subtracted from the corresponding actual angle of the clock hand to produce 
the estimate error. Negative values show underestimation and positive values show 
overestimation. As the clock is circular, but the angle of the clock hand can only be between 
0 and 360 degrees, estimate errors over 180 degrees or under -180 degrees were corrected, 
under the assumption that participants’ estimates fell within the correct half of the clock face. 
In estimate errors over 180 degrees 360 degrees were subtracted from the estimate error. 
For example, if the estimate was 354 degrees and the actual value was 6 degrees, it was 
assumed that the estimate error is -12, rather than 348 degrees. The reverse was done for 
estimates under -180 degrees. 
For the purpose of analysis, estimate errors in degrees were converted to 
milliseconds. The values in degrees were multiplied by 7.11 to achieve this (2,560ms per 
rotation divided by 360 degrees, i.e. 7.11ms per degree). Both the mean standard error per 
participant per condition and the within-participant standard deviations were computed for 
analysis. 
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4.2.2.3.  Estimate errors 
The mean estimate errors and mean shifts can be seen in Table 4.2. The mean shifts 
represented the differences between two-event conditions and their single-event baseline 
equivalents. For each participant mean estimate errors from signal conditions were 
subtracted from the signal baseline estimate errors, and the no-signal estimate errors 
subtracted from the no-signal estimate errors. Positive mean shifts represent a forward shift 
relative to baseline and negative mean shifts represent a negative shift relative to baseline. 
Mean shifts were used for the main analysis. 
The descriptive statistics show higher overestimation in the no-signal baseline 
condition than for the signal baseline. Overall there was a negative shift in both no-signal 
two-event conditions, and a positive shift in signal conditions. This appears to be the result of 
a lower baseline mean when the signal was present, as well as higher estimate errors in 
signal conditions. However, mean shifts were lower in causal conditions than no causal 
conditions across the board. 
Table 4.2 
Mean estimate errors and mean shifts by condition. 
Condition Mean error (ms) Mean shift (ms) 
Baseline (signal) 8.05 (79.01) - 
Baseline (no signal) 67.49 (58.88) - 
   
Causal (key-press) + signal 28.33 (59.46) 20.28 (52.67) 
Causal (key-press) + no signal 20.88 (86.95) -46.61 (77.48) 
Non-causal (two-tone) + signal 70.57 (69.54) 62.52 (67.34) 
Non-causal (two-tone) + no signal 34.93 (60.83) -32.56 (59.02) 
Note: standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
 
The analysis included the shifts relative to baseline in all two-event conditions. These 
can be seen in Figure 4.7. While participants made greater overestimations overall when a 
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signal was present, lower perceptual shifts can be seen in both causal conditions compared 
with non-causal conditions, with a greater difference between the two in signal trials. 
    
 
Figure 4.7. The mean perceptual shifts by causality and predictability. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
A two-way, repeated-measures ANOVA found significant main effects of causality 
(F(1, 36) = 15.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .30) and signal (F(36, 1) = 27.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .43). 
Additionally, there was significant interaction between causality and signal (F(1, 36) = 8.52, p 
= .006, ηp2 = .19). A simple effects analysis found a significant difference between the causal 
and non-causal conditions when a signal was present (F(1, 36) = 22.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .39), 
but not in the absence of a signal (F(1, 36) = 2.81, p = .10, ηp2 = .07).  
4.2.3. Discussion 
 Experiment 8 made use of a temporal binding paradigm similar to that used by 
Haggard et al. (2002) and many temporal binding studies since. The experiment compared 
perceptual shifts in the perceived time of a tone either caused by the participant’s keypress 
or preceded by another tone, compared with single-event baseline measures. A further 
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manipulation was included in which a signal was to the onset of the judged tone was present 
in half of the trials, whereby a circle at the centre of the Libet clock gradually changed colour 
from white to green from the end of the first event until the onset of the second event.  
Results showed an overall positive shift in the perceived time of the tone in signal 
trials compared with no-signal trials, but also found a significant effect of 
causality/intentionality whereby forward shifts were significantly greater in non-causal trials 
compared with causal trials. This suggests temporal binding had taken place when a signal 
was present, despite the forward shift in all signal conditions. The lack of temporal binding in 
no-signal trials is unsurprising as some previous studies have found that the effects of 
temporal binding on event perception diminish at delay intervals longer than 250ms (e.g. 
Haggard et al., 2002; see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 for a discussion of the evidence for an 
effect of interval length on temporal binding), while this study made use of a 500ms interval.  
While it is not clear from the analysis whether temporal binding had taken place in 
the absence of a signal, the presence of a signal providing a cue to the onset of the outcome 
(tone) appeared to strengthen, rather than diminish, the temporal binding effect. It should be 
noted that the use of a Libet clock limits the direct application of these findings to the 
previous experiments discussed in this thesis, which made use of interval estimation and 
reproduction methods. However, the perceptual shifts in event perception likely contribute to 
the overall compression in perceived delay intervals on top of differences in internal clocks. 
In addition - assuming that the temporal binding effect as observed in action binding, 
outcome binding and the compression of the perceived interval between the two results from 
similar processes - the effect of predictability on the weighting of prior expectations should 
be observed in all cases. This experiment found no evidence that the predictability of the 
outcome diminishes temporal binding and indeed found that the converse was true. The 
predictability of the outcome in experiments 1-6 is therefore not a likely explanation for the 
lack of temporal binding in phenomenal causality found in those experiments.  
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4.3. Experiments 7 and 8: discussion 
Experiments 7 and 8 were conducted in order to test several hypotheses for the lack 
of evidence for temporal binding found in experiments 1-6. Experiment 7 tested hypotheses 
generated from causal and agency accounts of temporal binding with the use of visual 
stimuli and similar measures to those used in experiments 1-6. Experiment 8 tested whether 
external visual cues to the onset of the outcome event and the duration of the delay interval 
reduce temporal binding due to a decreased reliance on prior assumptions of causally 
related events as temporally contiguous. 
Several methodological features of experiments 1-6 were applied to experiment 7. 
Visual cues alone were available to participants at the onset of causal events, outcomes and 
control events, including intentional actions. Delay intervals differed between trials and the 
interval reproduction procedure used in experiments 3-6 was employed. Strong evidence for 
temporal binding was found, indicating that the use of these methods cannot account for the 
lack of temporal binding in experiments 1-6. Causal ratings collected at the end of the 
experiment suggested that this evidence for temporal binding was found despite a smaller 
relative difference in causal ratings between conditions than was found with the use of 
phenomenal causality stimuli. 
Experiment 7 further aimed to test agency and causal accounts of temporal binding 
to aid in the interpretation of the lack of temporal in phenomenal causality in experiments 1-
6. Evidence was found for causal binding with an additional intentional “boost” whereby 
reproduced intervals were lower for the delays between causally related events compared 
with unrelated events, but lower still when intentional actions were performed. This outcome, 
although seen in other experiments (Buehner, 2012; 2015) is not entirely predicted by either 
agency or causal account, although it does suggest that agency is not necessary for 
temporal binding to occur. It cannot be ruled out, however, that this “boost” occurred due to 
the presence of motor actions, rather than agency per se. 
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Experiment 8 tested the hypothesis that external cues to the onset of the outcome 
may reduce temporal binding due to a decreased reliance on prior knowledge in making 
temporal judgements. A more typical temporal binding design was used, making use of 
keypress-tone event sequences and measuring outcome binding using a Libet clock. The 
Libet clock was chosen as the most well-established method by which temporal binding is 
measured, and to ensure minimal perceptual similarity between experiment 8 and 
experiments 1-6, with the exception of the predictability of the outcome event and the 
duration of the delay interval.  
The shifts in the perception of the outcome events relative to the non-causal control 
condition were only significant when an external visual cue was present, indicating that 
predictability led to greater outcome binding, rather than a reduction in outcome binding. 
Although care must be taken when applying this inference to the effects of temporal binding 
on interval perception, there appears to be no general reduction in temporal binding due to 
external visual cues to the onset of the outcome, and, in fact, the opposite was found.  
In summary, experiments 7 and 8 succeeded in eliminating several hypothetical, non-
causal accounts as likely explanations for the lack of phenomenal causality found in 
experiments 1-6. Based on the findings of experiment 7, the design of experiments 1-6 – the 
number of trials, measurements, etc. – appear to be appropriate for detecting a temporal 
binding effect. The findings have further narrowed the range of possible accounts for the 
findings reported in this thesis. 
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5. Chapter 5: General Discussion 
Temporal binding, the subjective contraction of the time interval between cause and 
effect, has been studied extensively since it was first reported in 2002 (Haggard et al., 2002). 
Although it was initially reported as the contraction between intentional actions and their 
outcomes, debate over the role of causality in the effect has generated some interest, with 
some suggesting the effect is driven entirely by the perception of causality and not 
intentionality or agency (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002). 
Perhaps surprisingly, given that the perception of causality is generally viewed as at least 
necessary, if not sufficient for the effect to occur (Moore & Obhi, 2012), the mechanisms by 
which causality contributes to temporal binding has remained under-explored. This thesis 
aimed to investigate whether temporal binding occurs in phenomenal causality, a subject 
which to date has only been investigated once (Cravo et al., 2009). Phenomenal causality 
refers to visual impressions of causality: these are fast and appear to be automatic, and 
emerge without the needed for prior experience of, or multiple exposures to, the stimuli 
used. Phenomenal causality has been suggested to result from separate processes from 
those leading to causal inferences (e.g. Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Scholl & Tremoulet, 
2000). As such, evidence either for or against temporal binding in phenomenal causality has 
the potential to further our understanding of the role that causality plays in temporal binding 
and the mechanisms by which this occurs. 
The difficulty in using phenomenal causality stimuli in temporal binding research is 
that stimuli leading to visual impressions of causality do not typically contain a temporal gap 
between causes and their effects and temporal delays between causes and their effects 
have been shown to reduce causal impressions (e.g. Michotte, 1946/63; Yela, 1952; 
Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; White, 2014). To overcome this, Experiments 1-6 have made 
use of stimuli adapted from White’s (2015) research, which showed that the inclusion of 
visual cues to generative transmission can maintain causal impressions across temporal 
delays. In all trials launching animations were used whereby a launcher object moved toward 
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a target object. A second, target object began to move in the same direction as the launcher 
after a delay. To generate high impressions of causality, a series of objects between the 
stopping point of the launcher changed colour from grey to black in sequence from the 
direction of the launcher toward the direction of the target during the delay interval. As a 
control, other trials contained a reversed colour change sequence which has been found not 
to maintain causal impressions. 
Experiments 1-6 made use of a number of variations on these stimuli to investigate 
whether temporal binding took place due to phenomenal causality, in the absence of agency. 
Participants made estimates of the delay duration using both interval estimation 
(experiments 1 and 2) and interval reproduction methods (experiments 3-6). Participants 
also provided causal ratings which were used to ensure that participants experienced the 
intended causal impressions. Experiments 1-6 found the causal impressions to be highly 
reliable. However, the prediction made by causal accounts of temporal binding – that if 
temporal binding had occurred, the higher the causal impressions, the smaller the perceived 
intervals should be – did not manifest. Analyses of the regression slope coefficients between 
causal ratings and interval estimate errors across experiments 1-6 did not find clear 
evidence for a relationship between causal impressions and interval estimation or 
reproduction errors. 
Experiments 4-6 were carried out in part as replications of experiments 1-3 and in 
order to test alternative explanations for the findings. All three experiments reduced the 
number of gap sequence types and animation speeds to two (forward and backward gap 
sequences and fast and slow animation speeds, corresponding to short and long delays). 
The number of interval reproduction trials per condition was increased to 40 to increase the 
reliability of estimated intervals. Experiment 4 obscured the gap stimuli on half of the trials, 
with forward and backward gap sequences presented in separate blocks. These occluded 
stimuli were intended to yield similar causal impressions to fully visible trials, thus eliminating 
any visual differences between the two animation types other than causal impressions. This 
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manipulation failed, however, as high causal impressions were only maintained when a cue 
to generative transmission was visible. This was indicated by the absence of a significant 
difference in causal ratings between occluded animations, regardless of whether they were 
presented alongside causal-appearing or non-causal-appearing animations. The experiment 
nevertheless found evidence that time perception had been affected by the presence of the 
gap sequences, regardless of causal impressions. Causal ratings were similarly low for all 
occluded animations and comparable to those found for backward gap sequences. Despite 
this, participants made significantly higher over-estimations of the delay intervals when the 
gap sequences were not visible, which could not be explained by differences in causal 
impressions. 
Experiment 4 further found some evidence for temporal binding, as interval 
reproduction errors were significantly lower in forward gap sequence compared with 
backward gap sequences, in visible, slow animations. This mirrored the effects of gap 
sequence direction on causal ratings, where forward gap sequences only led to increased 
causal ratings in visible, slow animations on this occasion. It is not clear, however, why 
evidence for temporal binding was only found in experiment 4. The differences in causal 
ratings between gap sequence types found here, although statistically significant, were 
smaller than in the rest of Experiments 1-6 and would therefore be expected to result in a 
reduction in temporal binding. This cannot be explained by the increase in the number of 
trials, as Experiments 5 and 6 made use of the same number of trials per condition. One key 
difference between Experiment 4 and other experiments reported here is that the different 
gap sequence types were presented in separate blocks, rather than in a randomised order. 
Indeed, a separation of causal and non-causal conditions is typical in temporal binding 
experiments, whereas interleaving of causal and non-causal conditions is much less so. 
There are, nevertheless, some examples in which different causal conditions are interleaved, 
such as Desantis et al.’s (2011) study, in which temporal binding was found despite the 
presentation of different causal conditions within the same blocks of trials. A final possibility 
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is that the significant interaction found in Experiment 4 was does not represent a true effect 
and was instead a false finding. The slope analysis reported in Chapter 3 did not find any 
significant evidence for a negative slope between causal ratings and interval reproduction 
errors in Experiment 4. This, along with the lack of any similar findings in Experiments 1-3, 5 
or 6 suggests that the findings of experiment 4 are not replicable, although it is uncertain 
whether this is indeed the case. 
Experiment 5 aimed to investigate the possible role of shifts in eye movement or 
attention on time perception in the findings of experiment 1-4. On half of the trials the 
launching objects were replaced with two stationary objects which disappeared in sequence 
(signal trials). These were intended as non-causal control stimuli which drew attention to the 
same parts of the screen as the events of launching sequences. Surprisingly, causal 
impressions were as high in signal trials as in the launching trials, despite the absence of 
motion. Signal animations did not act as a non-causal control for the launching animations, 
therefore. Because of this, an effect of differences in eye movements between gap 
sequence conditions in experiments 1-4 could not be ruled out based on the findings of 
experiment 5. Nevertheless, the absence of evidence for temporal binding was replicated 
here in both launching and signal animations. Further, the surprisingly high causal 
impressions in signal animations suggest that non-collision events can be used to create 
visual causal impressions, at least under specific circumstances. Similarly, a recent study by 
Bechlivanidis, Schlottmann and Lagnado (2019; experiment 3) found high causal 
impressions when participants viewed a collision which caused the target object to change 
colour, shape or size at the moment of collision. These causal ratings remained high even 
after exposure to a typical “launching” animation and as such these findings cannot be 
explained by context effects. Phenomenal causality appears not to be limited to “realistic” 
simulations of real-life physical interactions, therefore, although more research is needed to 
establish whether this is indeed the case. In particular, more research is needed to establish 
what non-kinematic features of the visual stimuli may give rise to a visual causal impression. 
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Experiment 6 included three types of launcher object movement in order to test for a 
role of intentionality. In self-causal trials the launcher was controlled by the participant using 
a computer mouse. Linear movement trials were identical to those used in experiments 1-5. 
Simulated self-causal trials reproduced visually similar patterns of motion, captured during a 
pilot session and were included as a control for the differences in the patterns of motion of 
the launcher object between self-causal trials and linear movement trials. Different 
hypotheses can be made for findings constituting evidence for temporal binding in 
phenomenal causality, based on agency and causal accounts of temporal binding. Based on 
agency accounts, if temporal binding had taken place due to phenomenal causality, gap 
intervals would be perceived as shorter in forward compared with backward gap sequence 
animations, but only in self-causal trials. A further possibility was that if phenomenal 
causality did not contribute to temporal binding, interval estimate errors would be lower in 
self-causal trials compared with simulated self-causal and linear movement trials, as 
“launch” events were caused by the participant’s actions regardless of visual causal 
impressions. Based on the causal account of temporal binding, lower interval estimate errors 
would be expected in forward gap sequence animations than backward gap sequence 
animations, regardless of the type of movement. No effect of either gap sequence direction 
or type of launcher movement was found, however. Based on the causal account, this 
supports the hypothesis that temporal binding does not occur due to phenomenal causality, 
in the stimuli used here.  
The findings of Experiment 6 suggest that the lack of intentional actions in 
experiments 1-5 does not account for the lack of evidence for temporal binding. However, 
the lack of a “classic” temporal binding effect when intentional actions were present suggests 
the possibility that the lack of temporal binding in experiments 1-6 was not caused by a lack 
of effect of phenomenal causality on time perception but due to other perceptual influences 
(several such possibilities are discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2). As discussed above, the 
findings of Experiments 1 and 4 demonstrate an effect of the presence of a colour change 
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sequence on time perception, irrespective of causal impressions. Although estimated and 
reproduced intervals were closer to the actual delay intervals when gap sequences were 
present, this does not necessarily indicate that these estimates were more accurate, as both 
measures are only used to report subjective perceived intervals. The conversion of 
perceived intervals into a numerical value as in interval estimation tasks, or the conversion of 
visually perceived intervals to tactile feedback as in interval reproduction tasks, mean that 
participants’ responses are not expected to be accurate relative to actual interval durations. 
Further, the effects of the gap sequences on time perception would not necessarily be 
expected to eliminate temporal binding.   
Finally, experiments 7 and 8 made use of inferred causality to test alternative 
explanations for the findings of experiments 1-6. Experiment 7 compared three models 
derived from the predictions of causal and agency accounts of temporal binding. A novel 
apparatus using a laser and light sensor was used to remove all non-visual cues to the onset 
of either of the two judged events in each trial. Participants were asked to reproduce the 
delay interval between event pairs in self-causal, machine-causal and non-causal conditions. 
The results suggested that temporal binding can be observed with the use of visual stimuli, 
random delay intervals and interval reproduction. Furthermore, temporal binding appeared to 
occur in the absence of agency but was further increased by agency. It should be noted that 
although an increase in temporal binding in self-action conditions has been reported 
previously (Buehner, 2012; 2015) it is not easily accounted for by current theoretical 
accounts of temporal binding. However, it is possible, under the causal account of temporal 
binding, that temporal binding had also occurred between the disappearing of the laser 
beam and the event preceding it – the initiation of the hand movement in self-action 
conditions or the turning of the wheel in machine-action conditions. It is not clear whether 
this might have affected the different causal conditions to a different extent, however. 
Nevertheless, if such an effect did occur it would be expected to reduce the magnitude of the 
temporal binding effect or cause a shift in the perceived time of the judged interval toward 
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the first event. The presence of a contraction of the subjective delay interval suggests that 
temporal binding had taken place despite these possible influences.  
Experiment 8 controlled for the predictability of outcomes. A key difference between 
experiments 1-6 and most temporal binding experiments was that participants had access to 
external visual cues to the onset of the second event in and the duration of the delay interval 
in each sequence. Previous research does not indicate that predictability leads to a 
reduction in temporal binding (e.g. Cravo et al., 2011; Haggard et al., 2002; Ruess et al., 
2017). However, in these experiments predictability was determined by the consistency of 
delay intervals, i.e. whether they varied between trials within a block of trials or not, rather 
than external cues. Of particular interest here is whether the availability of external cues 
would lead to a decreased reliance on internal prior assumptions that causally related events 
are likely to be temporally contiguous, as might be predicted based on the causal account of 
temporal binding. Experiment 8 made use of a typical keypress-response temporal binding 
paradigm and the Libet clock method. To vary predictability, on some trials the centre of the 
Libet clock changed gradually in colour from white to green for the duration of the delay 
interval. This experiment found a significantly greater shift of the perceived time of the 
outcome toward the action in self-causal compared with non-causal trials, in trials where 
visual cues were present. No significant difference was found when no such cue was 
present, suggesting that increased predictability enhanced temporal binding, rather than 
diminishing it. The predictability of the outcome event in experiments 1-6 is therefore unlikely 
to have led to the lack of evidence for temporal binding.  
The findings of Experiment 8 should be considered with the caveat that the 
experiment did not exactly replicate the gap stimuli used in Experiments 1-6, or the 
measures of time perception used in those experiments. Here, the gap stimulus was altered 
as the findings of Experiment 5 suggest that even in the absence of motion a series of 
objects disappearing in sequence may create visual impressions of causality. This means 
the signal used in place of the gap stimulus is continuous rather than made up of a series of 
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discrete visual events and the results suggest a lack of effect of an external visual cue rather 
than all possible effects of the gap stimulus. Further, these findings in event perception 
should be applied to temporal binding in time perception with caution, as temporal binding 
findings are not always replicable between event and time perception measures. Lastly, this 
experiment only investigated outcome binding (as the signal does not alter the predictability 
of the time of the action) and made use of both visual and auditory event. Consequently, the 
findings of this study constitute strong evidence against a general effect of predictability on 
temporal binding, whereby increased predictability due to external visual cues would lead to 
a reduction in temporal binding. This does not necessarily indicate that the same effect takes 
place when participants make interval judgements or in the specific settings of Experiments 
1-6. 
5.1. Possible objections to the class of stimuli used in experiments 1-6 
Experiments 1-6 made use of novel phenomenal causality stimuli, based on recent 
research by White (2015). These experiments were carried out under the assumption that 
the stimuli and sequence of events taking place in the temporal gap between the cause and 
effect acted as visual cues to generative transmission, implying a transfer of causal force 
from the launcher to the target object. Experiments 1-6, in addition to the experiments 
reported by White, repeatedly found that participants reported high causal impressions when 
cues to generative transmission were present. Visually similar gap stimuli that did not imply 
generative transmission (backward gap sequences) yielded similar causal ratings to those 
found when no gap sequence was present. This confirms that backward colour change 
sequences did not moderate the typical reduction in visual impressions of causality due to 
temporal delays between cause and effect. Because of this and due to being more visually 
similar to forward colour change sequences than empty gap sequences, backward gap 
sequences were used as low-causality control conditions throughout experiments 1-6. 
Apparent motion can be suggested to have caused participants to perceive the 
colour change sequence as a third “launching” object which expanded from one side of the 
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spatial gap to the other, due to apparent motion. The question of apparent motion was 
addressed by White (2015) who found that the launching effect persisted even when the gap 
objects disappeared in sequence, where apparent motion could not have taken place.   
A further objection to the use of these stimuli might be that the stimuli used here 
represented a “domino effect”, whereby the colour change sequence was perceived as a 
sequence of causally related events, rather than the gap sequence acting as an abstract 
representation of a medium by which causal force can be transferred across a spatial and 
temporal gap. The launching object would therefore be perceived as the cause of the first 
colour change, while all subsequent events would be perceived as following from the 
preceding event. It is not known whether events and temporally bound only to their 
immediate causes and effects; temporal binding research to date has only investigated 
causal chains of up to three events (Yabe et al., 2017). Yabe et al.’s research found 
evidence that temporal may take place between multiple events within a three-event chain 
but did not investigate binding between the first and third events in a three-event chain. 
However, Yabe et al.’s study showed that an event may be temporally bound toward both 
the preceding and following event, meaning temporal binding may be cancelled in these 
cases. It may be that participants perceived a series of causally related events as taking 
place during gap sequences, with each temporally bound to the preceding event, resulting in 
the absence of temporal binding. While this remains a possibility, care should be taken in 
applying Yabe et al.’s findings to the studies described here as Yabe et al.’s study made use 
of the Libet clock method and measured event, rather than time perception. As discussed 
previously, some differences have been found between temporal binding in event perception 
and time perception and the extent to which event perception contributes to the contraction 
of the perceived interval between cause and effect is unknown at this time.  
 An assumption implicit in all accounts of temporal binding is that events are 
temporally bound to some, but not all causally related events. This is because if all events 
were equally perceptually bound to both previous and subsequent events, no temporal 
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binding effect would be expected. In the mechanisms involved in keypress-tone event 
sequences, for instance, participants cause the key to depress, which completes a circuit 
and initiates computer operations resulting in the output of the tone. The immediate cause of 
the tone is therefore the unseen computer operations, rather than the action of the 
participant. Nevertheless, the pressing of the key is expected to be perceived as the cause 
of the tone. For this reason, as in White’s (2015) research, in Experiments 1-6 participants 
were asked to report their impression of the first object to move as causing the launch of the 
target, rather than simply their impression of whether a causal event had taken place. The 
high causal ratings found in forward gap sequences suggest that participants perceived the 
“collision” of the launcher with the gap stimuli as the cause of the launch, rather than an 
intermediary event. This is similar to other evidence showing that even in “tool effect” stimuli, 
where an intermediary object is present between the launcher and target, participants 
perceive the first object to move as the cause of the motion of the target object (e.g. 
Michotte, 1963/46). As such, in order for the perception of a “domino” or tool effect to result 
in the absence of temporal binding, such an effect must only take place when participants 
are aware of the time at which the intermediary causal event had taken place, but not when 
the time of this event cannot be determined, as is the case in most temporal binding studies. 
In a similar vein, it could be suggested that the collision of the launcher with the gap 
stimuli may be interpreted as having multiple consequences. The collision of the launcher 
with the gap objects can be viewed as causing the colour change sequence in addition to 
the “launch” of the target. Whether temporal binding occurs only between events and their 
most direct consequences, rather than between events and all their causal consequences, 
has not been investigated to date. However, in most temporal binding studies, actions lead 
to immediate effects, such as auditory and tactile feedback for the key/lever being pressed, 
in addition to the subsequent tone or flash. Given that evidence for evidence of temporal 
binding has been found despite this, it does not appear likely that the perception of multiple 
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consequences attributed to the same cause would prevent temporal binding from taking 
place. 
The evidence points to the gap sequences used here as maintaining causal 
impressions over temporal and spatial gaps by implying a transfer of force from the launcher 
to the target object. This, in addition to the consistently distinct causal impressions reported 
by participants suggests that the causal impressions generated by the class of stimuli used 
here were appropriate in studying temporal binding in phenomenal causality. Several 
potential drawbacks of this class of stimuli were discussed in this section. However, the 
existing literature does not support any of these as likely causes for the absence of evidence 
for temporal binding in Experiments 1-6. Likewise, theoretical accounts of temporal binding 
would not predict that these would lead to a lack of temporal binding. 
5.2. Can the lack of temporal binding in phenomenal causality be explained by 
low-level perceptual differences? 
A key difference between most temporal binding studies and experiments 1-6 is the 
presence of visual feedback at the onset of the events before and after the judged interval. 
Although participants made motor movements during self-causal trials, the time of the 
collision of the launcher object with the gap stimuli could not be inferred from proprioceptive 
or tactile feedback. This can be assumed as the beginning of the gap sequences was 
initiated depending on the position of the launcher object, rather than in response to any 
movement of the computer mouse by the participant. Although previous studies have 
replicated temporal binding with the use of visual outcomes (e.g. Engbert et al., 2008; Ruess 
et al. 2018), the intentional actions used in temporal binding studies typically include tactile 
and auditory feedback at the time of the lever/key-press. To address this, in experiment 7 
visual feedback alone was available at the onset of the events before and after the judged 
interval in all conditions. Experiment 7 succeeded in replicating temporal binding in the 
absence of non-visual sensory feedback at the onset of causes and their outcomes, with the 
use of the same interval reproduction procedure used in experiments 4-6, and a similar 
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number of participants and trials as used in experiments 4-6. The absence of multisensory 
feedback and the use of visual feedback alone do not appear to be likely explanations for 
the lack of temporal binding observed in experiments 1-6, therefore. 
Experiments 1 and 4 both made use of conditions in which no gap objects were 
visible between the launcher and target objects, and no gap sequence took place. In both, 
this resulted in significantly higher over-estimations of the delay intervals compared with 
animations containing a gap sequence. As causal ratings in the absence of a gap sequence 
were similar to those found for backward gap sequences, causal impressions cannot 
account for this effect. The very presence of a colour change sequence, regardless of 
whether it acted as a cue to generative transmission, appears to have affected perceived 
delay intervals, therefore. The key question in interpreting the findings of experiments 1-6 is 
whether low-level perceptual differences between conditions may have eliminated a 
temporal binding effect which might otherwise have been observed. However, it is the 
relative differences in interval estimates/reproduced intervals, rather than absolute 
magnitude of these estimates, that are of interest in investigating temporal binding. 
Therefore, an effect of low-level perceptual differences between conditions can only have 
eliminated temporal binding if either a) this effect did not affect all gap sequence conditions 
equally, or b) the effect prevented any influence of causal perception on perceived interval 
durations. 
Experiments 4 and 5 failed to rule out an effect of changes in eye movement due to 
differences in the spatial focus of attention between forward and backward gap sequence 
animations. Past research has found a compression of the perceived length of intervals 
presented during saccadic eye movements (Morrone et al., 2005). As such, if participants 
made more eye movements during non-causal animations this may have resulted in shorter 
estimates of interval durations, leading to a similar contraction in the perceived interval 
duration in visually non-causal conditions as would be expected in visually causal conditions 
due to temporal binding. While in forward gap sequence animations the focus of attention 
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moved consistently from the left to the right side of the screen, in backward gap sequence 
animations this shifted from left (collision) to right (beginning of the gap sequence), right to 
left (the gap sequence) and back to the right (launch). This suggests the possibility that a 
greater number of eye movements were made during backward gap sequence animations, if 
participants failed to fixate on the fixation cross. Two caveats to this possible explanation of 
the findings, must be considered, however. Firstly, it requires the assumption that the 
contraction in perceived delays due to eye movements was consistently of a similar 
magnitude to the effect of temporal binding across all conditions. In experiments 2 and 3 this 
would have also had to occur in offset gap animations which were visually different from both 
forward and backward animation types, with middling causal ratings. Secondly, this 
explanation assumes that a sufficient number of participants affected the findings by not 
following the instructions to fixate on the fixation point. Overall, it is unlikely that differences 
in eye movement between gap sequence types can explain the lack of evidence for temporal 
binding in experiments 1-6, for the reasons discussed above.  
However, this does not rule other possible effects of differences in the spatial focus 
of attention between different gap sequence types. Attention has been proposed to have a 
role in time perception (e.g. see Lejeune, 1998) whereby an increase in the attentional 
resources focussed on the passage of time results in a slowing of the perceived rate of the 
passage of time and longer perceived interval durations. Conversely, the shifting of 
attentional resources from the passage of time results in time being perceived as passing 
more quickly and interval durations appearing shorter. In the case of Experiments 1-6 it is 
possible that backward gap sequence types may have attracted attention to a greater extent 
than forward gap sequence animations due to the absence of a coherent direction of motion. 
For the same reason, it is further possible that participants were better able to distinguish the 
collision and launch from preceding events in backward colour change sequence. This is as 
the sequence of events was less continuous than forward colour change sequence 
animations and, therefore, the collision and launch may have appeared more salient. 
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However, discussed above in relation to the effects of eye movement, both of these 
explanations require that the perception differences between gap sequence types are 
consistently sufficient to eliminate a temporal binding effect which would otherwise be 
present, across all 6 experiments. In addition, this may only explain the findings under the 
causal account of temporal binding, which predicts temporal binding in Experiments 1-5 
despite the absence of intentionality. In contrast, agency accounts would only predict 
temporal binding in Experiment 6 and therefore, if differences in eye movement, attention, or 
the salience of events between forward and backward colour change sequences affected 
time perception temporal estimates should have been significantly smaller in backward gap 
sequence animations, in the absence of agency. This, however, was not the case, with the 
exception of Experiment 5. 
The alternative to temporal binding being masked by differences in low-level 
perceptual influences between conditions, as discussed above, is that temporal binding did 
not occur at all due to the perceptual features of the stimuli used in Experiments 1-6. As 
mentioned previously, in Experiments 1 and 4 the presence of a colour change sequence, 
regardless of its direction, led to significantly smaller estimates of the delay interval 
compared with animations with no visible colour change sequence. This finding is surprising 
due to the well-established “filled duration illusion” (e.g. Buffardi, 19 1). In this illusion 
temporal intervals filled with visual or auditory events are perceived as longer than “empty” 
intervals, whereas the converse was observed in experiments 1 and 4. A key difference, 
however, is that the gap stimuli served as a cue to the end of the gap interval, whereas in 
investigations of the filled duration illusion participants typically do not know when the judged 
interval will end in advance. Although experiments 1 and 4 showed no evidence of a filled 
duration illusion taking place during visible gap sequence trials, a clear effect of the colour 
change sequences on interval perception was found. It is currently unknown how the 
temporal binding effect interacts with other temporal illusions - whether the effects are 
additive, or whether the presence of other temporal illusions moderates or even eliminates 
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the temporal binding. Therefore, it remains possible the regularity of the colour changes may 
have prevented the influences of causality and agency on interval perception, although the 
mechanisms by which this could have occurred are unclear.  
It could be claimed that the predictability of interval durations may have eliminated 
temporal binding by making the task “too easy” by providing external visual cues to the 
onset, duration and end of the judged intervals. Such a claim would assume that higher 
predictability would lead participants to rely less on internal cues when estimating interval 
durations. Based on the causal account of temporal binding, this would reflect a decreased 
reliance on the prior assumption that causally related events are likely to be contiguous on 
the perceived interval and an increased reliance on external sensory cues. This, however, is 
not supported by the existing evidence for an effect of predictability on temporal binding. 
Although the evidence to date is mixed - some studies have found temporal binding to be 
greater when predictability is increased (e.g. Cravo et al., 2011; Haggard et al., 2002) while 
others have found no such effect (e.g. Ruess et al., 2017) – it does not suggests that 
increased predictability diminishes temporal binding. However, the above studies 
manipulated predictability by altering the consistency of delay intervals (different delay 
intervals were presented in a randomised order rather than within separate blocks). While 
such manipulations indeed make the intervals more predictable, they do not do so with the 
use of external visual cues as was the case in experiments 1-6. Experiment 8 was carried 
out to test whether such external cues affect temporal binding and found evidence for an 
increase in temporal binding when predictability was increased. Participants performed a 
typical temporal binding task using a Libet clock, with separate blocks containing either no 
visual cues or a continuous visual cue taking place for the duration of the delay interval and 
providing a visual cue to the end of the interval. The increase in predictability was found to 
increase, rather than reduce, outcome binding. Based on this finding, along with others 
described above, it is unlikely that the predictability of the stimuli or the presence of external 
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sensory cues had reduced temporal binding. On the contrary, if temporal binding had 
occurred, the effect is likely to have been greater due to increased predictability. 
Past findings and the experiments presented in this thesis failed to eliminate some 
possible influences of low-level perceptual differences between stimuli on the lack of 
evidence for temporal binding in experiments 1-6. Differences in saccadic eye movements 
due to changes in the spatial focus of attention and the physical features of the gap 
sequences (regular sequences of visual events) cannot be ruled out. Both explanations, 
however, require some additional assumptions. While it cannot be verified whether 
participants successfully followed instructions to focus on the fixation cross during each trial, 
it seems unlikely that the effect of differences in eye movements would consistently lead to 
changes to time perception able to cancel out evidence of temporal binding, across different 
animation types with varying causal impressions. It should also be noted that eye 
movements were restricted by the use of a fixation cross, as in other temporal binding 
studies. Likewise, the regular sequence of visual events taking place during gap intervals 
appears to have affected perceived interval durations. However, there is no explanation for 
how this could have affected different gap sequence directions in different ways. It is further 
unclear why this would eliminate all other influences on the perceived duration of the delay, 
such as causality/intentionality or event perception. 
5.3. Phenomenal causality and agency accounts of temporal binding 
The issue of whether causality alone is sufficient for temporal binding remains 
contentious. Some studies, including experiment 7 reported here and experiments by 
Buehner (2012; 2015) have found evidence for this, while others have reported an increase 
in temporal binding due to agency (e.g. Caspar et al., 2016; Wohlschlager et al., 2003a; 
Wohlschlager et al., 2003b). Indeed, experiment 7 found evidence for an increase in 
temporal binding due to agency in addition to causality. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed 
that causality is necessary for temporal binding to take place. Experiment 6 made use of 
animations in which participants manually controlled the launcher object and found no 
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evidence of temporal binding regardless of agency. It is unlikely, therefore, that the lack of 
temporal binding in experiments 1-5 can be explained by the lack of agency in those studies.  
Cravo et al. (2009) found evidence for temporal binding in phenomenal causality, but 
only when the launcher was controlled by the participant. This is typically interpreted as 
evidence that both the perception of causality and agency are necessary for temporal 
binding to take place (for instance, see Moore & Obhi, 2012). However, agency accounts 
make no clear prediction as to whether visual impressions of causality are sufficient for 
temporal binding to occur, and as such either temporal binding in phenomenal causality or a 
lack thereof can be difficult to interpret under these accounts. This is as visual impressions 
of causality are illusory by their nature. Participants observing launching animations report 
their impressions of causality while simultaneously aware that these stimuli are two-
dimensional representations of causal events, rather than real objects.  
In both Cravo et al.’s experiment and Experiments 6, participants’ actions caused the 
movement of the target objects in all animation types. Whether the animations created a 
visual impression of causality did not determine the effect of participants’ actions on the 
events that followed. Visual impressions of causality were therefore in conflict with inferred 
causality, and indeed the actual causal mechanism taking place. There is further no 
evidence from either study for a cumulative effect of both forms of causal perception: 
estimated intervals were not significantly longer when they lacked both a visually perceived 
and inferred causal structure. However, Dogge et al. (2012) found evidence for temporal 
binding between a keypress and its outcome when participants were asked to imagine they 
are in control of their movements, despite their fingers being moved passively. Dogge et al.’s 
findings demonstrate that imagined causality and agency can be sufficient for temporal 
binding to take place, even when the participant is aware of the actual causal structure of the 
task. If imagined causality and agency can lead to temporal binding, it is plausible that 
illusory causal impressions could contribute to temporal binding. 
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It remains unclear why experiment 6 did not replicate the findings of Cravo et al. 
Experiment 6 aimed to improve on Cravo et al.’s design. The number of participants and 
trials was increased, and a simulated self-movement condition was added to control for the 
perceptual differences between self- and computer-generated patterns of motion. As such 
the findings are not easily explained by a lack of statistical power or perceptual differences 
between self-causal and other conditions. In addition, participants were given increased 
control over the movement of the launcher, including the direction of movement and 
momentum, in order to ensure the perception of agency was as high as possible. In contrast, 
it can be argued that Cravo et al.’s participants were not in full control of the launcher, but 
able only to play or pause the animation, by holding down or releasing the mouse button, 
respectively. The methods used in Experiment 6 resulted in less experimental control over 
the speed and direction of the motion of the launcher object, adding an additional perceptual 
difference between conditions. It is possible that this resulted in the absence of temporal 
binding in some way. However, no significant differences were found between the control, 
simulated self-movement condition and either the linear movement or self-movement 
conditions, suggesting that this was not the case. Furthermore, Cravo et al. did not report 
any constraints of participants’ eye movements, such as a fixation cross or instructions to 
fixate on a particular part of the screen. It is possible, as discussed previously, that 
differences saccadic eye movements had affected temporal estimates unequally between 
conditions.  
Discussion of the role of causality in agency accounts of temporal binding is usually 
limited to investigations of whether causality is necessary or sufficient for the effect to occur. 
It is typically assumed that temporal binding only takes place between actions and their 
perceived consequences (e.g. Moorre & Obhi, 2012; Desantis et al., 2011). – indeed, 
“intentional binding”, as first reported, was defined as an attraction in perceived time 
between intentional action and their sensory consequences. Agency accounts of temporal 
binding had not considered phenomenal causality as distinct from inferred causality, 
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including in the interpretation of the findings of Cravo et al. (2009). Instead, causal attribution 
often is studied as a single variable (e.g. Desantis et al., 2011; Haggard et al., 2002). Fewer 
investigations had been carried out where causal beliefs and actual causality are in conflict 
(e.g. Dogge et al., 2012). Cravo et al.’s findings suggest either that temporal binding can 
only occur if visual causal impressions and inferred causality are in agreement, or that 
stimuli visually perceived as non-causal eliminate temporal binding. However, this was not 
replicated in Experiment 6. The findings of experiment 6 were equally surprising under 
agency accounts of temporal binding. Not only did visual impressions of causality not lead to 
a temporal binding effect, but no temporal binding appeared to take place between 
participants’ actions and their consequences. These results cannot be explained either by a 
lack of temporal binding in phenomenal causality.  
More research is required to determine how conflicting causal impressions and 
beliefs modulate temporal binding, and the theoretical reasons why this might occur. 
Although it is possible that the illusion of causality caused by the launching effect has a 
similar effect to the imagined causality studied by Dogge et al. (2012). However, findings of 
Dogge et al., as well as those of Desantis et al. (2011), demonstrate a top-down influence of 
beliefs of causality/intentionality. In contrast, phenomenal causality is suggested to be 
processed visually (e.g. Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) and is processed rapidly and 
automatically, without the need for higher-level processing. This would suggest that any 
influence of inferred causality on motor predictions would not take place in the same manner 
as imagined causality. 
5.4. Is temporal binding specific to inferred causality? 
The lack of evidence for temporal binding in phenomenal causality raises the 
possibility that temporal binding arises from causal inferences alone and not visual 
impressions of causality. While Cravo et al.’s (2009) findings suggest temporal binding due 
to phenomenal causality is possible, their study has not been replicated since and alternative 
explanations for their findings have not been ruled out at the time of writing. For instance, the 
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stimuli used were not perceptually similar due to differences in the direction of movement of 
the launching objects. This is further complicated by the lack of control over participants’ eye 
movements. Any general inferences about the role of phenomenal causality in temporal 
binding cannot be made based on Cravo et al.’s findings alone, particularly as they were 
contradicted by the findings of experiment 6 reported here. As noted above, it is difficult to 
account for phenomenal causality in agency accounts of temporal binding as causality had 
not been the focus of the majority of temporal binding research and theory. Under the causal 
account of temporal binding, however, an absence of temporal binding in phenomenal 
causality may indicate that time perception is not influenced by visual impressions of 
causality in the same way as inferred causality.  
The causal account of temporal binding proposes a bidirectional relationship between 
the perception of causality and time: just as temporally contiguous events are more likely to 
be perceived as causally related, binding is suggested to result from causally related events 
being perceived as likely to be temporally contiguous (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002). As is 
the case in inferred causality, temporal contiguity has been found to be important in the 
formation of visual causal impressions (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3 for more detail on 
temporal contiguity and phenomenal causality. 
By implication, if temporal binding does not occur due to phenomenal causality, the 
relationship between time perception and visual causal would have to be one-sided, with 
temporal cues informing causal impressions, while causal impressions do not affect temporal 
judgements. Scholl and Tremoulet (2000) proposed that that phenomenal causality is 
processed visually and that the perceptual processes responsible for phenomenal causality 
are encapsulated from other processes. The processing of temporal cues contributing to 
phenomenal causality would have to be similarly encapsulated from other time perception 
processes. 
However, recent research has found evidence for visual causal impressions leading 
to a contraction in the perceived distance between launching objects, which the authors 
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suggested resulted from the implicit assumption that causally related events are likely to be 
spatially contiguous (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). Likewise, Bechlivanidis and Lagnado 
(2016) found that causal assumptions in launching animations can lead to an illusory 
reversal of the perceived temporal order of events. These findings suggest that visual 
impressions of causality can indeed affect the perception of space and time. Such findings, 
although qualitatively different from temporal binding, are predicted by the causal account of 
temporal binding, which does not presuppose that the influence of prior assumptions based 
on causal perception would apply only to time perception.  
The question of whether phenomenal causality is processed by an encapsulated 
module is beyond the scope of this thesis. The inference that temporal binding is unique to 
inferred causality cannot be made based on the findings presented here and the temporal 
binding literature to date. The studies discussed above suggest a clear relationship between 
causal impressions and other perceptual processes, in addition to the well-documented 
effects of temporal cues on causal impressions. To infer that phenomenal causality does not 
contribute to temporal binding requires two additional assumptions: that visual impressions 
of causality are processed in a separate module from inferred causality, that this processing 
does not affect interval judgements. Both the research presented here and Cravo et al.’s 
research made use of “launching” impressions to manipulate perceived causality, whereas 
other, qualitatively different forms of visual causal impressions have also been found (see 
Hubbard, 2011, for a review of these findings). As such, care should be taken in generalising 
the findings reported here to all forms of visual causal impressions. 
5.5. Conclusion 
Experiments 1-6 have found no clear evidence for temporal binding in phenomenal 
causality, while experiments 7 and 8 eliminated some potential explanation for these 
findings. The results expected if temporal binding had taken place due to phenomenal 
causality, based on both causal and agency accounts, had not occurred. In addition, 
experiment 6 did not find evidence for temporal binding between intentional actions and their 
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consequences when participants controlled the launcher object in similar animations to those 
used in Experiments 1-6.  
These results are difficult to account for under both agency accounts and the causal 
account of temporal binding. This raises the possibility that findings had been affected in an 
unforeseen way by the stimuli used here. While the use of interval estimation and interval 
reproduction tasks and the use of visual stimuli had been validated by Experiment 7, the use 
of phenomenal causality and the colour change sequences used here are novel in temporal 
binding research. As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is possible that temporal binding did 
not take place due to the causal structure perceived in these animations, or that temporal 
estimates and were affected by the perceptual features of the animations in a way which had 
eliminated temporal binding. 
The above hypotheses have been largely unexplored to date. More specifically, very 
little research has been carried out investigating temporal binding in causal chains of more 
than two events (with the exception of Yabe et al., 2017) or between actions and their 
multiple consequences. Similarly, it is not known how temporal binding interacts with other 
factors influencing time perception, such as attention, movement and the accuracy of 
temporal judgements. There is clear scope for future research on temporal binding which 
could not only enhance our understanding of its underlying mechanisms but enable us to 
understand the circumstances under which temporal binding does not take place, and how 
this may affect the findings of temporal binding research. This is of particular importance in 
studies comparing causal and non-casual events, or intentional actions and other events, 
where it is difficult to create different conditions which differ in causality or agency while 
remaining otherwise perceptually identical.  
The attempt to interpret the findings of the experiments presented here under agency 
accounts of temporal binding demonstrates the difficulty in accounting for causality in these 
models. These often make no clear predictions regarding causality other than it must be 
necessary for temporal binding to occur. Whether causal or agency accounts can be 
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demonstrated to best explain temporal binding, little is known about how, rather than simply 
whether, causality contributes to the effect. The disproportionate focus on agency in 
temporal binding research is surprising given that causality and agency appear to be at least 
equally necessary for temporal binding to take place. Further investigation of the role of 
causality in temporal binding have the potential to greatly further our knowledge of the effect.  
 Under the causal account of temporal binding the results of Experiments 1-6 are 
particularly surprising. It is unclear why phenomenal causality should not affect temporal 
judgements in a similar way to inferred causality given that phenomenal causality is at least 
as sensitive to temporal contiguity, if not more so. As discussed earlier, if other perceptual 
influences cannot explain the findings reported here it may indicate a difference in how 
visual causal impressions and causal inferences contribute to time perception, although this 
is beyond the scope of the research reported here.  
Overall, although temporal binding had attracted much attention since it was first 
reported in 2002, many potential research questions remain unexplored. The difficulty in 
accounting for the findings of Experiments 1-6 demonstrates the need for more research on 
temporal binding in phenomenal causality and the need for greater variety of stimuli and 
apparatus in temporal binding research, such as the actions performed by participants and 
the sensory feedback available throughout the task. More research is needed to establish 
the exact role of causality in temporal binding and temporal binding in more complex settings 
and causal structures. While much has been discovered about the effect to date, there is 
further potential for temporal binding research to inform our understanding of the perception 
of causality, agency and time and how all three interact.  
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7. Appendix A: full instructions provided to participants in experiments 1-6 
Below are the full main instructions describing the stimuli and tasks to participants, in 
experiments 1-6. These were presented at the beginning of each experimental block of trials, 
before the practice section. 
7.1.1. Instructions presented to participants before the causal block in 
experiment 1 
In this experiment you will see a series of short movies, about two or three seconds 
in duration. When you see the movies, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red 
fixation cross.  
In each movie you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some point 
the black rectangle might come into contact with a row of rectangles, depending on the 
condition. After the black rectangle stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the 
row will start to move. 
We are interested in your impression of whether the black rectangle brings about the 
motion of the white rectangle. This might sound odd, since the black rectangle does not 
come into contact with the white rectangle. However, it is still possible to have the visual 
impression that the black rectangle makes the white rectangle move even though they don't 
come into contact. For each movie you will be asked the following question: 
"Did you have the impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of 
the white rectangle?" 
You should answer this question by providing a number from 0 to 100. If you had an 
impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of the white rectangle, put a 
rating somewhere between 0 and 100 depending on how strong the impression was. A 
rating of 100 indicates a very strong impression, whereas a rating of 0 indicates that did not 
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have an impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion the white rectangle at 
all, and that the white rectangle moved of its own accord. 
You will now see several practice movies so you can get familiar with the procedure. 
For each movie you will have to provide a causal estimate. 
Please read these instructions again and then press SPACE to begin the practice 
trials. 
7.1.2. Instructions presented to participants before the temporal block 
in experiment 1 
“In this experiment you will see a series of short movies, about two or three seconds 
in duration. When you see the movies, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red 
fixation cross.  
In each movie you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some point 
the black rectangle might come into contact with a row of rectangles, depending on the 
condition. After the black rectangle stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the 
row will start to move. 
We are interested in your time perception with respect to these events. 
More specifically, we want to know how much time you think has passed between the 
stopping of the black rectangle and the onset of motion of the white rectangle. For each 
movie you will be asked the following question: 
"How much time passed between the stopping of the left rectangle and the motion 
onset of the right rectangle (in milliseconds)" 
You should answer this question by providing a number from 0ms(no time at all) to 
1000ms. Please remember that 1 second = 1000 milliseconds. None of the intervals you will 
be asked to judge will be longer than 1000 milliseconds. 
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You will now see several practice movies so you can get familiar with the procedure. 
After each, you will have to provide a temporal estimate in milliseconds.” 
Please read these instructions again and then press SPACE to begin the practice 
trials.  
 
7.1.3. Instructions presented to participants before the causal block in 
experiment 2 
In this experiment you will see a series of short movies, about two or three seconds 
in duration. When you see the movies, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red 
fixation cross.  
In each movie you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some point 
the black rectangle might come into contact with a row of rectangles, depending on the 
condition. After the black rectangle stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the 
row will start to move. 
We are interested in your impression of whether the black rectangle brings about the 
motion of the white rectangle. This might sound odd, since the black rectangle does not 
come into contact with the white rectangle. However, it is still possible to have the visual 
impression that the black rectangle makes the white rectangle move even though they don't 
come into contact. For each movie you will be asked the following question: 
"Did you have the impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of 
the white rectangle?" 
You should answer this question by providing a number from 0 to 100. If you had an 
impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of the white rectangle, put a 
rating somewhere between 0 and 100 depending on how strong the impression was. A 
rating of 100 indicates a very strong impression, whereas a rating of 0 indicates that did not 
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have an impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion the white rectangle at 
all, and that the white rectangle moved of its own accord. 
You will now see several practice movies so you can get familiar with the procedure. 
For each movie you will have to provide a causal estimate. 
Please read these instructions again and then press SPACE to begin the practice 
trials. 
 
7.1.4. Instructions presented to participants before the temporal block 
in experiment 2 
In this experiment you will see a series of short movies, about two or three seconds 
in duration. When you see the movies, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red 
fixation cross.  
In each movie you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some point 
the black rectangle might come into contact with a row of rectangles, depending on the 
condition. After the black rectangle stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the 
row will start to move. 
We are interested in your time perception with respect to these events. 
More specifically, we want to know how much time you think has passed between the 
stopping of the black rectangle and the onset of motion of the white rectangle. For each 
movie you will be asked the following question: 
"How much time passed between the stopping of the left rectangle and the motion 
onset of the right rectangle (in milliseconds)" 
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You should answer this question by providing a number from 0ms (no time at all) to 
1000ms. Please remember that 1 second = 1000 milliseconds. None of the intervals you will 
be asked to judge will be longer than 1000 milliseconds. 
You will now see several practice movies so you can get familiar with the procedure. 
After each, you will have to provide a temporal estimate in milliseconds. 
Please read these instructions again and then press SPACE to begin the practice 
trials. 
 
7.1.5. Instructions presented to participants at the beginning of 
experiment 3 
In this experiment you will see a series of short movies, about two or three seconds 
in duration. When you see the movies, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red 
fixation cross.  
In each movie you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some point 
the black rectangle might come into contact with a row of rectangles, depending on the 
condition. After the black rectangle stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the 
row will start to move. 
On each trial we will ask you one of two questions. In some of the trials we will be 
interested in your impression of whether the black rectangle brings about the motion of the 
white rectangle. This might sound odd, since the black rectangle does not come into contact 
with the white rectangle. However, it is still possible to have the visual impression that the 
black rectangle makes the white rectangle move even though they don't come into contact. 
For each movie you will be asked the following question: 
"Did you have the impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of 
the white rectangle?" 
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You should answer this question by providing a number from 0 to 100. If you had an 
impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of the white rectangle, put a 
rating somewhere between 0 and 100 depending on how strong the impression was. A 
rating of 100 indicates a very strong impression, whereas a rating of 0 indicates that did not 
have an impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion the white rectangle at 
all, and that the white rectangle moved of its own accord. 
On other trials you will be asked to hold down the control key for an amount of time 
that matches the duration between the time at which the black rectangle stopped and the 
white rectangle started moving. Please try to match the duration as accurately as you can. 
You will not find out which task you will be performing until after you have seen the 
animation. 
You will now see several practice movies so you can get familiar with the procedure. 
Please read these instructions again and then press SPACE to begin the practice 
trials, or alert the experimenter if you have any questions. 
 
7.1.6. Instructions presented to participants at the beginning of the 
first block of trials in experiment 4 
This experiment is made of two blocks of trials. In each block you will see a series of 
short movies, a few seconds in duration. When you see the movies, you will need to keep 
your eyes fixated on a red fixation cross.  
In each movie you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some point 
the black rectangle will come into contact with a row of rectangles. After the black rectangle 
stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the row will start to move. On some trials 
a part of the screen might be hidden behind another object. 
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On each trial we will ask you one of two questions. In some of the trials we will be 
interested in your impression of whether the black rectangle brings about the motion of the 
white rectangle. This might sound odd, since the black rectangle does not come into contact 
with the white rectangle. However, it is still possible to have the visual impression that the 
black rectangle makes the white rectangle move even though they don't come into contact. 
For each movie you will be asked the following question: 
"Did you have the impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of 
the white rectangle?" 
You should answer this question by providing a number from 0 to 100. If you had an 
impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of the white rectangle, put a 
rating somewhere between 0 and 100 depending on how strong the impression was. A 
rating of 100 indicates a very strong impression, whereas a rating of 0 indicates that you did 
not have an impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion the white rectangle 
at all, and that the white rectangle moved of its own accord. 
On other trials you will be asked to hold down the left mouse button for an amount of 
time that matches the duration between the time at which the black rectangle stopped and 
the white rectangle started moving. Please try to match the duration as accurately as you 
can. You will not find out which task you will be performing until after you have seen the 
animation. 
At the beginning of each block you will see several practice movies so you can get 
familiarised with the procedure. 
Please read these instructions again and then press [P] to proceed to the first block 
of trials, or alert the experimenter if you have any questions. 
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7.1.7. Instructions presented to participants at the beginning of 
“movement” block of trials in experiment 5 
In this block of trials you will see a series of short animations. When you see the 
animations, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red fixation cross.  
In each animation you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some 
point the black rectangle will come into contact with a row of smaller rectangles. After the tall 
black rectangle stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the row will start to move. 
 
On each trial we will ask you about your impression of whether the black rectangle 
brought about the motion of the white rectangle. This might sound odd, since the tall black 
rectangle does not come into contact with the white rectangle. However, it is still possible to 
have the visual impression that the black rectangle makes the white rectangle move even 
though they don't come into contact. For each movie you will be asked the following 
question: 
"Did you have the impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of 
the white rectangle?" 
You should answer this question by providing a number from 0 to 100. If you had an 
impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of the white rectangle, put a 
rating somewhere between 0 and 100 depending on how strong the impression was. A 
rating of 100 indicates a very strong impression, whereas a rating of 0 indicates that you did 
not have an impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion the white rectangle 
at all, and that the white rectangle moved of its own accord. 
Please read these instructions again and then press [C] to continue, or alert the 
experimenter if you have any questions. 
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7.1.8. Instructions presented to participants at the beginning of the 
“signal” block of trials in experiment 5 
In this block of trials you will see a series of short animations. When you see the 
animations, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red fixation cross.  
In each animation you will see a tall black rectangle beside a row of shorter 
rectangles, and a tall white rectangle on the other side of the row of shorter rectangles. In 
each trial the tall black rectangle will disappear, followed by the white rectangle 
disappearing. 
On each trial we will ask you about your impression of whether the black rectangle 
disappearing made the white rectangle disappear. This might sound odd, since the black 
rectangle does not come into contact with the white rectangle. However, it is still possible to 
have the visual impression that the black rectangle makes the white rectangle disappear 
even though they don't come into contact. For each movie you will be asked the following 
question: 
"Did you have the impression that the black rectangle made the white rectangle 
disappear?" 
You should answer this question by providing a number from 0 to 100. If you had an 
impression that the black rectangle made the white rectangle disappear, put a rating 
somewhere between 0 and 100 depending on how strong the impression was. A rating of 
100 indicates a very strong impression, whereas a rating of 0 indicates that you did not have 
an impression that the black rectangle made the white rectangle disappear at all, and that 
the white rectangle disappeared of its own accord. 
Please read these instructions again and then press [C] to continue, or alert the 
experimenter if you have any questions. 
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7.1.9. Instructions presented to participants at the beginning of the 
“linear” and “simulated self-causal” blocks of trials in experiment 6 
In this block of trials you will see a series of short animations. When you see the 
animations, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red fixation cross.  
In each animation you will see a black rectangle move across the screen. At some 
point the black rectangle will come into contact with a row of rectangles. After the black 
rectangle stops moving, the white rectangle at the far end of the row will start to move. 
On each trial we will ask you about your impression of whether the black rectangle 
brought about the motion of the white rectangle. This might sound odd, since the black 
rectangle does not come into contact with the white rectangle. However, it is still possible to 
have the visual impression that the black rectangle makes the white rectangle move even 
though they don't come into contact. For each movie you will be asked the following 
question: 
"Did you have the impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of 
the white rectangle?" 
You should answer this question by providing a number from 0 to 100. If you had an 
impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion of the white rectangle, put a 
rating somewhere between 0 and 100 depending on how strong the impression was. A 
rating of 100 indicates a very strong impression, whereas a rating of 0 indicates that you did 
not have an impression that the black rectangle brought about the motion the white rectangle 
at all, and that the white rectangle moved of its own accord. 
Please read these instructions again and then press [C] to continue, or alert the 
experimenter if you have any questions. 
 
201 
 
7.1.10. Instructions presented to participants at the beginning of the 
“self-causal” block of trials in experiment 6 
In this block of trials you will be interacting with a series of short animations. During 
each trial, you will need to keep your eyes fixated on a red fixation cross.  
In each trial you will see a row of grey rectangles, with a white rectangle at the end. 
There will also be a black rectangle, to the left of the row of rectangles, which you will be 
controlling using the mouse. In each trial you will need to move the black object to the right, 
until it makes contact with the row of grey rectangles. Nothing will happen if you move the 
black object too slowly. If the black rectangle was moving fast enough, the white rectangle at 
the far end of the row will start to move. Between these two events, the row of grey 
rectangles will change colour. 
You will now have several practice trials to get used to this task. 
Please read these instructions again and then press [C] to continue, or alert the 
experimenter if you have any questions. 
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8. Appendix B: additional analyses: interaction effects: experiments 1-3 
In Chapter 3, interaction effects in temporal estimate errors and interval reproduction 
errors not predicted by temporal binding. If temporal binding had taken place, main effects 
and interactions of estimate and reproduction errors were expected to mirror the effects 
found in causal ratings. As such, interactions which did not indicate a temporal binding 
effect, or did not find evidence for a moderation of temporal binding by variables other than 
causality or agency, were omitted as they were of limited theoretical value. Interactions in 
causal ratings are included here where these are of a small magnitude, do not indicate a 
crossover effect and are unlikely to be expected to cause detectable effects on perceived 
interval durations. 
8.1.1. Interaction effects in temporal estimate errors: experiment 1 
As reported in Chapter 3, a significant interaction was found between gap sequence 
type and animation speed. This interaction was explored using the same planned contrasts 
used to explore the main effect of animation type, and comparisons between the slow and 
medium, and medium and fast speeds. Interaction graphs of significant interactions can be 
seen in Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
Significant interactions were found between the continuous + covariation and 
continuous sequences at fast and medium speeds (F(1, 29) = 8.75, p = .006, ηp2 = .23), 
between the continuous and backward sequences at fast and slow speeds (F(1, 29) = 4.95, 
p = .03, ηp2 = .15), and between the backward and empty gap sequences at medium and 
slow speeds (F(1, 29) = 4.41, p = .04, ηp2 = .13). No significant interactions were found when 
comparing the forward and continuous + covariation gap sequence types at fast and medium 
speeds (F(1, 29) = .10, p = . 6, ηp2 = .003) and medium and slow speeds (F(1, 29) = 1.78, p 
= .19, ηp2 = .06). Likewise, no significant interactions were found when comparing the two 
continuous gap sequence types and medium and slow speeds (F(1, 29) = .004, p = .95, ηp2 
<.001), continuous gap sequences and backward gap sequences and medium and slow 
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speeds (F(1, 29) = .70, p = .41, ηp2 =.02) or backward and empty gap sequences and fast 
and medium speeds (F(1, 29) = .02, p = .88, ηp2 = .001).  
The comparison of the continuous + covariation and continuous gap sequences 
shows a clear crossover effect between the fast and medium speeds (Figure 8.1), in which 
estimate errors were lower for continuous gap sequences compared with continuous + 
covariation gap sequences at fast speeds, and lower at medium speeds. A similar effect can 
be seen between the continuous and backward gap sequences at fast and medium speeds, 
where a larger difference in estimate errors is seen at fast compared with medium intervals 
(Figure 8.2). Finally, the backward and empty gap sequences show a greater difference in 
estimate errors at slow compared with medium speeds.  
 
Figure 8.1. Interaction graph: temporal estimate errors by gap sequence type (Continuous + 
covariation v. continuous) and animation speed (fast v. medium). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Figure 8.2. Interaction graph: temporal estimate errors by gap sequence type (CCC v. 
backward) and animation speed (fast v. medium). Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 8.3. Interaction graph: temporal estimate errors by gap sequence type (backward v. 
empty) and animation speed (medium v. slow). Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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8.1.2. Interaction effects in causal ratings: experiment 2 
As reported in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, a significant interaction was found between 
gap sequence type and animation speed, in the analysis of mean causal ratings. The same 
planned contrasts used to investigate the main effects were carried out in order to explore 
this interaction. Contrasts found a significant interaction when comparing the forward and 
offset gap sequence types and the medium and slow speeds (F(1, 28) = 4.64, p = .04, ηp2 = 
.14); see Figure 8.4 for an interaction graph. No significant interactions were found when 
comparing the fast and medium speeds and forward and offset animations (F(1, 28) = .54, p 
= .47, ηp2 = .02), the fast and medium speeds and offset and backward gap sequences (F(1, 
28) = .24, p = .63, ηp2 = .008) or the medium and slow and offset and backward gap 
sequences (F(1, 28) = 3.69, p = .07, ηp2 = .12). The source of the interaction appears to be 
the difference in the effect of speed on causal ratings, whereby causal ratings decreased 
more between the medium and slow speeds in offset gap sequence animations, compared 
with forward gap sequence animations. However, despite this small interaction effect, clear 
relationships between gap sequence type and causal impressions, and speed and causal 
impression, can still be seen.  
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Figure 8.4. Interaction graph: mean causal rating by gap sequence type (forward v. offset) 
and animation speed (medium v. slow). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
8.1.3. Interaction effects in causal ratings: experiment 3 
As reported in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2, a significant interaction was found between 
gap sequence type and animation speed in the analysis of causal ratings. This interaction 
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significant interaction was found when comparing the medium and slow animations speeds, 
and the forward gap sequence and offset gap sequence (F(1, 25) = 5.95, p = .02, ηp2 = .19). 
Significant interaction effects were not found when comparing the fast and medium speeds 
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and the medium and slow speeds and offset and backward gap sequences (F(1, 25) = .54, p 
= .47, ηp2 = .02). The interaction appears to indicate a smaller difference in causal ratings 
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was small and did not appear to alter the overall pattern of findings shown in the main 
effects.  
 
Figure 8.5. interaction graph showing the mean causal ratings by gap sequence type 
(forward v. offset) and animation speed (medium v. slow). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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